95-1681

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.
Appellants
vs.

RAY HAYS, et al.
Appellees

On Appeal From A Three-Judge Panel Of The United States District Court For The Western District Of Louisiana

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The basic question presented is:

(1) WHETHER *MILLER v. JOHNSON* CONDEMNS ACT 1 AND LOUISIANA'S FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT AS A RACIAL GERRYMANDER IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?

The subsidiary questions are:

(2) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF *MILLER v. JOHNSON* IN HOLDING THAT RACE WAS THE "PREDOMINANT FACTOR" DRIVING THE ENACTMENT OF LOUISIANA'S CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING PLAN?

(3) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO LOUISIANA'S CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING PLAN, EVEN THOUGH ACT 1 COMPORTED WITH LOUISIANA'S CUSTOMARY AND TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES?

(4) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOUISIANA'S CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING PLAN, AS EMBODIED IN ACT 1 OF 1994, DID NOT SERVE COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS AND WAS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO FULFILL THOSE INTERESTS?

PARTIES

Actual parties to the proceeding in the United States District Court were:

(1) Ray Hays, Edward L. Adams, Susan Shaw Singleton, Gary Stokely, Patricia Slocum, Richard David, Barbara David, Terry Gillespie, Floyd Gonzalez, Richard Sanders, Parks Sansing, Bobby Williams, plaintiffs, appellees herein

(2) State of Louisiana, defendant, appellant herein

(3) Edwin W. Edwards, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, defendant

(4) Samuel B. Nunez, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the Louisiana State Senate, defendant

(5) John A. Alario, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives, defendant

(6) W. Fox McKeithen, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana, defendant

(7) Jerry Fowler, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Elections for the State of Louisiana, defendant

(8) The United States of America, defendant-intervenor, appellant herein

(9) The Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, defendant-intervenor, appellant herein

(10) Bernardine St. Cyr, Hazel J. Freeman, Donald Thibodeaux, Patrick Fontenot, Janice Frazier, Ralph Wilson, defendant-intervenors, appellants herein

(11) Congressman Cleo Fields, defendant-intervenor, appellant herein

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OPINIONS BELOW

The January 5, 1996, opinion of the three-judge United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, declaring Act 1 to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has not yet been reported and appears in the appendix ("J.S. App."), Appendix A, at J.S. App. 1. The district court's order and judgment dated January 5, 1996, enjoining further elections under Act 1 and imposing a court-ordered congressional redistricting plan, is unreported and appears in Appendix A, at J.S. App. 39. The district court's July 25, 1994, opinion and order declaring Act 1 to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is reported at 862 F.Supp. 119 (W.D.La. 1994)(Shaw C.J., concurring), *vacated*, 115 S.Ct. 2431(1995)[hereinafter *Hays II*], and appears in Appendix F, at J.S. App. 63. The district court's December 28, 1993, opinion, declaring Louisiana's first post-1990 congressional plan to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is reported at 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.La. 1993), *vacated*, 114 S.Ct. 2731(1994)[hereinafter *Hays I*], and appears in Appendix J, at J.S. App. 105. On August 27, 1992, the district court denied plaintiffs initial request for an injunction, denied the constitutional claims of plaintiffs, state and federal, and took under advisement certain issues under the Voting Rights Act. This memorandum opinion appears in Appendix K, at J.S. App. 178.

JURISDICTION

The judgment holding that Act 1 violates the Fourteenth Amendment was entered on January 5, 1996. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 7, 1996. Appendix D, at J.S. App. 58. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, this appeal is being docketed within 60 days of January 5, 1996. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1253.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1

42 U.S.C. §1973

42 U.S.C. §1973c

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the reapportionment of Louisiana's congressional districts. The judgment of the court below invalidated Louisiana's second post-1990 congressional redistricting plan, which the state enacted in April 1994 to comply with an earlier ruling of the same court striking down Louisiana's first congressional redistricting plan enacted in 1992. The merits of this case were previously before this Court in *United States v. Hays*, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995), whereby this Court reversed the decision of the district court and dismissed the case due to the plaintiffs-appellees lack of standing.

A. The State's First Congressional Redistricting Plan, Act 42.

The results of the 1990 Census required Louisiana, which has a total population of 4.2 million persons (of whom 30.6% are African American), to redraw its congressional districts. The number of representatives apportioned to Louisiana was reduced from eight and seven. In May, the Louisiana legislature enacted Act 42 of the 1992 Regular Session which redistricted Louisiana into seven congressional districts. Two of the seven congressional districts created by Act 42 were majority black districts. Preclearance of Act 42 was obtained from the U.S. Justice Department, and the state implemented the plan for the 1992 congressional elections.

B. The Legal Challenge to Act 42.

On July 22, 1992, four registered voters in Lincoln Parish, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that Act 42 violated their rights under, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. On August 26, 1992, a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction was held. At its conclusion, the district court denied the motion for preliminary judgment, dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, and took under advisement the plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. On June 28, 1993, this Court decided *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993). The district court recalled its order dismissing the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, and on August 19-20, 1993, held a two-day trial to determine whether Louisiana's plan violated the constitutional standard set forth in *Shaw*.

On December 28, 1993, the three-judge district court issued an opinion and order holding that Act 42 violated the Equal Protection Clause. Appendix J, at J.S. App. 105. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that Act 42, assuming it was supported by a compelling state interest, was not narrowly tailored. The court found that District 4, with a black voting age population ("VAP") of 63%, packed more black voters into the district than were "reasonably necessary to give blacks a realistic chance to determine the outcome of elections there." Appendix J, at J.S. App. 150. The court further criticized the unusual shape of District 4 (see map, Appendix J, at J.S. App. 158) and reasoned that "a second majority black district could have been drawn that would have done substantially less violence to traditional redistricting principles." Appendix J, at J.S. App. 153. The State appealed the decision to this Court.

While the State's appeal to this Court was pending, the Legislature enacted a new congressional plan on April 25, 1994. The new plan, Act 1, is the subject of this appeal. (See map, Appendix O, at J.S. App. 194). Following the enactment of Act 1, this Court granted Louisiana's motion to vacate the December 28, 1993 decision of the three-judge court and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of Act 1. *Louisiana v. Hays*, No. 93-1539 (Order dated June 27, 1994).

C. The State's Second Congressional Redistricting Plan, Act 1.

In revising its redistricting plan, the Louisiana Legislature sought in good faith to comply with both the Voting Rights Act and the lower court's earlier decision in *Hays I* invalidating the state's first congressional plan. In crafting the plan that became Act 1, the Legislature created two majority African American districts while also employing traditional redistricting criteria and non-racial considerations. These criteria included the drawing of reasonably compact districts, the preservation of cores of various congressional districts enacted in prior reapportionments, reasonable efforts to preserve parish and municipal boundaries, political fairness and impact on incumbents, and compliance with both the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the provisions of the Voting Rights Act.

In crafting District 4, the focus of this litigation, the State Legislature reviewed its congressional districts during the 1970's and 1980's and attempted to model the new District 4 on old Congressional District 8. New District 4, which is approximately 54% black in voting age population, extends along the Red River, Louisiana's second largest tributary. Persons living along the Red River valley have historically shared commonalities of interest, including income levels, job status, education, and social concerns.

The Legislature recognized that voting is extremely racially polarized in Louisiana and that black citizens, who comprise 30.6% of the population, do not enjoy an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates to Congress unless they constitute a majority of the voters in a district. The legislature also was mindful of the district court's 1993 finding that "a second majority black district could have been drawn that would have done substantially less violence to traditional redistricting principles," Appendix J, at J.S. App. 153, and that a district excessively "packed" with black voters would not be considered narrowly tailored. All of these considerations were successfully balanced in Act 1, which received the necessary Section 5 preclearance from the Attorney General on June 3, 1994.

D. The Legal Challenge to Act 1.

After the passage of Act 1, the four plaintiffs who had challenged Act 42 filed a motion to amend their complaint to challenge Act 1 on equal protection grounds. On July 6, 1994, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. The court also granted a motion filed by the United States to intervene as of right, but denied motions to intervene filed by black voters in District 4 and the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus. The district court set the matter for trial on the merits to begin on July 21, 1994.

Trial proceeded on July 21-22, 1994, with the State required to proceed first with its proof. At the conclusion of the State's case, before the plaintiffs had called any witnesses, the court granted the plaintiffs' oral motion for judgment as a matter of law, announcing from the bench that Act 1 was unconstitutional and enjoining the State from holding future elections under Act 1. The basis for the court's decision was its finding that District 4 as provided in Act 1 was drawn on the basis of the race of the voters and therefore constituted a racial gerrymander. The court disregarded the evidence introduced by

the defendants establishing that Act 1, including its district 4 was a result of many factors, and not solely drawn on the basis of race. Further, the court found that the state did not have a compelling interest in using race as a factor in drawing District 4. Subsequently, on July 22, 1994, the district court, ordered into effect its own congressional redistricting plan. Appendix F, at J.S. App. 87. The district court entered its written opinion on July 25, 1994. Appendix F, at J.S. App. 63.

The State defendants and the United States appealed the district court decision to this Court. The matter was orally argued on April 19, 1995. On June 29, 1995, this Court rendered a decision reversing the trial court and dismissing the suit for lack of standing. *United States v. Hays*, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995).

On July 10, 1995, the four original plaintiffs, whom this court declared were without standing to maintain the suit, sought to amend their complaint to include additional plaintiffs who resided in the fourth congressional district. Over the objections of the defendants and defendant-intervenors, the district court allowed the original plaintiffs to continue their suit and amend their complaint. The court also allowed the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, Congressman Cleo Fields, (the incumbent in District 4), and certain black voters in District 4 to intervene.

Trial was held on October 30-31,1995. The entirety of the record from the previous hearings was admitted into evidence. The other evidence introduced by the defendants and the defendant-intervenors corroborated the evidence from the prior proceedings that indicated the necessity and reasonableness of Act 1, and established that Act 1 was indeed valid under *Shaw v. Reno*, supra, and *Miller v. Johnson*, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).

Despite the evidence establishing the validity of Act 1, the district court again declared it unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its implementation. In its stead, the court or-

dered that the 1996 Louisiana congressional elections, and all subsequent congressional elections, be conducted pursuant to the court's own plan that contained only one majority-minority district of the seven congressional districts, in a state in which 30% of the citizens and 28% of the registered voters are African-American. The appellants sought a stay from the district court of its order enjoining the implementation of Act 1. The district court denied the stay applications on February 21, 1996, Appendix B, at J.S. App. 54, and on February 28, 1996, Appendix C, at J.S. App. 56.

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

Louisiana's congressional redistricting plan at issue in this appeal, Act 1 of 1994, is the same plan that was before this Court last term. Because the previous appeal was dismissed due to the appellees' lack of standing, the substantive issues raised in this appeal are the same as the prior appeal in which this Court noted probable jurisdiction.

This case brings to this Court the issue of the constitutionality of a congressional redistricting plan that has been drawn subsequent to this Court's decision in *Shaw v. Reno*. It is the first case before this Court in which a legislature drew a redistricting plan for the specific purpose of complying with the *Shaw* decision. As set forth above, the Louisiana legislature, in enacting Act 1, revised its previous redistricting plan by replacing a 600 mile long, 63% black district with a district approximately 260 miles in length that contains only 55% registered black voters and comports Louisiana's past districting practices. The maps contained in Appendix O, at J.S. App. 194 and Appendix P, at J.S. App. 198 indicate that the districts employed in Act 1 resemble those utilized by Louisiana's past congressional districting plans, a clear indication that Louisiana did not subordinate or abandon its traditional districting practices in order to create a majority-minority district.

Nevertheless, the district court, as it did 1994, again declared Act 1 unconstitutional. In so doing, the district court misconstrued this Court's *Miller v. Johnson* and *Shaw v. Reno* decisions, failed to give Louisiana's past and present districting plans any presumption of validity, and substituted its own subjective redistricting preferences and objectives for that of the state. The court created its own redistricting plan, obliging the state to carry out the court's preferences and objectives, rather than that of the citizens of Louisiana, as expressed through their elected representatives.

This Court should note probable jurisdiction to resolve the far-reaching questions which this case presents concerning the proper application of the Fourteenth Amendment to legislatively enacted redistricting plans—questions erroneously resolved by the court below.

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ANY INTENTIONAL CREATION OF A MAJORITY-BLACK DISTRICT RENDERS A PLAN PRESUMPTIVELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY BY FEDERAL COURTS.

The district court misread *Miller v. Johnson* and *Shaw v. Reno* to establish a sweeping rule invalidating legislatively enacted redistricting plans: any intentional creation of a majority-black election district renders a state's congressional redistricting plan constitutionally suspect.

In *Shaw*, this Court "express[ed] no view as to whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim." 113 S.Ct. at 2828. In *Miller*, this Court again ruled that race-consciousness in drawing district lines would not alone render a districting plan presumptively unconstitutional. Rather, a plaintiff must not only establish that race was the "predominant" fac-

tor in creating the district, but also must do so by proving that the state "subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations." 115 S.Ct at 2488.

A. The factors included in the drawing of Louisiana's congressional plan, Act 1.

The record in this case establishes that the challenged district, District 4 of Act 1, was created, not in substantial disregard of, but pursuant to the state's customary and traditional districting practices. The evidence shows that the state modeled District 4 after various versions of District 8 as contained in the state's previous congressional redistricting plans. Copelin Test., La. Exh. 1 (1994), House Comm. 4/18/94 Tr. 46; Brinkhaus Test., 7/22/94 a.m., Tr. 21; La. Exh. 18 (1994), Jetson Decl. 2; La. Exh. 16 (1994), Accardo Decl. 3; Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 25; see also Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 20-21, 23.

Undaunted by those record facts, the district court parted with *Miller* and *Shaw*, disregarding Louisiana's past districting practices because, the court noted, those past practices were never "challenged on constitutional grounds." Appendix A, at J. S. App. 17, FN 48. This was error. The district court was obligated to treat Louisiana's prior plans as presumptively valid, not presumptively unconstitutional. *See Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156-57 (1993).

A mere viewing of the maps of the state's earlier districting plans confirms that District 4 resembles districts utilized by Louisiana in the past. It is uncontroverted that during both the drafting process and the legislative debates on the plan that was ultimately enacted as Act 1, the legislators and staff were well aware of the prior districting plans, and considered dis-

trict 4 to be a progeny of those previous plans. Copelin Test., La. Exh. 1 (1994), House Comm. 4/18/94 Tr. 46; Brinkhaus Test., 7/22/94 a.m., Tr. 21; La. Exh. 18 (1994), Jetson Decl. 2; La. Exh. 16 (1994), Accardo Decl. 3; Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 25; see also Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 20-21, 23.

Although different versions of District 8 were created by the state from the late 1960's until the state lost its eighth congressional seat as a result of the 1990 census, all, like the present district 4, cut diagonally across the state, roughly following the Red River and Mississippi River. In one version, the district extended from the Texas border in the Northwest to the shores of Lake Ponchartrain in the southeast, a distance of approximately 250 miles. Appendix P, at J.S. App. 196.

The district court's summary dismissal of the similarity of the "Old Eighth" to District 4 as "spurious" underscores that court's grievous misapplication of *Shaw* and *Miller*, and demonstrates the district court's "itch" to condemn Act 1 solely because it did not conform to the court's own subjective eyeballing of District 4. Appendix A, at J. S. App. 16. *Miller* and *Shaw* logically instruct that the appropriate point of reference for the inquiry of whether race "predominates" the redistricting process, is the state's past redistricting practices.

The district court's finding, twice repeated, that "race was the 'fundamental factor' driving the design of Act 1," *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 122; *Hays III*, Slip Op. at 14, is clearly erroneous in law and fact. To say that "race alone predominated the design of District 4," *Hays III*, Slip Op. at 16, blinks the record in this case with a blindness that, with all respect, is quite amazing. Here is what Glenn Koepp, Assistant Secretary of the Louisiana Senate, who drew the new plan told the district court about its design:

> There was some, I guess a lot of discussion during that period about what the Hays case meant. And a lot of confusion on some people's parts and not others. There was discussion of

whether or not the case said you couldn't have two minority districts, whether it said you could create two minority districts, and I think the general opinion came out and my opinion was that this case and this court didn't say you cannot have two minority districts in Louisiana nor did it say you had to have two minority districts, but it did set down some guidelines for redistricting. We started looking at that.

***

And with that in mind, with looking at the various groups that played in this I started working somewhat independently on my own but with directions from numerous senators in trying to come up with a plan that would meet this Court's requirements, that would do as little disruption as possible to the present districts and the incumbents in those districts, and that could possibly get consensus in the legislature and be passed.

Q. Let me interrupt you. What about preclearance by the Justice Department in compliance with Section two?

A. Absolutely. We knew as soon as we adopted the plan and the Governor signed it we had to submit it to the Justice Department for preclearance and we were—I think if you will look at the testimony of the committee on both sides we really felt that not only did we have to get preclearance from the Justice Department in what we did but we had to also have that plan looked at by this Court and have their evaluation of that plan in light of the Shaw and their previous decision in this case. And I took all that into consideration.

***

One of the big factors that started to play in this was I was asked to look at the old Eighth District, the old Eighth District being the highest minority population district in the state other than the minority district number two in Orleans and see what I could do to go off that creating a dis-

trict and what the different districts would fall in line to after that. And I went back, not just to the 1981 congressional plan, but back to the beginning of the 1970 or late '60's legislation—

***

JUDGE SHAW: But Act One—you took this map that's under the direction of members of the State legislature, you were not free to draw a map as you so desired; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Actually, I drew this as I so desired. The first name on this particular plan and the way it's put together carried my name.

JUDGE SHAW: I understand. But you were free to draw this on your own?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

***

JUDGE WALTER: Let me ask it again. You started off with the idea that whatever happens, I'm going to wind off-wind up with one man, one vote and two majority, minority districts?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

JUDGE WALTER: That is not where you started?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

JUDGE WALTER: That's what I've been hearing you say.

***

THE WITNESS: No, sir. If I said that, that's not what I meant. What we were doing was attempting to meet all of the criteria if, in fact, when I finished trying to draw that and there was no way to put together a minority district other than a very bizarre way or if you in the creation of a

> minority district it may derive serious gerrymandering in other areas, then I don't think—know the legislature would not have adopted it, that type of plan.[1]

While criticizing Louisiana for any reliance on the "untested" old 8th Congressional District, the court's decision below also hedged its bets by stating that the creation of a district reflecting the old 8th District was a mere guise for amassing a large percentage of minority voters into one district and not as a means of following traditional districts. Appendix A, at J.S. App. 16. The district court's reasoning has it exactly backwards. If Louisiana had refused to create a second black-majority district on the grounds that the district would be insufficiently compact, the federal courts could easily have found that excuse to be a pretext for discrimination, given that Louisiana has had a similarly configured majority white district in the same general area of the state for the last 25 years. If Louisiana law provided that configurations such as the old 8th District may be used only for white-majority districts, and not for black-majority districts, that law would clearly be unconstitutional. The decision below reads into the Fourteenth Amendment just such a discriminatory rule, contrary to Justice O'Connor's admonition in *Miller:*

> To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting principles. Those practices provide a crucial frame of reference and therefore constitute a significant governing principle in cases of this kind. The standard would be no different if a legislature had drawn the boundaries in favor some other ethnic group; *certainly the standard does not treat efforts to create majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other*

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[1]These connected record excerpts are Glenn Koepp's testimony before the district court on July 21, 1994, Morning Session, which appears in the Joint Appendix filed in this Court in Nos. 94-558 and 94-627, United States v. Hays and State of Louisiana v. Hays, respectively, pp. 34-49.

> *groups*. Indeed, the driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination against blacks. 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor concurring) (emphasis added).

In *DeWitt v. Wilson*, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 1994), *aff'd* in part, appeal dismissed in part, 115 S.Ct. 2637 (1995), the district court upheld California's race-conscious redistricting plan against a constitutional challenge by white voters, holding that the plan was not subject to strict scrutiny because it evidenced a "judicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistricting, one of which was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights Act's objective of assuring that minority voters are not denied the chance to effectively influence the political process." *Id*. at 1413-1414.

The district court decision in the instant matter is the antithesis of the *DeWitt* decision. Rather than considering the many factors that played a part in Louisiana's redistricting, the district court focused on race to the exclusion of all other factors, effectively invalidating Act 1 solely because the legislature, in enacting the plan, was "race-conscious".

Act 1, while creating two majority-black districts, is also the product of other traditional redistricting principles and non-racial factors including partisan fairness, the historic configuration of Louisiana's congressional districts, reasonable preservation of political boundaries, and the existence of commonalities of interests among populations in particular districts. Thus, like the California plan upheld in *DeWitt*, Louisiana's congressional redistricting plan evidences a judicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistricting, one of which was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights Act's objective of assuring that minority voters are not denied the chance to effectively influence the political process.

Although the district court attempted to rephrase its earlier decision using the terminology of *Miller*, the practical effect of its ruling is to require strict scrutiny for any intentional consideration of race. It ignores the practical circumstances under which redistricting takes place. Majority-minority districts are almost never created "accidentally." State legislators and incumbent congressional officeholders are always aware of the likely political consequences of drawing any district, including black- majority districts. In many states, the objections of white incumbents must often be overcome in order to draw any non-white majority district. None of this happens "accidentally." Moreover, legislators routinely consider the race, ethnicity, and religion of those to be included in white-majority districts as well as non-white majority districts. A blanket application of strict scrutiny to such practices would, if enforceable, render presumptively unconstitutional virtually every districting plan currently in force in the nation.

A rule requiring strict scrutiny of any plan creating an intentionally drawn majority-black district also creates an intolerable conflict with states' obligations to assure compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, makes unlawful any state redistricting plan that, under the totality of circumstances, results in a denial of equal political opportunity to racial and language minorities. *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994); *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Section 2 requires states to consider carefully the likely impact of their redistricting plans on minority voters. States that draw majority-minority districts to assure compliance with the Voting Rights Act always do so intentionally — not "accidentally."

If a state's consideration of race automatically subjects its plan to strict scrutiny, states will be forced to choose between considering race and facing a Fourteenth Amendment chal-

lenge by white voters, or ignoring race and facing a Voting Rights Act challenge by minority voters or the Justice Department. The end result of such a legal regime would be the wholesale transfer of the reapportionment process to the federal judiciary, contrary to the central principle that state governments bear primary responsibility for redistricting.

This Court's constitutional jurisprudence must permit a proper balance between state responsibility and federal court oversight, one which acknowledges that state legislatures are entitled to substantial deference in balancing the commands of the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and the state's own political interests in redistricting. The proper balance will be struck if states are presumed to act lawfully when their redistricting plans, like Louisiana's, do not unnecessarily "pack" excessive numbers of blacks in relation to their numbers in the population, and are not dramatically more irregular in shape than white-majority districts previously drawn by the state.

The district court here, however, erroneously held that a plan meeting all these criteria is presumed to be illegal, a plainly insupportable conclusion, contrary to the presumption of good faith that *Miller v. Johnson* mandates be afforded to the Louisiana Legislature in the exercise of its political judgment—which was well balanced and not controlled by racism—aimed at reasoned compliance with, not mere obeisance to, the Voting Rights Act and equal opportunity for minorities too long shut out of the Halls of Congress. "Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures, and so the States must have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests." *Miller v. Johnson*, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995). "The courts, in assessing the sufficiency of a challenge to a districting plan, must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enters a legislature's redistricting calculus." *Id.*

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACT 1 DID NOT SERVE COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS AND WAS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO FULFILL THOSE INTERESTS.

The district court, after concluding that Act 1 was subject to strict scrutiny, held that neither of the state's objectives, compliance with the Voting Rights Act and remedying past discrimination, warranted the creation of District 4.

A. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act.

The district court held that the creation of District 4 was not necessary in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act because the state could not satisfy the necessary requirements of *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), to make out a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of that Act. In *Gingles*, this Court held that three factors must be satisfied in order to establish a Section 2 claim: (1) the possibility of creating a reasonably compact district; (2) a politically cohesive minority group; and (3) white block voting that results in the usual defeat of minority preferred candidates.

The record shows that voting is racially polarized in Louisiana, such that white block voting prohibits blacks from electing candidates of their choice, unless blacks constitute a majority in the election district. La. Exh. 13 (1994); Engstrom Decl. at 9. As a result, since reconstruction no black candidate has been elected to statewide office, and no black candidate has been elected to congress or to the state legislature from a district in which white voters constitute a majority. The district court acknowledged that racial bloc voting is a "fact of contemporary Louisiana politics." Appendix A, at J.S. App. 6, n. 17. But the district court concluded that Section 2 did not require the creation of District 4, because it concluded that the state could not satisfy the "reasonably compact" requirement of *Gingles*. This conclusion is clearly erroneous and based upon an incorrect in-

terprelation of the governing legal standard.

The test for "reasonable compactness" under *Gingles* is not a comparison to some absolute compactness standard, *Clark v. Calhoun County*, 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994), but rather, whether it is reasonably consistent with past redistricting practices. In *Jeffers v. Clinton*, 730 F.Supp. 196, (E.D.Ark. 1989)(three-judge court), *aff'd mem.*, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991), this Court affirmed the district court's decision that held that the proposed majority-minority districts, although somewhat irregular in configuration, satisfied the *Gingles* compactness factor because they were "not materially stranger in shape" than other legislatively drawn districts. *Id.* at 207. As discussed above, district 4 is consistent with, and not contrary to, Louisiana's past redistricting practices.

In applying the *Gingles* factors to Louisiana's congressional redistricting, the record firmly establishes that the legislature correctly concluded that the state could reasonably be subject to a Section 2 claim unless a second majority-minority district was created. The legislature was therefore justified in taking race-conscious action to assure compliance with federal law when there was "a firm basis for concluding that remedial action [is] appropriate." *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education*, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

B. Remedying past discrimination.

The district court while acknowledging that there is a "significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination," and that Louisiana had a "well-documented history of racial discrimination with regard to its voting policies," concluded "[b]ut history it is; and we are constrained by the fact that the defendants have failed to provide any concrete evidence of the lingering effects of past discrimination in current voting laws and procedures." Appendix A, at J.S. App. 20. With this statement, the court below completely discounted

that which it previously acknowledged, that racial bloc voting is a fact of contemporary Louisiana politics, and ignored the obvious, that such is a lingering effect of past discrimination.

The trial court's conclusion that Louisiana minorities no longer suffer the effects of past discrimination in voting is clearly contrary to the record in this case. This blindfold approach is reflected in the trial court's apparent belief that the mere passage of the Voting Rights Act remedied all racial discrimination in voting.

> JUDGE WALTER: I'm sorry. I don't understand. What wrong are you seeking to remedy this?
>
> GLENN KOEPP: Well, one of the things is our past history of racial discrimination. That's what the Voting Rights Act, as I understand it, the Voting Rights Act was about.
>
> JUDGE WALTER: Didn't the Voting Rights Act remedy racial discrimination in voting?
>
> GLENN KOEPP: No, Sir. Joint Appendix, Nos. 94-558 and 94-627, pp. 50-51.

And more:

> SENATOR DENNIS BAGNERIS: I don't know if I can answer your question any different than I have, judge. There is and has been and continues to be racial discrimination in this state; and it is believed, we, the minority population, the African American population in this state—if I may speack one of its representatives—that the way to overcome that is to put into power those persons who can best share and interest, help make the laws, help enforce the laws. To me, it is simple and clear-cut; and evidently I haven't been able to close that line and answer it for you. But I can't use any different words that I have already used.
>
> JUDGE WALTER: What bad things will flow from not having a second majority minority?
>
> SENATOR BAGNERIS: Well, the opposite. You have

> less of an opportunity. You have less of access. The playing field is less level. There have been those who have stated that influentials, so-called influential districts might be more to the advantage of minority population; and perhaps we are cutting our own throats, our wrists when we created districts that are more majority minority. I think when you look at the affect and the success of those districts that have been referred to as influential districts have had, I would prefer to have a minority majority opportunity of election of choice of candidate or candidate of choice. Joint Appendix, Nos. 94-558 and 94-627, pp. 99-100.

Contrary to the district court's view, the record clearly shows the Louisiana Legislature considered Act 1 necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination and thus its purpose was to overcome racial bloc voting and the documented exclusion of Louisiana's black citizens from the political process. *See* Koepp Dep. 115; Bagneris Test. 7/21/94 p.m., Tr. 106-017, 109-10; Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 20-21; Brinkhause Test. 7/22/94 a.m., Tr. 34-35; La. Exh. 17 (1994); Accardo Decl.

It is clear that a vestige of the state's past discriminatory practices is racial bloc voting, whereby minorities are denied an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice except in majority-minority districts. The evidence clearly indicates that in Louisiana, it is not a stereotype that whites and blacks vote along racial lines — it is a fact. Thus, the creation of a majority-minority district in Louisiana does not promote the racial stereotyping decried in *Shaw* and *Miller*, but rather minimizes the effects of the existing stereotyping by remedying the effects of racial bloc voting.

Racial bloc voting has existed in Louisiana long before the legislature ever drew a majority-minority district. Thus, to the extent that racial bloc voting is a result of the racial stereotyping decried by *Shaw* and *Miller*, majority-minority districts are not the cause. Rather in those instances, as shown here, where

voting along racial lines prohibits equal participation by minorities, majority-minority districts are necessary to remedy the effects of racial stereotyping on the voting process.

C. Proof of a reasonable belief for remedial action.

Louisiana demonstrated that the inclusion of two black-majority districts in Act 1 was supported by its compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act and over-coming past racial discrimination against the State's black citizens. The court below seriously misconstrued this Court's precedents in dismissing all of these compelling interests as inadequate and erred in concluding that Act 1 did not further such compelling state interests.

In *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., supra*, this Court held that a state actor may take race-conscious action to assure compliance with federal law when "there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion); see also *id.*, at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(specific finding of prior violation of law not necessary to demonstrate remedial purpose "as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required"). See also *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989)(plurality opinion).

The district court, however, asserted that a compelling state interest was lacking because the State was unable to prove that its refusal to create a second majority-black district would in fact have been unlawful. Appendix A, at J.S. App. 18. This was error of law.

The relevant question defined in *Wygant* and *Croson* is whether the state actor had a reasonable basis for believing that remedial action was necessary, not whether the state actor can prove an actual violation of federal law. See *Wygant*, 476 U.S. at 292 (noting that the requirement of a remedial purpose

does not mean "that the court must take an actual finding of prior discrimination based on the [state actor's] proof before ... [race-conscious action] will be upheld") (O'Connor, J.).

Judged under the proper standard, the evidence adduced by Louisiana was more than adequate to satisfy any burden of production showing a firm basis in fact for believing that a plan with only one majority-black district would be vulnerable to challenge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After the State produced this evidence, the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to carry their "ultimate burden" of overcoming the State's showing of a remedial purpose. *Wygant*, 476 U.S. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The district court, therefore, clearly erred in ruling that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proof on this issue.

Finally, the creation of a second majority-black congressional district was fully justified as a means to overcome patterns of racially polarized voting in Louisiana which have excluded African American political representation in majority-white election districts. Jurisdictions may take steps to improve minority citizens' access to the political process even if such steps are not compelled by the Voting Rights Act. Certainly a parish could voluntarily expand the number of elected parish officers so as to help overcome minority exclusion from elected office, without thereby subjecting its decision to strict scrutiny, even though such action could not be compelled under the Voting Rights Act in light of this Court's decision in *Holder v. Hall*, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994). So too, states have a strong and compelling interest in drawing election districts that afford historically disfranchised minorities equal political opportunity, even if a court might ultimately hold that the Voting Rights Act does not require such districts.

D. Act 1 is narrowly tailored.

The district court also erred legally in holding that Act 1

was not narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interests. The district court's sole basis for its conclusion is its eyeball belief that district 4 is not reasonably compact. As discussed above, the district court's belief is unfounded, because district 4 conforms to the state's customary districting practices, and is therefore reasonably compact under Louisiana's traditional standards of compactness.

District 4, containing only 54% black voting age population, does not unnecessarily "pack" black voters or exclude white voters, but rather is the most integrated of all the districts. Act 1 also furthers the state's non-racial goals of partisan balance and regional fairness, and fairly addresses incumbency concerns.

CONCLUSION

Probable jurisdiction should be noted.

Respectfully submitted,

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In The
Supreme Court Of The United States
October Term, 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Ray Hays, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From A Three-Judge Panel of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522

No. 95-1241

RAY HAYS, et al.,

Plantiffs,

Versus

STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.,

Defendants.

(Jan. 5, 1996)

Before WIENER, Circuit Judge, SHAW, Chief District Judge, and WALTER, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

For yet a third time, we are called upon to review the constitutionality of a Congressional redistricting plan adopted by the Louisiana Legislature (the Legislature) following the reduction of the state's Congressional delegation as a result of the 1990 census. And for yet a third time we conclude—just as we have concluded twice before (once as to the very plan we review today)—that the redistricting plan enacted by the Legislature violates the equal protection rights of the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, we declare the plan null and void, enjoin the State from holding any future Congressional elections under that redistricting legislation, and supply a redistricting plan to be implemented and used by the State in future Congressional elections under the 1990 census.

I.

PROCEEDINGS

At this juncture the procedural posture of the suit has become almost as convoluted as the shapes of some of the districts drawn by the Legislature. Accordingly, we begin with a brief synopsis of the history of the case to date.

A. HAYS I: CONSIDERING ACT 42

This saga began roughly five years ago, when the Legislature learned that, as a result of the 1990 census, Louisiana's Congressional delegation had been reduced from eight members of the House of Representatives to seven. The Legislature then set about the decennial task of redrawing the state's Congressional districts, ever mindful that, as Louisiana is a "covered jurisdiction" under the § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)[1] any plan adopted would be required to withstand the scrutiny of either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.[2]

From the outset the legislators received unmistakable advisories from the Attorney General's office that only redistricting legislation (containing two majority-minority districts[3]

---

[1] *See* 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973b(b) (Law. Co-op. 1986). Louisiana has been covered by § 4(b) since November 1, 1964. *See* 28 CFR pt. 51, App.; *see also United States v. Hays*, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1995) [hereinafter Hays III].

[2] Under § 5 of the VRA, whenever a state that is covered by § 4(b) legislates or administers a new "procedure with respect to voting," it must obtain either a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or "preclearance" from the Attorney General, verifying that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." *See* 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973c (Law. Co-op. 1986). Redistricting plans constitute a voting procedure subject to the requirements of § 5. *See Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2433.

[3] Throughout this opinion, we use the expression "majority-minority dis-

would be approved ("precleared"), so the Legislature directed its energies toward crafting such a plan.[4] The end product of those efforts was Act 42, passed in May of 1992. Act 42 included two majority-minority districts: District 2, which encompassed the New Orleans region and resembled the majority-minority district of the previous district map[5]; and District 4, which, "[l]ike the fictional swordsman Zorro, when making his signature mark, . . . slash[ed] a giant but somewhat shaky "Z" across the state."[6]

The Attorney General precleared Act 42; and shortly thereafter residents of the newly formed District 4 filed suit against the State, challenging Act 42 under the Louisiana and federal constitutions, as well as the VRA. This three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 to hear the case. While we had the case under submission following a two-day trial, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in *Shaw, v. Reno*,[7] which requires that strict scrutiny be applied to a districting plan if it is shown that "race was the predominant factor motivating the Legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters

---

trict" to signify a district in which "'a majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group.'" *See Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2433 (quoting *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993)).

[4] *See Hays v. Louisiana*, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1196 n.21 (W.D. La. 1993) [hereinafter *Hays I*] *vacated*, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).

[5] Until the early 1980s, Louisiana's Congressional districting plans contained no majority-minority districts. In 1983, a three-judge panel invalidated the plan in effect at the time, on the ground that it illegitimately diluted minority voting strength in the New Orleans area. *See Major v. Treen*, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983). The legislature subsequently enacted a districting plan that included a majority-black district in the New Orleans area. Louisiana's first black representative since Reconstruction was elected by that district in 1990. *See Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2433 n.*.

[6] *Hays I*, 839 F. Supp. at 1199. For a map of Act 42, see Appendix I.

[7] 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).

within or without a particular district."[8] In light of *Shaw*, we held another two-day evidentiary hearing and received supplemental briefing from the parties and amici curiae. In December of 1993, we issued our first opinion in this case. Focusing principally— but not exclusively— on District 4,[9] we concluded that Act 42's plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and accordingly enjoined the use of that plan in any future elections.[10] Prominent among our observations in *Hays I* was the recognition that the Civil Rights division of the Department of Justice was the *bete noir* that caused the Legislature to accept as inevitable the need either to produce a plan comprising two majority-minority districts or be denied preclearance— a recognition amplified by the Supreme Court in *Miller v. Johnson*.[11]

Hays I was appealed directly to the Supreme Court by Louisiana, as defendant, and by the United States, as defendant intervenor.[12] During the pendency of the appeal, however, the Legislature apparently recognized the impending demise of its Zorro-esque handiwork, for it repealed Act 42 and replaced it with Act 1, which also contained two majority-minority districts and which— like Act 42 before it— was

---

[8] *Miller v. Johnson*, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (discussing Shaw).

[9] *See Hays I*, 839 F. Supp. at 1191 ("District 2 is not challenged in the instant lawsuit . . . . Rather, District 4 . . . is the primary focus of this constitutional challenge.").

[10] *See id.* at 1209. We adopt by reference all findings of fact and conclusions of law from our opinion in *Hays I* except to the extent that they were made inapplicable by the repeal of Act 42 and the passage of Act 1 of 1994 and to the extent that they are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court precedent.

[11] *See Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2491-93; Hays I, 839 F. Supp. at 1196 n.21.

[12] *See* 28 U.S.C.S. § 1253 (Law. Co-op. 1986).

promptly precleared by the Attorney General. The Supreme Court accordingly vacated *Hays I* and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the passage of Act 1. [13]

B. HAYS II: CONSIDERING ACT 1

On remand, we allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to challenge the constitutionality of Act 1. Like the districts in Act 42, Act 1's two majority-minority districts were still labeled District 2 and District 4. The new District 2 remains embedded in the New Orleans area. District 4, on the other hand, was transformed. Instead of "[running] in a zigzag fashion along the northern and eastern borders of the state" like its Act 42 counterpart, [14] Act 1's District 4 resembles an inkblot which has spread indiscriminately across the Louisiana map.[15]

After considering the evidence presented in yet a third two-day evidentiary hearing and the arguments of the parties and of amici curiae, we issued our opinion in *Hays II*.[16] Again focusing primarily but not exclusively on Act 1's District 4, [17]

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[13] *See Louisiana v. Hays*, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).

[14] *See Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.

[15] *See Hays v. State of Louisiana*, 862 F. Supp. 119, 126 (W.D. La 1994) [hereinafter *Hays II*] (Shaw. C.J., concurring), *vacated*, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). For a map of Act 1, see Appendix II.

[16] 862 F. Supp. 119. We adopt by reference all findings of fact and conclusions of law from our opinion in *Hays II* except to the extent that they are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court precedent.

[17] We observe again that the Legislature's racial gerrymandering in both Act 42 and Act 1 was not confined to District 4. Just as there can be no heads without tails, no yen without yang, there can be no bizarrely extreme racial gerrymandering of a single voting district without concomitant racial gerrymandering of the adjacent districts. Both times that the Legislature's cartographer pushed his computerized stylus hither and yon around the map of Louisiana to ingest sufficient black neighborhoods into the majority-minority district that became District 4, of necessity he had to do the same

we concluded that the Louisiana legislators had once again allowed race to be the dominant factor, first in the Legislature's determination to create a second majority-minority district and, second, in the determination of exactly where to draw district lines. Accordingly, we declared Act 1 unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement, and— for the first time— imposed a court-drawn redistricting plan.[15]

---

thing to the adjoining districts, albeit in reverse. Like the drawing of District 4, the drawing of those abutting districts as confected in Act 1 could not be accomplished without splitting parishes, splitting precincts, splitting metropolitan areas, and combining distant and disparate geographical, economic, social, religious and cultural groups and areas, to produce "bleached" Congressional districts with super-majority white populations, and with disproportionately small black populations.

It has been argued with some validity that as racial bloc voting is a fact of contemporary Louisiana politics, the "packing" of voters by race into different districts minimizes the *influence* of black voters in majority white districts and vice-versa: Racial minority political influence in the resulting super-majority districts— whether black or white— is either lost or significantly diminished because office holders and office seekers no longer need to heed the voices of the minority residents of their districts— here, the whites of District 4, the blacks of the other, "bleached" districts— once their influence has been gerrymandered away.

The redistricting plan of Act 1 leaves none of the five majority white districts with a black population of 25% or more; the plan we drew and ordered implemented in *Hays II*, although comprising one black majority and six white majority districts, contained three white majority districts with at least 25% black population, i.e., three "influence" districts. *See Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council. Inc. v. McWherter*, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn.), *aff'd*, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995). Plaintiffs' expert argues convincingly that our plan, with its one black majority and three influence districts, empowers more black voters statewide than does Act 1's plan. By minimizing the number of black voters in the five majority-white districts of Act 1, the Legislature effectively assigned the proxies of those voters to the minority residents of Districts 2 and 4—a result which is avoided by our plan.

[15] *See* Appendix III.

Louisiana and the United States again appealed to the Supreme Court. Without addressing the merits of the case, however, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Act 1. The Court noted that the plaintiffs, who had (with one exception) been residents of District 4 under Act 42, all live outside the boundaries of District 4 as it is configured under Act 1. The Court then explained that nonresidents of a challenged district must make a specific evidentiary showing to establish standing:

> Where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district, . . . the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action. . . . On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, . . . any inference that the plaintiff has, personally been subjected to a racial classification would not be justified absent specific evidence tending to support that inference.[19]

Concluding that none of the plaintiffs had made a showing of individualized harm, the Court vacated *Hays II* and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the original plaintiffs' complaint.[20]

C. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS

We share the frustration of the Australian who went bonkers trying to throw away his old boomerang, as this case is back once again in our "home court." We therefore pause before discussing our findings of fact and conclusions of law to delineate our decisions regarding a few preliminary matters.

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[19] *Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2436 (citation omitted).

[20] *Id.* at 2437.

1. *Grant of Leave to Amend Complaint*

First, we permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, adding as plaintiffs residents of Act 1's District 4. [21] We interpreted the Supreme Court's instructions on remand as a directive to allow amendment of the complaint: We were instructed to dismiss the original plaintiffs' complaint but *not* their action.

It is well established that a district court should grant leave to amend a complaint even after the original complaint has been dismissed so long as the action is still before the district court[22]; and the Supreme Court has indicated that a refusal to

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[21] At the time that the plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend the original complaint, they also initiated a new action by filing a complaint identical to their proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, when we granted leave to amend the original complaint, we consolidated the new action with the original action.

[22] Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that "leave shall be freely granted when justice so requires" The Supreme Court has warned that "this mandate should be heeded," that plaintiffs should be "afforded an opportunity to test [their] claim[s] on the merits," and that absent a reason such as delay, bad faith, prejudice, or futility, the leave sought should be granted. *See Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 17B, 182 (1962).

Similarly, the Fifth circuit has stated that leave should be freely granted. *See Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v. Shaw*, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). While noting that "this determination [of whether to grant leave to amend] rests in the sound discretion of the district court," this circuit has emphasized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "'evince a bias in favor of granting leave.'" *See id.*; *see also Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co.*, 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing *Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp.*, 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981)), *cert. denied*, 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has held that if the district court lacks a "substantial reason" to deny leave, its discretion is "not broad enough to permit denial." *See Jamieson*, 772 F.2d at 1208; Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598.

For similar rulings by other circuits, *see Newark Branch. N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison N.J.*, 907 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that district court could exercise its discretion as to whether the plaintiff should be granted

grant leave under such circumstances "[i]n the absence of any declared or apparent reason" constitutes an abuse of discretion.[23]

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that when an action remains before the district court, the court's discretion is "not broad enough to permit denial" of leave to amend unless the court finds a "substantial reason" for the denial.[24] In the instant case, the action remains properly before us on remand; and we found no substantial reason— such as "'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant'"[25]—to deny leave. Accordingly, in light of the Court's instructions, we allowed the original plaintiffs to file their second amended complaint, which added an additional eight plaintiffs.

2. *Grant of Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Standing*

After amending their complaint, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of standing. Summary judgment can be rendered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) for "all or any part" of a claimant's case. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate if

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leave to amend its complaint after the original complaint had been dismissed for lack of standing); *Czeremcha v. Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Workers*, 724 F.2d 1552, 1554-56 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that after a complaint is dismissed, the plaintiff may move the court for leave to amend, "and such amendments should be granted liberally"); *Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.*, 570 F.2d 679, 680 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that even though case had been remanded to district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint, district court was not instructed to dismiss the action and so could exercise its discretion with regard to whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint).

[23] *Foman*, 371 U.S. at 182.

[24] *"See Jamieson*, 772 F.2d at 1208; *Dussouy*, 660 F.2d at 598. *See also Whitaker v. City of Houston. Tex.*, 963 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1992).

[25] *Whitaker*, 963 F.2d at 836 (quoting *Foman*, 371 U.S. at 182).

> the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[26])

In the case before us, none dispute that the amended complaint added eight plaintiffs who reside and are registered to vote in District 4, as configured under Act 1. The Supreme Court has held that the residents of a district allegedly the product of racial gerrymandering have standing to challenge the district. When considering the appeal of Hays II, for example, the Supreme Court expressly stated that "[w]here a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district . . . the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action."[27] Similarly, in *Miller v. Johnson*,[28] a companion case of the Court's latest *Hays* ruling, wherein the implications of *Shaw* are clarified, the Court concluded that, "[a]s residents of the challenged Eleventh District [of Georgia], all appellees had standing."[29]

We are convinced that the eight residents of Act 1's District 4 have standing to bring this suit. Moreover, as long as one plaintiff's claim satisfies constitutional standing requirements, federal jurisdiction is properly invoked; no further analysis of the threshold standing issue is necessary.[30] Accordingly, the

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[26] Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c).

[27] *Hays III*, 115 S. Ct. at 2436.

[28] 115 S. Ct. 2475 (holding that a Georgia Congressional district violated the equal protection clause, as race was the "predominant factor" motivating its design).

[29] *Id.* at 2485.

[30] *See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.*, 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) ("Because

plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of standing, and their motion for partial summary judgment on that issue was granted.

3. *The Evidentiary Hearing*

Having determined that the plaintiffs have standing to proceed, we held our *fourth* evidentiary hearing in this case.[31] In the interest of judicial economy, given the extensive evidence already presented in the case and the parties' unanimous agreement to stand on the prior record, we placed limitations on the presentation of further evidence: Each side was granted a total of four "real time" hours in which to present its case. That four hours included time for opening and closing arguments, direct questioning of witnesses, and cross-examination. We specified that each side could present live testimony of one expert witness only (but the depositions or agreed written statements of as many experts as they wished to submit), together with sworn statements of fact witnesses outside our subpoena power and live testimony of as many fact witnesses as they wished to call during the time they had remaining.

The defendants complain that these specifications infringed on their constitutional due process rights. We disagree. An extensive record had been developed previously, and all

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we find California has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs."); *Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977); *Allandale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Comm.*, 840 F.2d 258, 263 (5th cir. 1988); *Hanson v. Veterans Admin.*, 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986).

[31] In the meantime we had, despite our concerns for the delay and confusion it might produce, allowed intervention by Louisiana's Fourth District Congressmen Cleo Fields, the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, and individual residents of District 4. Intervenors participated in this fourth hearing, adding nothing new by way of relevant and material evidence. Still, they had their "day(s) in court."

parties to this latest hearing agreed to adopt the prior record in the current proceedings. *Hays II* had been remanded by the Supreme Court on grounds entirely unrelated to the merits of the case, leaving us with no reason to doubt that the prior record was more than sufficient for a proper legal determination of the issues involved. Regardless, it is perhaps most significant that neither side used the full amount of its allotted time; and in the time that each did use, nothing but essentially redundant, cumulative evidence was adduced. This is not surprising given that absolutely *nothing* new has occurred factually since the conclusion of the two-day evidentiary hearing for *Hays II* in July of 1994.

We thus conclude that the due process complaints of the defendants are unmeritorious, and that defendants' due process rights were not violated by the schedule we set for the latest hearing.

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

With those preliminary issues clarified, we address the heart of the matter: Does District 4 of Act 1 constitute a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution? We held in *Hays II* that it does; nothing has changed factually; the law from the Supreme Court is even clearer; and thus we conclude again that such a violation did and continues to occur. In *Miller v. Johnson*,[32] which presents us with what we in Louisiana call a "Goose" case,[33] the Supreme Court delineated the appropriate analysis for addressing that question. The first step in the analysis is to

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[32] 115 S. Ct. 2475.

[33] Louisianians call commanding precedent, factually on all fours, a "Goose" case. Such precedent is also known as a "Spotted Horse" or "Spotted Dog" case in Alabama, a "Cow" case in Kansas, and a "White Horse" or

determine whether "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations."[34] If the court finds that race was in fact the "predominant, overriding factor" explaining the design of the district,[35] then the redistricting plan cannot be upheld unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.[36]

A. THE ROLE OF RACE IN THE CREATION OF DISTRICT 4

The evidence presented by both parties in the latest hearing added little except to confirm our earlier finding that race was the "fundamental factor" driving the design of Act 1.[37] As we used that phrase, "fundamental" is synonymous with "predominant." The record is replete with both direct and circumstantial evidence supporting this conclusion, and the putative race-neutral explanations espoused by defense witnesses are frivolous.

1. *Circumstantial Evidence*

The evidence at trial established that legislators who considered Act 1 initially disregarded and subsequently subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles—such as compactness, respect for commonality of interests, and respect for political subdivisions— to enact a plan containing a second majority-minority district.[38] And, as was the case with Act 42, even contiguity was honored only by cynical formalism.

"White Pony" case in Texas. *See Jefferson v. Ysleta Independent School Dist.*, 817 F.2d 303, 305 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1987).

[34] *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.

[35] *Id.* at 2490.

[36] *Id.*

[37] *See Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 122.

[38] *Id.* at 126 (Shaw, C.J., concurring).

Far from being compact, District 4 winds its way through fifteen of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes (only three of the fifteen are whole parishes) and is approximately 250 miles long, considerably longer than any other district in the state.[39] The District thinly links minority neighborhoods of several municipalities from Shreveport in the northwest to Baton Rouge in the southeast (with intermittent stops along the way at Alexandria, Lafayette, and other municipalities), thereby artificially fusing numerous and diverse cultures, each with its unique identity, history, economy, religious preference, and other such interests. Along its otherwise aimless and tortuous path the District splits twelve of its fifteen parishes, as well as fourteen municipalities, among which are included four of Louisiana's five largest population centers.

As was true in *Miller*, when the shape of the District is viewed "in conjunction with its racial and population densities,"[40] the fact that race was the predominant factor behind Act 1 becomes overwhelmingly clear. Every time that the District splits a parish, it gathers in a disproportionate number of black voters and excludes a disproportionate number of white voters. Every time that the District splits a municipality, it gathers in a disproportionate number of black voters and excludes a disproportionate number of white voters. The plaintiffs presented credible evidence demonstrating that, even down to the precinct level, the State considered only race in determining which pockets of voters to pull in and which pockets of voters to push out. In the words of the *Miller* Court, such statistics are "quite compelling" as evidence that District 4 is unexplainable other than by race.[41]

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[39] *Id.* at 127 (Shaw, C.J., concurring).

[40] *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.

[41] *Id.*

2. *Direct Evidence*

But, as was the case in *Hays I* and again in *Hays II*, we need not even consider— much less rest our holding on— circumstantial evidence. Once again the plaintiffs have adduced ample direct evidence that race alone predominated the design of District 4. The cartographer charged with creating Act 1's districts readily admits that, in creating District 4, he concentrated virtually exclusively on racial demographics and considered essentially no other factor except the ubiquitous constitutional "one person-one vote" requirement.[42] The combined record— including the testimony of numerous legislators— clearly establishes the reason for this focus: The Legislature was justifiably convinced that the United States Department of Justice would preclear no redistricting plan for Louisiana that failed to include a second majority-minority district. Accordingly, by the legislators' own admissions, Act 1 was passed for the very reason that it was effective in separating black voters from white.[43]

The Department of Justice actively reinforced the legislators' belief that it would not preclear any plan without a second majority-minority district. After the repeal of Act 42, and while the Legislature was debating new redistricting legislation, the Department issued a letter informing legislators of its conclusion "that the Voting Rights Act requires the state to devise a congressional redistricting plan with two black-majority districts." The Department took this action despite language in

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[42] *See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

[43] *See Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 122 ("Misinterpreting our opinion of December 1993 as approving a racially gerrymandered district if it contained no more than 55% minority registered voters; and remaining convinced that the Department of Justice would not preclear any plan that did not contain two majority-minority districts, the Legislature embarked on an endeavor to comply with those demands and still secure adoption.").

Hays I emphasizing that the Voting Rights Act simply "does not justify [an] insistence upon two black districts."[44] As this court has maintained time and again,[45] and as the *Miller* Court has confirmed,[46] by demanding a maximization of majority-minority districts the Justice Department impermissibly encouraged— nay, mandated— racial gerrymandering. The State's desire to comply with the Department's policy only reinforces the conclusion that the Legislature knowingly allowed race to become the predominant factor driving the enactment of Act 1.[47] The perverted syllogism becomes irrefutably apparent: The Department of Justice will preclear a redistricting plan only if it includes two majority-minority districts out of seven; the Legislature must obtain timely preclearance; ergo, the Legislature must adopt a plan containing at least two majority-minority districts.

3. *Proffered Race-Neutral Explanations*

The defense offers three weak race-neutral explanations for the shape of District 4: (1) the boundaries were intended to coincide with the lines of Louisiana's "Old Eighth" district; (2) the District was designed to follow the Red River; and (3) the District is actually majority-poor, rather than majority-black. The latter two explanations are patently post-hoc rationalizations. Evidence adduced at trial established that neither the Red River nor socio-economic factors were relied on by legislators at the time of the drawing of the district.

The contention that District 4 merely resurrects the Old Eighth district is equally spurious, albeit slightly less obvious. Again, the cartographer responsible for confecting the details

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[44] *Hays I*, 839 F. Supp. at 1196 n.21.

[45] *See id.*; *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 123 n.3.

[46] *See Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2492-93.

[47] *See id.* at 2489.

of Act 1 candidly concedes that the Old Eighth itself was used as a guise for amassing a large percentage of minority voters into one district, not as a means of following traditional district boundaries. Thus, the use of the Old Eighth to explain away the "new" Fourth merely reinforces the conclusion that race motivated the design of District 4.[48]

B. THE APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY

As they did in each prior incarnation of this case, the plaintiffs have decisively established that race was the predominant factor behind the Legislature's determination to draw a district map with two of seven districts being majority-minority, and that race was the predominant factor driving the configuration of District 4. Accordingly, Act 1 cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny. In other words, the State must demonstrate that, despite being predominantly race-based, its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.[49] We first examine whether the State has set forth a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify its racial gerrymander.

1. *Alleged Compelling State Interests*

a. *The Voting Rights Act*

The primary justification espoused by the State for the enactment of District 4 has been that a second majority-minority district was *required* under the Voting Rights Act. The *Miller* Court addressed this argument, and its conclusion applies in equal measure to the instant case:

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[48] We note as well that the "Old Eighth" was never challenged on constitutional grounds. We suspect that if challenged today, that district would meet the same fate as District 4, as it was formed unabashedly with the intention of gathering minority voters into one district to ensure the re-election of longtime Louisiana Congressman Gillis Long.

[49] *See Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.

> Whether or not in some cases compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here. . . . [C]ompliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws.[50]

Reduced to its essentials, the VRA simply does not *require* the enactment of a second majority-minority district in Louisiana. The Justice Department's conclusion to the contrary is both incorrect and irrelevant: "When the Justice Department's interpretation of the Act compels race-based districting, it by definition raises a serious constitutional question, and should not receive deference."[51]

We have emphasized from the very outset of this case that neither § 5 nor § 2 of the VRA mandates a second majority-minority district in Louisiana.[52] First, the Supreme Court has specified that the purpose of § 5 "'has always been to insure that no voting- procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.'"[53] In this case, however, a redistricting plan that included one black majority district would have satisfied the nonretrogression requirement. As discussed above, the redistricting legislation resulted from the reduction of Louisiana's Congressional delegation from eight representatives to seven. Thus, a plan

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[50] *Id.* at 2490-91.

[51] *Id.* at 2491-92 (citations omitted).

[52] *See Hays I*, 839 F. Supp. at 1196 n.21; *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 123-24.

[53] *See Hays I*, 839 F. Supp. at 1196 n.21 (quoting *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).

with one majority-minority district would actually have increased the relative voice of a representative from that district: "[W]hereas before black majority districts comprised one-eighth of all districts, under a new plan with one black majority district, such districts would constitute one-seventh of all districts, an increase of nearly two percent."[54]

Similarly, § 2 of the VRA simply does not require the creation of District 4. In *Thornburg v. Gingles*,[55] the Supreme Court specified three factors required to make out a § 2 "dilution" claim: (1) a numerous and compact minority, that is (2) politically cohesive, and (3) subject to majority bloc voting usually defeating the minority's preferred candidate.[56] We reiterate now our conclusion in *Hays II:* "The evidence convincingly proves that the State cannot clear the first *Gingles* hurdle."[57] District 4 meanders for roughly 250 miles from the northwestern corner of the state to the southeast, dividing parishes and municipalities while surgically agglomerating pockets of minority populations along the way. The reasons that it does so is obvious: Outside New Orleans, the black population of Louisiana is so widely and evenly dispersed that, to create a Congressional District that meets the one-person-one-vote criterion *and* has even a simple majority black population, resort must be had to graphic design that constitutes racial Rorschach-ism. The threshold compactness requirement of *Gingles* has not been met and cannot be met, so § 2 of the VRA—like § 5—cannot be relied on as a compelling governmental interest to justify the enactment of Act 1.

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[54] *Id.*

[55] 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

[56] *Id.* at 50-51.

[57] *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 124.

b. *Remedying Past Discrimination*

The defendants also advance the rationale that District 4 was created to remedy the effects of a history of discrimination in Louisiana. We acknowledge that there is "'a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination.'"[58] Moreover, we in no way wish to understate the gravity of Louisiana's well-documented history of racial discrimination with regard to its voting policies.[59] But history it is; and we are constrained by the fact that the defendants have failed to provide any concrete evidence of the lingering effects of past discrimination in current voting laws and procedures. Neither have they provided any credible evidence that the Legislature considered this motivation when it adopted Act 1. The Supreme Court has decreed that a remedial plan may constitutionally be enacted only if there exists a "'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'"[60] As the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burden in this respect, we cannot conclude that remedying vestigial effects of past discrimination warrants the racial gerrymandering involved in the creation of District 4. Generalized societal "remedying" of past discrimination can never meet the Supreme Court's requirement of particularized solutions for specifically identifiable vestiges of past discrimination.[61]

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[58] *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting *Shaw*, 113 S. Ct. at 2831).

[59] *See, e.g., United States v. State of Louisiana*, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), *aff'd*, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); *Major v. Treen*, 574 F. Supp. 325.

[60] *Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education*, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion)).

[61] *See id.* at 498-508. The defendants argue that they have met their evidentiary burden on this issue by establishing (1) that no black candidate has been elected either to the United States Congress or to the Louisiana legislature from a district that is majority white, and (2) that racial bloc voting exists in Louisiana. While these voting patterns may very well have been in-

2. Narrow Tailoring

Finally, we note that even if we were to assume arguendo that the defendants had adequately established a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify a racial gerrymander, District 4 would still fail to withstand strict scrutiny. When viewed in light of the plethora of evidence adduced and recounted in prior iterations of this case, it simply cannot be said that District 4 is narrowly tailored to achieve remediation. Indeed, "[t]he fact that outside of the Orleans Parish area, the minority . . . population is relatively dispersed throughout the rest of the State, elicited the question of whether it was even possible to develop a districting plan that creates a second majority-minority district and is narrowly tailored, in the sense that the plan in total does not unduly burden the rights of third parties."[62] Even if Act 42's "Zorro" District 4 were held up as the benchmark against which the "tailoring" of Act 1's District 4 is to be tested for narrowness— and it is not— the heavy-handed confection of the current district would fall woefully short.

III.

CONCLUSION

We find from the cumulative record of this case that Act 1's District 4 was and is the product of racial gerrymandering and was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Accordingly, we hold that Act 1 violates the Plaintiffs' right

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fluenced by the "sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country," standing alone they are insufficiently connected to past discrimination in voting laws and procedures to support the racial gerrymandering by the State in Act 1. *See id.* at 499; *cf Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-52 (holding that evidence of racial bloc voting, without more, is insufficiently connected to electoral laws and procedures to support a claim under § 2 of the VRA).

[62] *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 128 (Shaw, C.J., concurring).

to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and must be stricken as unconstitutional.

IV

REMEDY

In crafting a remedy today we cannot turn a blind eye on the record of the Legislature and the United States Department of Justice in the context of Louisiana's Congressional redistricting efforts following the 1990 Decennial Census. First, disrespecting historical political units and other traditional redistricting criteria, the Legislature succumbed to the illegitimate preclearance demands of the Justice Department and adopted Act 42 of 1992 with its now-infamous "Zorro" Fourth District. When, in *Hays I*, the plaintiffs prevailed in having us strike down as unconstitutional the redistricting plan embodied in Act 42, the Legislature reacted, not by repudiating the unjustified demands of the Justice Department for maximizing majority-minority districts, but by merely repealing Act 42 and enacting Act 1 of 1994, with its physically modified but conceptually indistinguishable "new" Fourth District, again violating historical political subdivisions and ignoring other traditional redistricting criteria.

After we again, in *Hays II*, struck down the Legislature's unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, the Legislature—with the advice and consent of the Department of Justice—continued its vigorous legal defense of its actions. This defense persisted even after the handwriting of the opinion in *Miller v. Johnson* was visible on the wall. For neither before nor after *Miller* did the Legislature see fit to fold its tents, repeal Act 1, and adopt a constitutionally defensible congressional redistricting plan, either one of its own conception or the one ordered by this court in *Hays II*.

Even now, the Legislature persists in defending the inde-

fensible. In its record of doggedly clinging to an obviously unconstitutional plan, the Legislature has left us no basis for believing that, given yet another chance, it would produce a constitutional plan.[63] It is therefore with regret and reluctance, but with no other choice perceived, that we hold as follows:

1. The Congressional redistricting plan for the State of Louisiana embodied in Act 1 of 1994, is declared null and void, and of no further force and effect.

2. The State of Louisiana is enjoined from holding any future elections based on the plan embodied in Act 1.

3. Past elections based on Act 1 are nevertheless left undisturbed.

4. The State of Louisiana is directed to implement the redistricting plan drawn by this court and ordered implemented in *Hays II*.[64] As every aspect of this case remains unchanged by the latest evidentiary hearing, our plan as well remains unchanged: "The districts that we draw split only six parishes of the sixty-four, follow traditional lines, only one town of approximately 3,000 [is] divided, and the plan [meets] all Constitutional one [person] -one vote requirements. It [does] ignore all political considerations. And, instructed by Gingles, we [do] not carve districts along race lines, except in District 2, where the Constitution and fairness requir[e] us to consider it."[65]

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[63] No basis, that is, except the changes in personnel wrought by the 1995 legislative elections. What if any effect that might have is too speculative for our purposes today.

[64] Reproduced in toto and attached hereto as Appendix III.

[65] *Hays II*, 862 F. Supp. at 125.



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

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LOUISIANA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

The State of Louisiana is divided into the following seven Congressional Districts:

DISTRICT 1

District 1 is composed of Precincts 3-G, 5-G, 8-G, 9-G, 10-G, 1-H, 2-H, 3-H, 4-H, 5-H, 6-H, 7-H, 8-H, 9-H, 1-K, 2-K, 3-K, 4-K, 5-K, 6-K, 7-K, 8-K, 9-K, 10-K, 11-K, 12-K, 13-KA, 15-K, 16-K, 17-K, 18-K, 19-K, 20-K, 25-K, 27-K, 28-K, 34-K, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 170, 171, 171, 174B, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 193, 194A, 195, 210, 211, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, and 234 of Jefferson Parish; Precincts 3-20, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-10A, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-13A, 4-14, 4-14A, 4-15, 4-16, 4-16A, 4-17, 4-17A, 4-18, 4-18A, 4-19, 4-20, 4-20A, 4-21, 4-21A, 4-22, 4-23, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 7-33A, 7-40, 7-41, 7-42, 12-4, 13-1, 14-1, 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-8, 14-9, 14-10, 14-11, 16-2, 17-1, 17-17, 17-18, 17-18A, 17-18B, 17-19, 17-19A, 17-20, and 17-21 of Orleans Parish; St. Tammany Parish; Tangipahoa Parish; and Washington Parish.

DISTRICT 2

District 2 is composed of Precincts 1-G, 2-G, 4-G, 6-G, 7-G, 11-G, 13-KB, 14-K, 21-K, 22-K, 23-K, 24-K, 26-K, 29-K, 30-K, 31-K,

32-K, 33-K, 1-W, 2-W, 3-W, 4-W, 5-W, 6-W, 7-W, 8-W, 9-W, 104, 107, 115, 131, 133, 138, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157A, 157B, 172, 173, 174A, 179A, 179B, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194B, 196, 197, 198, 212, 213A, 213B, 213C, 214, 215, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 246A, and 246B of Jefferson Parish and Precincts1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-6A, 2-7, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 7-1, 7-2, 7-4, 7-4A, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-9A, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19, 7-20, 7-20A, 7-21, 7-22, 7-23, 7-24, 7-25, 7-25A, 7-26, 7-26A, 7-27, 7-27A, 7-27B, 7-28, 7-29, 7-30, 7-31, 7-32, 7-33, 7-34, 7-35, 7-36, 7-36A, 7-37, 7-37A, 7-38, 7-38A, 7-39, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-18, 8-19, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22, 8-23, 8-24, 8-25, 8-25A, 8-26, 8-26A, 8-27, 8-27A, 8-28, 8-29, 8-30, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-3A, 9-3B, 9-4, 9-5, 9-5A, 9-6A, 9-6B, 9-6C, 9-6D, 9-6E, 9-6F, 9-7, 9-8, 9-8A, 9-8B, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 9-13, 9-14, 9-15, 9-16, 9-17, 9-18, 9-19, 9-20, 9-21, 9-22, 9-23, 9-24, 9-25, 9-25A, 9-26, 9-26A, 9-27, 9-28, 9-28A, 9-28B, 9-28C, 9-28D, 9-28E, 9-28F, 9-29, 9-29A, 9-30, 9-30A, 9-31, 9-31A, 9-31B, 9-31C, 9-31D, 9-31E, 9-32, 9-33, 9-33A, 9-34, 9-34A, 9-35, 9-35A, 9-36, 9-36A, 9-36B, 9-40, 9-40A, 9-40B, 9-40C, 9-41, 9-41A, 9-41B, 9-41C, 9-41D, 9-42, 9-42A, 9-42B, 9-42C, 9-42D, 9-42E, 9-43, 9-43A, 9-43B, 9-43C, 9-43D, 9-43E, 9-43F, 9-43G, 9-43H, 9-43I, 9-43J, 9-43K, 9-43L, 9-43M, 9-43N, 9-44, 9-44A, 9-44B, 9-44C, 9-44D, 9-44E, 9-44F, 9-44G, 9-44H, 9-44I, 9-44J, 9-44K, 9-44L, 9-44M, 9-44N, 9-44O, 9-44P, 9-44Q, 9-45, 9-45A, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10, 10-11, 10-12, 10-13, 10-14, 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, 11-10, 11-11, 11-

12, 11-13, 11-14, 11-15, 11-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-19, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7, 12-8, 12-9, 12-10, 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, 12-19, 12-20, 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, 13-7, 13-8, 13-9, 13-10, 13-11, 13-12, 13-13, 13-14, 13-14A, 13-15, 13-16, 14-5, 14-6, 14-7, 14-12, 14-13, 14-13A, 14-14, 14-15, 14-16, 14-17, 14-18, 14-18A, 14-19, 14-20, 14-21, 14-22, 14-23, 14-24, 14-24A, 14-25, 14-26, 14-26A, 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 15-4, 15-5, 15-6, 15-7, 15-8, 15-9, 15-10, 15-11, 15-11A, 15-12, 15-12A, 15-13, 15-13A, 15-13B, 15-14, 15-14A, 15-14B, 15-14C, 15-14D, 15-14E, 15-14F, 15-14G, 15-15, 15-15A, 15-15B, 15-16, 15-17, 15-17A, 15-17B, 15-18, 15-18A, 15-18B, 15-18C, 15-18D, 15-18E, 15-18F, 15-19, 15-19A, 15-19B, 15-19C, 16-1, 16-1A, 16-3, 16-4, 16-5, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8, 16-9, 17-2, 17-3, 17-4, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, 17-8, 17-9, 17-10, 17-11, 17-12, 17-13, 17-13A, 17-14, 17-15, and 17-16 of Orleans Parish.

DISTRICT 3

District 3 is composed of Precincts 13, 14, 15, 16A & 16B, 27A, 27B, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35A, 35B, 36, 37, 40, 41, and 42 of Ascension Parish; Assumption Parish; Iberia Parish; Precinct 1-GI, 1-LA, 1-LB, 2-L, 216, 217, 238, 247, 249, and 250 of Jefferson Parish; Lafourche Parish; Plaquemines Parish; St. Bernard Parish; St. Charles Parish; St. James Parish; St. John the Baptist Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1 & 2-3, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 & 5-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 9-1, 9-4, and 9-5 of St. Martin Parish; St. Mary Parish; and Terrebonne Parish.

DISTRICT 4

District 4 is composed of Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 2-6-O, 3-1, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 5-2, 5-2A*, 5-5, and 5-10 of Allen Parish; Beauregard Parish; Bienville Parish; Bossier Parish, Caddo Parish; Claiborne Parish; De Soto Parish; Natchitoches Parish; Red River Parish; Sabine Parish; Vernon Parish; and Webster Parish.

DISTRICT 5

District 5 is composed of Avoyelles Parish; Caldwell Parish; Catahoula Parish; Concordia Parish; East Carroll Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-13-0, 1-13-1, 4-1-2R, 4-1-3R, 4-1C, 4-2-0, 4-2-1, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2-0, 5-2-1, 5-2-2, 5-3, 5-4C, 5-4R, and 5-5 of Evangeline Parish; Franklin Parish; Grant Parish; Jackson Parish; La Salle Parish; Lincoln Parish; Madison Parish; Morehouse Parish; Ouachita Parish; Rapides Parish; Richland Parish; Tensas Parish; Union Parish; West Carroll Parish; and Winn Parish.

DISTRICT 6

District 6 is composed of Precincts 1, 2A & B, 3, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B, 6, 7A, 8A & 8B, 9, 10A & 10B, 11A, 12, 21A & 21B, 22A, 22B, and 23 of Ascension Parish; East Baton Rouge Parish; East Feliciana Parish; Iberville Parish; Livingston Parish; Pointe Coupee Parish; St. Helena Parish; West Baton Rouge Parish; and West Feliciana Parish.

DISTRICT 7

District 7 is composed of Acadia Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-5, 2-1, 2-2-C, 2-2-O, 2-3, 2-4-C, 2-4-O, 2-5, 2-6-C, 3-2, 5-1, 5-3, 5-3A*, 5-

4-C, 5-4-O, 5-4-X*, 5-4-Y*, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-8A*, 5-9, 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13 of Allen Parish; Calcasieu Parish; Cameron Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4-0R, 1-4-1R, 1-4C, 1-5-0, 1-5-1, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8-0, 1-8-1, 1-8-2, 1-9-0C, 1-9-1C, 1-9-2C, 1-9-3C, 1-9R, 1-10-0, 1-10-1, 1-11, 1-12, 1-14, 1-15, 1-16, 1-17-0R, 1-17-1R, 1-17C, 1-18-0C, 1-18-1C, 1-18R, 1-19, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1-0, 3-1-1, 3-2-0, 3-2-1, 3-2-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6-0, 3-6-1, 3-6-2, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1-0R, and 4-1-1R of Evangeline Parish; Jefferson Davis Parish; Lafayette Parish; St. Landry Parish; Precincts 9-2, and 9-3 of St. Martin Parish; and Vermilion Parish.

The precincts enumerated herein are the precincts existing on April 17, 1994 established by the respective parish governing authority and used by the Louisiana Legislature in Act 1 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 1994.

Congressional District Statistics

Total Population

District Name	Number Members	Total Population	Ideal Population	District Variance	% District Variance
District 1	1	602,842	602,853	-11	0.00%
District 2	1	602,877	602,853	24	0.00%
District 3	1	602,839	602,853	-14	0.00%
District 4	1	602,876	602,853	23	0.00%
District 5	1	602,933	602,853	80	0.01%
District 6	1	602,774	602,853	-79	-0.01%
District 7	1	602,832	602,853	-21	0.00%

PLANWIDE STATISTICS:

Range of populations: 602,774 to 602,933
Ratio range: 1.0003
Absolute range: -79 to 80
Absolute overall range 159
Relative range: -0.01 to 0.01%
Relative overall range: 0.03%
Absolute mean deviation: 36.00
Relative mean deviation: 0.01%

Congressional District Summary

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

District Name	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
	100.00%	85.54%	12.11%	100.00%	88.97%	9.72%
District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
	100.00%	35.77%	60.69%	100.00%	37.66%	60.32%
District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
	100.00%	73.59%	23.58%	100.00%	75.88%	23.30%
District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
	100.00%	65.96%	32.51%	100.00%	71.43%	27.66%
District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
	100.00%	68.12%	31.05%	100.00%	71.86%	27.73%
District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507
	100.00%	66.86%	31.76%	100.00%	71.77%	27.53%
District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329
	100.00%	75.13%	23.83%	100.00%	76.86%	22.69%
Total	4,219,973	2,839,138	1,299,281	2,257,376	1,607,469	628,912
	100.00%	67.28%	30.79%	100.00%	71.21%	27.86%

Parish Population by Congressional District

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

Census Unit	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1						
Jefferson Parish	289,679	261,785	16,940	153,838	145,986	5,351
Orleans Parish	39,761	36,804	2,219	26,264	24,516	1,318
St. Tammany Parish	144,508	126,806	15,917	82,209	73,706	7,225
Tangipahoa Parish	85,709	60,601	24,527	45,988	34,015	11,831
Washington Parish	43,185	29,669	13,376	24,646	17,982	6,629
Total District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
District 2						
Jefferson Parish	145,700	78,880	60,365	63,686	36,331	25,897
Orleans Parish	457,177	136,750	305,509	229,127	73,908	150,655
Total District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
District 3						
Ascension Parish	21,079	10,831	10,107	13,202	7,186	5,983
Assumption Parish	22,753	15,273	7,349	13,823	9,411	4,410
Iberia Parish	68,297	46,940	20,154	38,442	27,371	10,951
Jefferson Parish	12,927	10,505	1,737	6,940	6,011	737

District 3 — continued						
Lafourche Parish	85,860	72,371	10,703	43,794	39,464	4,243
Plaquemines Parish	25,575	18,522	5,944	14,589	10,454	3,137
St. Bernard Parish	66,631	62,199	3,111	39,195	37,308	1,754
St. Charles Parish	42,437	31,638	10,253	25,533	19,315	6,184
St. James Parish	20,879	10,484	10,357	13,676	7,093	6,567
St. John the Baptist Parish	39,996	25,039	14,419	22,263	13,593	8,580
St. Martin Parish	41,337	27,044	13,664	24,405	16,495	7,850
St. Mary Parish	58,086	37,688	18,337	30,986	21,270	9,508
Terrebonne Parish	96,982	75,082	16,032	43,200	35,461	7,011
Total District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
District 4						
Allen Parish	7,050	6,049	972	4,794	4,114	663
Beauregard Parish	30,083	25,242	4,489	16,481	14,255	2,125
Bienville Parish	15,979	8,986	6,949	9,883	5,606	4,270
Bossier Parish	86,088	67,030	17,381	39,519	33,037	6,146
Caddo Parish	248,253	146,580	99,511	123,515	81,992	40,524
Claiborne Parish	17,405	9,313	8,041	9,228	5,348	3,871
De Soto Parish	25,346	14,003	11,141	14,403	8,429	5,489
Natchitoches Parish	36,689	22,357	13,779	20,534	13,096	7,146
Red River Parish	9,387	5,752	3,589	5,997	3,848	2,144

District 4 — continued						
Sabine Parish	22,646	17,939	3,984	13,586	11,310	2,206
Vernon Parish	61,961	45,828	12,867	20,275	17,723	2,135
Webster Parish	41,989	28,550	13,277	21,437	15,273	6,157
Total District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
District 5						
Avoyelles Parish	39,159	28,324	10,585	23,253	17,472	5,729
Caldwell Parish	9,810	7,970	1,760	6,397	5,357	1,031
Catahoula Parish	11,065	8,136	2,874	7,573	5,738	1,822
Concordia Parish	20,828	13,164	7,596	12,063	7,868	4,184
East Carroll Parish	9,709	3,355	6,291	5,774	2,303	3,436
Evangeline Parish	6,405	5,776	613	4,234	3,858	371
Franklin Parish	22,387	15,278	7,040	13,240	9,682	3,549
Grant Parish	17,526	14,860	2,540	10,566	9,015	1,523
Jackson Parish	15,705	11,065	4,589	9,297	6,663	2,620
La Salle Parish	13,662	12,271	1,257	10,185	8,748	1,324
Lincoln Parish	41,745	24,620	16,590	20,477	12,814	7,450
Madison Parish	12,463	4,961	7,415	7,834	3,597	4,207
Morehouse Parish	31,938	18,584	13,263	17,008	10,816	6,178
Ouachita Parish	142,191	96,870	44,096	70,344	51,233	18,890
Rapides Parish	131,556	92,989	36,805	68,931	51,287	17,105

District 5 — continued						
Richland Parish	20,629	13,020	7,539	11,586	7,835	3,726
Tensas Parish	7,103	3,292	3,785	4,503	2,217	2,283
Union Parish	20,690	14,850	5,767	12,816	),449	3,347
West Carroll Parish	12,093	9,997	2,020,	6,808	5,809	986
Winn Parish	16,269	11,343	4,798	10,293	7,658	2,618
Total District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
District 6						
Ascension Parish	37,135	33,649	3,161	21,626	20,151	1,402
East Baton Rouge Parish	380,105	240,614	132,328	199,491	139,379	58,868
East Feliciana Parish	19,211	10,022	9,083	10,844	6,129	3,804
Iberville Parish	31,049	16,519	14,385	20,020	10,953	9,058
Livingston Parish	70,526	66,269	3,920	40,589	38,303	2,232
Pointe Coupee Parish	22,540	13,196	9,275	14,550	8,899	5,644
St. Helena Parish	9,874	4,725	5,127	7,834	3,831	3,996
West Baton Rouge Parish	19,419	12,329	6,993	11,645	7,473	4,154
West Feliciana Parish	12,915	5,672	7,149	5,808	3,442	2,349
Total District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507

District 7						
Acadia Parish	55,882	45,532	10,179	32,718	26,875	5,817
Allen Parish	14,176	10,259	3,524	8,177	6,126	1,896
Calcasieu Parish	168,134	128,181	38,445	84,484	66,510	17,423
Cameron Parish	9,260	8,685	503	6,125	5,776	342
Evangeline Parish	26,869	18,629	8,088	17,546	12,336	5,193
Jefferson Davis Parish	30,722	24,721	5,836	17,704	14,562	3,116
Lafayette Parish	164,762	125,340	36,846	89,258	70,268	18,467
St. Landry Parish	80,331	47,532	32,392	48,634	28,873	19,638
St. Martin Parish	2,641	1,762	868	1,498	1,021	474
Vermilion Parish	50,055	42,237	6,956	30,285	26,236	3,963
Total District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522
No. 95-1241

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET. AL.,

DEFENDANTS

(Jan. 5, 1996)

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that Act 1 of the Second Special Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature (the Act) is unconstitutional, in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the redistricting plan embodied in the Act is null and void.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Louisiana is permanently enjoined from holding any future elections under the Act.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that past elections based on the Act are left undisturbed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Congressional redistricting plan for the State of Louisiana is hereby provided, as set forth in Appendix A, on the basis of which all Congressional elections for the seven (7) United States Representatives from

the State of Louisiana shall be conducted, until and unless a Congressional districting plan enacted by the State of Louisiana according to law is submitted to this court and is determined by it to be constitutionally valid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as prevailing parties in all phases of this case to date, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all reasonable costs, attorneys' fees and expenses, including reasonable expert witness fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in amounts to be determined by reference to United States Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne for review and recommendations; provided, however, that such determination shall not prevent this Order from becoming final immediately upon its being filed.

This court intends to issue a memorandum opinion consistent with this Order.

FOR THE COURT:

s/_____
JACQUES L. WEINER, JR.
Circuit Judge

LOUISIANA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

The State of Louisiana is divided into the following seven Congressional Districts:

DISTRICT 1

District 1 is composed of Precincts 3-G, 5-G, 8-G, 9-G, 10-G, 1-H, 2-H, 3-H, 4-H, 5-H, 6-H, 7-H, 8-H, 9-H, 1-K, 2-K, 3-K, 4-K, 5-K, 6-K, 7-K, 8-K, 9-K, 10-K, 11-K, 12-K, 13-KA, 15-K, 16-K, 17-K, 18-K, 19-K, 20-K, 25-K, 27-K, 28-K, 34-K, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 170, 171, 171, 174B, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 193, 194A, 195, 210, 211, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, and 234 of Jefferson Parish; Precincts 3-20, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-10A, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-13A, 4-14, 4-14A, 4-15, 4-16, 4-16A, 4-17, 4-17A, 4-18, 4-18A, 4-19, 4-20, 4-20A, 4-21, 4-21A, 4-22, 4-23, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 7-33A, 7-40, 7-41, 7-42, 12-4, 13-1, 14-1, 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-8, 14-9, 14-10, 14-11, 16-2, 17-1, 17-17, 17-18, 17-18A, 17-18B, 17-19, 17-19A, 17-20, and 17-21 of Orleans Parish; St. Tammany Parish; Tangipahoa Parish; and Washington Parish.

DISTRICT 2

District 2 is composed of Precincts 1-G, 2-G, 4-G, 6-G, 7-G, 11-G, 13-KB, 14-K, 21-K, 22-K, 23-K, 24-K, 26-K, 29-K, 30-K, 31-K,

32-K, 33-K, 1-W, 2-W, 3-W, 4-W, 5-W, 6-W, 7-W, 8-W, 9-W, 104, 107, 115, 131, 133, 138, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157A, 157B, 172, 173, 174A, 179A, 179B, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194B, 196, 197, 198, 212, 213A, 213B, 213C, 214, 215, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 246A, and 246B of Jefferson Parish and Precincts1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-6A, 2-7, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 7-1, 7-2, 7-4, 7-4A, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-9A, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19, 7-20, 7-20A, 7-21, 7-22, 7-23, 7-24, 7-25, 7-25A, 7-26, 7-26A, 7-27, 7-27A, 7-27B, 7-28, 7-29, 7-30, 7-31, 7-32, 7-33, 7-34, 7-35, 7-36, 7-36A, 7-37, 7-37A, 7-38, 7-38A, 7-39, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-18, 8-19, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22, 8-23, 8-24, 8-25, 8-25A, 8-26, 8-26A, 8-27, 8-27A, 8-28, 8-29, 8-30, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-3A, 9-3B, 9-4, 9-5, 9-5A, 9-6A, 9-6B, 9-6C, 9-6D, 9-6E, 9-6F, 9-7, 9-8, 9-8A, 9-8B, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 9-13, 9-14, 9-15, 9-16, 9-17, 9-18, 9-19, 9-20, 9-21, 9-22, 9-23, 9-24, 9-25, 9-25A, 9-26, 9-26A, 9-27, 9-28, 9-28A, 9-28B, 9-28C, 9-28D, 9-28E, 9-28F, 9-29, 9-29A, 9-30, 9-30A, 9-31, 9-31A, 9-31B, 9-31C, 9-31D, 9-31E, 9-32, 9-33, 9-33A, 9-34, 9-34A, 9-35, 9-35A, 9-36, 9-36A, 9-36B, 9-40, 9-40A, 9-40B, 9-40C, 9-41, 9-41A, 9-41B, 9-41C, 9-41D, 9-42, 9-42A, 9-42B, 9-42C, 9-42D, 9-42E, 9-43, 9-43A, 9-43B, 9-43C, 9-43D, 9-43E, 9-43F, 9-43G, 9-43H, 9-43I, 9-43J, 9-43K, 9-43L, 9-43M, 9-43N, 9-44, 9-44A, 9-44B, 9-44C, 9-44D, 9-44E, 9-44F, 9-44G, 9-44H, 9-44I, 9-44J, 9-44K, 9-44L, 9-44M, 9-44N, 9-44O, 9-44P, 9-44Q, 9-45, 9-45A, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10, 10-11, 10-12, 10-13, 10-14, 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, 11-10, 11-11, 11-

12, 11-13, 11-14, 11-15, 11-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-19, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7, 12-8, 12-9, 12-10, 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, 12-19, 12-20, 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, 13-7, 13-8, 13-9, 13-10, 13-11, 13-12, 13-13, 13-14, 13-14A, 13-15, 13-16, 14-5, 14-6, 14-7, 14-12, 14-13, 14-13A, 14-14, 14-15, 14-16, 14-17, 14-18, 14-18A, 14-19, 14-20, 14-21, 14-22, 14-23, 14-24, 14-24A, 14-25, 14-26, 14-26A, 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 15-4, 15-5, 15-6, 15-7, 15-8, 15-9, 15-10, 15-11, 15-11A, 15-12, 15-12A, 15-13, 15-13A, 15-13B, 15-14, 15-14A, 15-14B, 15-14C, 15-14D, 15-14E, 15-14F, 15-14G, 15-15, 15-15A, 15-15B, 15-16, 15-17, 15-17A, 15-17B, 15-18, 15-18A, 15-18B, 15-18C, 15-18D, 15-18E, 15-18F, 15-19, 15-19A, 15-19B, 15-19C, 16-1, 16-1A, 16-3, 16-4, 16-5, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8, 16-9, 17-2, 17-3, 17-4, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, 17-8, 17-9, 17-10, 17-11, 17-12, 17-13, 17-13A, 17-14, 17-15, and 17-16 of Orleans Parish.

DISTRICT 3

District 3 is composed of Precincts 13, 14, 15, 16A & 16B, 27A, 27B, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35A, 35B, 36, 37, 40, 41, and 42 of Ascension Parish; Assumption Parish; Iberia Parish; Precinct 1-GI, 1-LA, 1-LB, 2-L, 216, 217, 238, 247, 249, and 250 of Jefferson Parish; Lafourche Parish; Plaquemines Parish; St. Bernard Parish; St. Charles Parish; St. James Parish; St. John the Baptist Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1 & 2-3, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 & 5-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 9-1, 9-4, and 9-5 of St. Martin Parish; St. Mary Parish; and Terrebonne Parish.

DISTRICT 4

District 4 is composed of Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 2-6-O, 3-1, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 5-2, 5-2A*, 5-5, and 5-10 of Allen Parish; Beauregard Parish; Bienville Parish; Bossier Parish, Caddo Parish; Claiborne Parish; De Soto Parish; Natchitoches Parish; Red River Parish; Sabine Parish; Vernon Parish; and Webster Parish.

DISTRICT 5

District 5 is composed of Avoyelles Parish; Caldwell Parish; Catahoula Parish; Concordia Parish; East Carroll Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-13-0, 1-13-1, 4-1-2R, 4-1-3R, 4-1C, 4-2-0, 4-2-1, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2-0, 5-2-1, 5-2-2, 5-3, 5-4C, 5-4R, and 5-5 of Evangeline Parish; Franklin Parish; Grant Parish; Jackson Parish; La Salle Parish; Lincoln Parish; Madison Parish; Morehouse Parish; Ouachita Parish; Rapides Parish; Richland Parish; Tensas Parish; Union Parish; West Carroll Parish; and Winn Parish.

DISTRICT 6

District 6 is composed of Precincts 1, 2A & B, 3, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B, 6, 7A, 8A & 8B, 9; 10A & 10B, 11A, 12, 21A & 21B, 22A, 22B, and 23 of Ascension Parish; East Baton Rouge Parish; East Feliciana Parish; Iberville Parish; Livingston Parish; Pointe Coupee Parish; St. Helena Parish; West Baton Rouge Parish; and West Feliciana Parish.

DISTRICT 7

District 7 is composed of Acadia Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-5, 2-1, 2-2-C, 2-2-O, 2-3, 2-4-C, 2-4-O, 2-5, 2-6-C, 3-2, 5-1, 5-3, 5-3A*, 5-

4-C, 5-4-O, 5-4-X*, 5-4-Y*, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-8A*, 5-9, 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13 of Allen Parish; Calcasieu Parish; Cameron Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4-0R, 1-4-1R, 1-4C, 1-5-0, 1-5-1, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8-0, 1-8-1, 1-8-2, 1-9-0C, 1-9-1C, 1-9-2C, 1-9-3C, 1-9R, 1-10-0, 1-10-1, 1-11, 1-12, 1-14, 1-15, 1-16, 1-17-0R, 1-17-1R, 1-17C, 1-18-0C, 1-18-1C, 1-18R, 1-19, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1-0, 3-1-1, 3-2-0, 3-2-1, 3-2-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6-0, 3-6-1, 3-6-2, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1-0R, and 4-1-1R of Evangeline Parish; Jefferson Davis Parish; Lafayette Parish; St. Landry Parish; Precincts 9-2, and 9-3 of St. Martin Parish; and Vermilion Parish.

The precincts enumerated herein are the precincts existing on April 17, 1994 established by the respective parish governing authority and used by the Louisiana Legislature in Act 1 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 1994.

Congressional District Statistics

Total Population

District Name	Number Members	Total Population	Ideal Population	District Variance	% District Variance
District 1	1	602,842	602,853	-11	0.00%
District 2	1	602,877	602,853	24	0.00%
District 3	1	602,839	602,853	-14	0.00%
District 4	1	602,876	602,853	23	0.00%
District 5	1	602,933	602,853	80	0.01%
District 6	1	602,774	602,853	-79	-0.01%
District 7	1	602,832	602,853	-21	0.00%

PLANWIDE STATISTICS:

Range of populations:	602,774 to 602,933
Ratio range:	1.0003
Absolute range:	-79 to 80
Absolute overall range	159
Relative range:	-0.01 to 0.01%
Relative overall range:	0.03%
Absolute mean deviation:	36.00
Relative mean deviation:	0.01%

Congressional District Summary

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

District Name	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
	100.00%	85.54%	12.11%	100.00%	88.97%	9.72%
District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
	100.00%	35.77%	60.69%	100.00%	37.66%	60.32%
District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
	100.00%	73.59%	23.58%	100.00%	75.88%	23.30%
District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
	100.00%	65.96%	32.51%	100.00%	71.43%	27.66%
District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
	100.00%	68.12%	31.05%	100.00%	71.86%	27.73%
District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507
	100.00%	66.86%	31.76%	100.00%	71.77%	27.53%
District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329
	100.00%	75.13%	23.83%	100.00%	76.86%	22.69%
Total	4,219,973	2,839,138	1,299,281	2,257,376	1,607,469	628,912
	100.00%	67.28%	30.79%	100.00%	71.21%	27.86%

Parish Population by Congressional District

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

Census Unit	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1						
Jefferson Parish	289,679	261,785	16,940	153,838	145,986	5,351
Orleans Parish	39,761	36,804	2,219	26,264	24,516	1,318
St. Tammany Parish	144,508	126,806	15,917	82,209	73,706	7,225
Tangipahoa Parish	85,709	60,601	24,527	45,988	34,015	11,831
Washington Parish	43,185	29,669	13,376	24,646	17,982	6,629
Total District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
District 2						
Jefferson Parish	145,700	78,880	60,365	63,586	36,331	25,897
Orleans Parish	457,177	136,750	305,509	229,127	73,908	150,655
Total District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
District 3						
Ascension Parish	21,079	10,831	10,107	13,202	7,186	5,983
Assumption Parish	22,753	15,273	7,349	13,823	9,411	4,410
Iberia Parish	68,297	46,940	20,154	38,442	27,371	10,951
Jefferson Parish	12,927	10,505	1,737	6,940	6,011	737

District 3 — continued						
Lafourche Parish	85,860	72,371	10,703	43,794	39,464	4,243
Plaquemines Parish	25,575	18,522	5,944	14,589	10,454	3,137
St. Bernard Parish	66,631	62,199	3,111	39,195	37,308	1,754
St. Charles Parish	42,437	31,638	10,253	25,533	19,315	6,184
St. James Parish	20,879	10,484	10,357	13,676	7,093	6,567
St. John the Baptist Parish	39,996	25,039	14,419	22,263	13,593	8,580
St. Martin Parish	41,337	27,044	13,664	24,405	16,495	7,850
St. Mary Parish	58,086	37,688	18,337	30,986	21,270	9,508
Terrebonne Parish	96,982	75,082	16,032	43,200	35,461	7,011
Total District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
District 4						
Allen Parish	7,050	6,049	972	4,794	4,114	663
Beauregard Parish	30,083	25,242	4,489	16,481	14,255	2,125
Bienville Parish	15,979	8,986	6,949	9,883	5,606	4,270
Bossier Parish	86,088	67,030	17,381	39,519	33,037	6,146
Caddo Parish	248,253	146,580	99,511	123,515	81,992	40,524
Claiborne Parish	17,405	9,313	8,041	9,228	5,348	3,871
De Soto Parish	25,346	14,003	11,141	14,403	8,429	5,489
Natchitoches Parish	36,689	22,357	13,779	20,534	13,096	7,146
Red River Parish	9,387	5,752	3,589	5,997	3,848	2,144

District 4 — continued						
Sabine Parish	22,646	17,939	3,984	13,586	11,310	2,206
Vernon Parish	61,961	45,828	12,867	20,275	17,723	2,135
Webster Parish	41,989	28,550	13,277	21,437	15,273	6,157
Total District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
District 5						
Avoyelles Parish	39,159	28,324	10,585	23,253	17,472	5,729
Caldwell Parish	9,810	7,970	1,760	6,397	5,357	1,031
Catahoula Parish	11,065	8,136	2,874	7,573	5,738	1,822
Concordia Parish	20,828	13,164	7,596	12,063	7,868	4,184
East Carroll Parish	9,709	3,355	6,291	5,774	2,303	3,436
Evangeline Parish	6,405	5,776	613	4,234	3,858	371
Franklin Parish	22,387	15,278	7,040	13,240	9,682	3,549
Grant Parish	17,526	14,860	2,540	10,566	9,015	1,523
Jackson Parish	15,705	11,065	4,589	9,297	6,663	2,620
La Salle Parish	13,662	12,271	1,257	10,185	8,748	1,324
Lincoln Parish	41,745	24,620	16,590	20,477	12,814	7,450
Madison Parish	12,463	4,961	7,415	7,834	3,597	4,207
Morehouse Parish	31,938	18,584	13,263	17,008	10,816	6,178
Ouachita Parish	142,191	96,870	44,096	70,344	51,233	18,890
Rapides Parish	131,556	92,989	36,805	68,931	51,287	17,105

District 5 — continued						
Richland Parish	20,629	13,020	7,539	11,586	7,835	3,726
Tensas Parish	7,103	3,292	3,785	4,503	2,217	2,283
Union Parish	20,690	14,850	5,767	12,816	9,449	3,347
West Carroll Parish	12,093	9,997	2,020,	6,808	5,809	986
Winn Parish	16,269	11,343	4,798	10,293	7,658	2,618
Total District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
District 6						
Ascension Parish	37,135	33,649	3,161	21,626	20,151	1,402
East Baton Rouge Parish	380,105	240,614	132,328	199,491	139,379	58,868
East Feliciana Parish	19,211	10,022	9,083	10,844	6,129	3,804
Iberville Parish	31,049	16,519	14,385	20,020	10,953	9,058
Livingston Parish	70,526	66,269	3,920	40,589	38,303	2,232
Pointe Coupee Parish	22,540	13,196	9,275	14,550	8,899	5,644
St. Helena Parish	9,874	4,725	5,127	7,834	3,831	3,996
West Baton Rouge Parish	19,419	12,329	6,993	11,645	7,473	4,154
West Feliciana Parish	12,915	5,672	7,149	5,808	3,442	2,349
Total District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507

District 7						
Acadia Parish	55,882	45,532	10,179	32,718	26,875	5,817
Allen Parish	14,176	10,259	3,524	8,177	6,126	1,896
Calcasieu Parish	168,134	128,181	38,445	84,484	66,510	17,423
Cameron Parish	9,260	8,685	503	6,125	5,776	342
Evangeline Parish	26,869	18,629	8,088	17,546	12,336	5,193
Jefferson Davis Parish	30,722	24,721	5,836	17,704	14,562	3,116
Lafayette Parish	164,762	125,340	36,846	89,258	70,268	18,467
St. Landry Parish	80,331	47,532	32,392	48,634	28,873	19,638
St. Martin Parish	2,641	1,762	868	1,498	1,021	474
Vermilion Parish	50,055	42,237	6,956	30,285	26,236	3,963
Total District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329



APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. CV92-1522s
No. CV95-1241

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET. AL.,

DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Considering the motions of (1) Defendant-Intervenors the Honorable Cleo Fields, the Louisiana Black Legislative Caucus, and Bernadine St. Cyr *et al.*, (2) the United States Department of Justice, and (3) the State of Louisiana (collectively "Defendants") for a stay pending appeal, together with Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, the Court orders:

(1) For the reasons given in this Court's decision of January 5, 1996, Defendants are not likely to prevail on appeal with respect to their claims regarding the constitutionality of Louisiana's Act 1 Congressional district;

(2) For the reasons given in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants motions for a stay, Defendants have waived their sub-

stantive and procedural objections to the court-imposed remedial plan, including their claims that: (i) this Court should have given the Louisiana Legislature an opportunity to replace the invalidated Act 1; (ii) this Court made more changes to Act 1 than reasonably necessary; (iii) this Court improperly failed to bifurcate the trial and provide a separate hearing on the remedial plan; and (iv) this Court's plan violates the Voting Rights Act. Because Defendants waived these claims, this Court has had no occasion to address them. Defendants are unlikely to prevail on appeal on claims that were not raised or passed upon in this Court

(3) Accordingly, Defendants motions for a stay pending appeal are *denied*.

Signed on behalf of the Court on this the 28th day of February 1996, in Shreveport Louisiana.

FOR THE COURT:

s/_____
HONORABLE DONALD E. WALTER

APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522s
No. CV95-1241

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET. AL.,

DEFENDANTS

ORDER

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED:

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion of Defendant-Intervenors The Honorable Cleo Fields, The Louisiana Black Legislative Caucus and Bernadine St. Cyr, et al., For A Stay Pending Appeal of the Order and Judgment of the Court entered January 5, 1996, enjoining the State of Louisiana from holding any future congressional elections under Act 1 of the Second Special Session of the Louisiana Legislative and implementing a court-ordered redistricting plan for Louisiana's congressional districts is hereby denied.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 20th day of February, 1996.

FOR THE COURT

s/_____

APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. CV92-1522S

RAY HAYS, EDWARD L. ADAMS, SUSAN SHAW SINGLETON AND GARY STOKLEY, ET. AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, Edwin Edwards, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; SAMUEL B. NUNEZ in his official capacity as President of the Louisiana State Senate; JOHN A. ALARIO, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House for the State of Louisiana; W.F. McKEITHEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the State for the State of Louisiana; JERRY FOWLER, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Elections for the State of Louisiana; and certain UNIDENTIFIED STATE LEGISLATORS,

DEFENDANTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR

(filed Feb. 7, 1996)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that the defendent, the State of Louisiana, appealing herein through its Attorney General,

hereby appeals to the United States Supreme Court from the Judgment of the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana (three-judge court), rendered and filed on January 5, 1996, and entered on January 6, 1996.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
Attorney General of Louisiana

Assistant Attorney General
La. Bar Roll No. 3011

ROY A MONGRUE, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
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LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 7, 1996, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served, by depositing the same in the U.S. mails, postage prepaid, upon the following counsel:

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NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900

Shreveport, Louisiana this 7th day of February, 1995.

s/_____
Henry M. Bernstein

APPENDIX E

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 94-558
No. 94-627

UNITED STATES,

APPELLANT

versus

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

and

LOUISIANA, ET. AL.,

APPELLANTS

versus

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

APPEALS from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

THESE CAUSES came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the above court and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated with costs and the causes are remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioners, United States and Louisiana, et al. recover from Ray Hays, et al. Five Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Eight Dollars ($5,788.00) for their costs herein expended.

June 29, 1995

Printing of record:	$5,788.00
Clerk's costs:	300.00
Total:	$6,088.00

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522

RAY HAYS, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS,

(July 25, 1994)

Before Wiener, Circuit Judge, Shaw, Chief District Judge and Walter, District Judge. Walter, J., Wiener and Shaw, JJ. concurring, with Shaw concurring specially with whom Wiener, J. concurs:

By order dated June 27, 1994, this case was remanded from the United States Supreme Court for further proceedings. For the following reasons, Act 1 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature is null and void. The State of Louisiana is hereby enjoined from holding any future Congressional elections based upon the redistricting scheme embodied by Act 1.

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ray Hays, Edward Adams, Susan Singleton, and Gary Stokely (Plaintiffs) brought this suit in state court in August 1992 challenging Act 42 of 1992. The case was removed to this

Court by the State of Louisiana. After one trial and an evidentiary hearing, we struck down Act 42 as an impermissible racial gerrymander violative of Plaintiffs' equal protection rights. The State of Louisiana et al. ("Defendants") pursued their appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, during an extraordinary session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 1, repealing Act 42 and creating a new Congressional redistricting scheme. Plaintiffs filed supplemental pleadings seeking to amend their complaint. The amended pleadings challenged Act 1 and sought injunctive relief. As the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, the motions were returned unsigned for lack of jurisdiction. On June 27, 1994, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment of December 29, 1993; remanded the case to this Court "for further consideration in light of Act 1 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature and the parties' filings in this Court concerning Act 1." Consistent with that order, this Court permitted the previously filed amended complaint and a two-day trial was held to determine the constitutionality of Act 1.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In the interest of brevity, we reiterate and adopt by reference our December 28, 1993 opinion. Our conclusions regarding Plaintiffs' standing to bring an equal protection challenge are adopted as well With that in mind, we make the following findings:

A

"The Act (1) speaks for itself"

The districting map of Louisiana, created under Act 1,

reflects a racial gerrymander. Specifically the bizarre and irregular shape of District Four raises the inference that the Louisiana Legislature classified its citizens along racial lines and segregated them into voting districts accordingly. The district cuts across historical and cultural divides, splits twelve of its fifteen parishes and divides four of the seven major cities of the State. The statistical evidence showing the racial composition of the districts further supports the finding that District Four is "so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting. *Shaw v. Reno*, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).[1] Plaintiffs, by submitting the new map with their supplemental pleadings, stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. We ordered the State of Louisiana and Defendant- Intervenor United States to begin the trial by rebutting this inference.

Defendants offered the testimony of two State Senators, the State Senate's assistant secretary, a geographer, and a sociologist in an effort to explain the shape of the district on other than impermissible racial grounds. Those persons involved directly with the formation of Act 1 acknowledged that the creation of a second majority-minority district was the specific intent of the Legislature. Two race-neutral explanations were submitted by the defense. First, the geographer opined that as District Four followed the Red River valley, it endowed all its residents with a commonality of interest. Second, the various witnesses asserted that District Four was inspired by "the old Eighth" district thereby satisfying the concept of traditional" districting principles.

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[1] The State now concedes that Act 42 was bizarre. In our opinion of December 28, 1993, we called for major surgery. Act 1 is at best a cosmetic makeover.

The starting point, following the 1990 census, was to redistrict for seven congressional districts, instead of eight, Louisiana having lost one member of Congress. Next, the State sought to comply with the Constitutional requirement of one man - one vote. In this case, each district should contain, as closely as practicable, 603,853 citizens. The State's evidence clearly shows what happened next: Misinterpreting our opinion of December 1993 as approving a racially gerrymandered district if it contained no more than 55 % minority registered voters; and remaining convinced that the Department of Justice would not pre-clear any plan that did not contain two majority/minority districts, the Legislature embarked on an endeavor to comply with those demands and still secure adoption. These were the only inflexible features given to the cartographer/demographer in charge of generating the seven districts.

After reviewing the evidence, we find that Act 1 can only be explained credibly as the product of race-conscious decisionmaking. The Senators themselves admitted that race played a large if not dominant role in the map as it is now drawn. The Red River valley theory is clearly a post hoc rationalization similar to the Mississippi River theory offered to support Act 42 and equally unbelievable. The State did not imitate the "old Eighth" for tradition's sake.[2] The "old Eighth," certainly bizarre, before *Shaw* and never challenged, was crafted for the purpose of ensuring the reelection of Congressman Gillis Long. New District Four was drafted with the specific intent of ensuring a second majority-minor-

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[2] In fact, District Four incorporates the "old Eighth" only in part. It shoves the top further north into Shreveport, further south into Baton Rouge and shortens it to the east.

ity Congressional district. The State's purported reliance on District Four's similarity to the "old Eighth" is mere pretext. Although the witnesses highlighted other factors that carved the contours of the awkward district, the *fundamental factor driving Act I was race.*

B

ACT 1 IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY

Race-conscious redistricting, while not always unconstitutional, is always subject to strict scrutiny. This conclusion has troubled legislators, scholars, litigators, and judges alike. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Samuel Issacharoff, *Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno,* 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 602 ("Aleinikoff"). The problem is caused by the incomplete constitutional status of affirmative action plans in the voting rights realm. In *United Jewish Organization v. Carey,* 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the Supreme Court applied a more deferential standard to what the plurality deemed "benign" measures. One year later, the Court decided *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,* 438 U.S. 265 (1978) following the theory that the right not to be injured on the basis of one's skin color was a personal right secured by the Constitution, and the asserted lack of an invidious purpose could not be a sufficient reason for reducing the level of judicial scrutiny applied to measures that disadvantaged persons on the basis of race. Aleinikoff, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 592. Eleven years later, *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,* 488 U.S. 469 (1989) confirmed the notion that, since *Bakke,* the scrutiny applied under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause will not vary based on the race of the preferred group. 488 U.S. at 493. *Shaw* is consistent with the more recent equal

protection precedents, focusing on individual rights as opposed to *UJO*'s group-based approach. Aleinikoff, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 600. By not overruling *UJO*, *Shaw v. Reno* can be read to ratify "the earlier group-based decisions which focus on whether electoral schemes 'dilute' the voting strength of protected minorities [while making clear] that the fact of non-dilution does not immunize districting plans from constitutional challenge." *Id.*

"A racial classification, despite purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." *Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeny*, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293 (1979). Therefore, such legislation must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest if it is to pass constitutional muster.

C

COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST

Defendants have proved no compelling governmental interest in distinguishing among citizens of Louisiana because of their race. Defendants contend that incumbency politics, the Voting Rights Act, and remedying past legal and social or continuing social discrimination justified the racial segregation of voters. We disagree.

We note at the outset that incumbency politics cannot justify racial classifications. Adhering to federal anti-discrimination laws and remedying past or continuing discrimination could constitute compelling governmental interests if the State could "demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 510, 109 S.Ct. at 730. Such a basis may be drawn from

judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.

1

Voting Rights Act

The State Legislature believed that the Voting Rights Act compelled the creation of a second majority-minority district.[3] A careful review of those statutes and the caselaw interpreting them reveals that the State's belief was misplaced.

Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C §1973c, the State has an affirmative duty to avoid retrogression or enactment of a plan that has the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote because of race or color. Neither the State nor the Department of Justice offered any evidence suggesting that failure to create a second majority-minority district would either be a retrogression of minority strength or have an illegal purpose or effect. Not surprisingly, we can find no support for such a claim either. Section 5 cannot be read to compel the results of Act 1.

A Voting Rights Act Section 2 violation occurs when, under the totality of the circumstances, a State's apportionment scheme has the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of a protected class. In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (1986), the Supreme Court enumerated three conditions to a Section 2 "dilution" claim: (1) a

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[3] This belief was encouraged, if not demanded, by the Department of Justice, under an actual or implied threat of withholding Section 5 preclearance. The shield became a sword. Whether the Attorney General had the right to withhold pre-clearance may be open to question, but she certainly had the power, and the threat, whether issued by her or some middle level bureaucrat, was a matter of real concern to the State. Litigation in the District of Columbia, and everywhere else is expensive. We hold, however, that a real concern is not a compelling one.

numerous and compact minority, that is (2) politically cohesive, and (3) subject to majority bloc voting usually defeating the minority's preferred candidate. 438 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct at 2766. The evidence convincingly proves that the State cannot clear the first *Gingles* hurdle.[4] Accordingly, Section 2 cannot serve as a compelling justification for Act 1. Certainly the Voting Rights Act would *permit* the creation of a second majority-minority district, but the fact that such a district is permitted does not *compel* its creation. *Shaw* demands that we distinguish between what the Voting Rights Act requires and what it permits. 113 S.Ct at 2830. As for any arguments that Section 2 compels maximization of minority voting strength, the Supreme Court recently held:

> (R)eading Section 2 to define dilution as any failure to maximize tends to obscure the very object of the statute and to run counter to its textually stated purpose. One may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political feast . . . Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of Section 2.

Johnson v. DeGrandy, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___,1994 WL 285792 (1994). Hence, the State did not have a basis in law or fact to believe that the Voting Rights Act *required* the creation of two majority-minority districts.[5]

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[4] Despite a minority population of approximately 30%, demographic distribution is simply too diffuse (See Gov't Exhibit 2) to generate a majority voting age population in any district outside of the Orleans Parish region. The State's own expert confirmed that Louisiana's minority population is simply not sufficiently concentrated to meet *Gingles* minimum requirements.

[5] A strong basis under *Gingles* does exist, however, to warrant the creation of a majority-minority district in the Orleans Parish region, where one has existed since 1983. *See Major v. Treen*, 574 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).

2

Remediation of Past or Present Discrimination

Defendants elicited testimony that the sordid history of unconstitutional treatment of black citizens in Louisiana prompted the State to tinker with district lines in order to ensure minority control at the polls. Using the disease as a cure is a dangerous antidote, one that must be absolutely warranted before being administered. Ironically, one witness contended that the days of "white" and "colored" water fountains and bus seats justify distinct "white" and "African-American" congressional districts. What the defense failed to establish is where the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have failed to accomplish what the State now sets out to do. Without concrete evidence of the lingering effects of past discrimination or continuing legal prejudice in voting laws and procedures, coupled with specific remedies, we cannot agree that the re-segregation of Louisiana by racially configured voting districts is warranted.* *Croson* and *Bakke* dictate this result.

Finally, we refuse to accept the explanation that citizen response to issues such as education, crime and health care is driven by skin pigmentation. Legitimation of that notion would herald the demise of equal protection.

III

THE COURT'S PLAN

Our strong preference is to leave to the Legislature the

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* We also note, that, accepting *arguendo* the remediation argument as compelling, the defendants utterly failed to demonstrate how gerrymandering could remedy the problems asserted as compelling interests. That is exactly the problem with a sweeping remedy to an amorphous concept. Without properly defining the compelling interest, it is impossible for the State to narrowly tailor any plan.

task of drawing election districts. We reluctantly set our hands to the task, considering the lateness of the hour, the dismal history of the Legislature in two previous attempts, foot-dragging by the defendants in the appeals and the risk that Louisiana might be without Congressional representation in January 1995. The districts that we drew split only 6 parishes of the sixty-four, followed traditional lines, only one town of approximately 3000 was divided, and the plan met all Constitutional one man - one vote requirements. It did ignore all political considerations. And, instructed by Gingles, we did not carve districts along race lines, except in District 2, where the Constitution and fairness requires us to consider it.[7]

IV

CONCLUSION

The Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of government use of race as a dividing line. This is an individual right in addition to any group-based protections that the Amendment affords. When voting districts are carefully planned like racial wards, an *individual* injury occurs. All citizens are stigmatized by the notion that their "interests" can be defined by race or will be represented adequately only if a member of their racial "group" holds a particular office. To reinforce such racial notions by *operation of law* seems to fly in the face of Justice Thurgood Marshall's expressed hope in his argument in *Cooper v. Aaron* that we "learn to live together with fellow citizens, and above all to learn to obey the law."

I find a contrary position strangely at odds with the

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[7] *See Major v. Treen, note 5 supra.*

desires so eloquently voiced, not so long ago, in Shreveport, in Jackson, in Selma, in countless towns across the South, at schools and lunch counters, at voter registrar's offices. They stood there, black and white, certain in the knowledge that the Dream was coming; determined that no threat, no spittle, no blow, no gun, no noose, no *law* could separate us because of the color of our skin. To say now: "Separate!" "Divide!" "Segregate!" is to negate their sacrifice, mock their dream, deny that self-evident truth that all men are created equal and that no government may deny them the equal protection of its laws.

The validity of equal protection and the systemic legitimacy of our electoral process are threatened when a State sculpts voting districts along race lines. As here, when the State cannot, or has not, offered and supported an extraordinary justification for these questionable measures, the race-conscious enactments must fall.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Civil Action No. 92-1522

RAY HAYS, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

EDWIN EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, et al.

DEFENDANTS,

SHAW, Chief District Judge, concurring:

I concur in the able opinion of the majority. It is an honest effort to provide a suitable plan for Congressional districts in Louisiana within the restraints of the Constitution. I would, however, like to add a few words which may be somewhat repetitive but which address matters in our December 28, 1993 ruling which we have adopted by reference as well as additional findings supported by the evidence. Applying the same constitutional analysis to Act 1 has led us to a similar conclusion.

Again, this Court is called upon to answer the same question, "Does a state have the *right* to create a second racial majority-minority Congressional district by racial gerrymandering?"

The United States Supreme Court has answered that question for this Court in *Shaw v. Reno*.[1] "Yes, but only if the

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[1] 508 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993).

plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest."

For the following reasons, this Court finds that the Congressional Redistricting Plan embodied in Act 1 and District 4, in particular, is the product of racial gerrymandering and is not narrowly tailored to further any compelling governmental interests. The plaintiffs' right to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution is violated by this redistricting plan, and as such, the plan is null and void.

Racial Gerrymandering

As stated in our previous opinion, racial gerrymandering is defined as the intentional segregation of voters on the basis of race. This Court is called upon to first determine whether the redistricting plan is the result of racial gerrymandering.

At trial, the witnesses for the State readily admitted that the purpose of District 4 was to create a second black majority district. The testimony of the state legislators and the State Senate Assistant Secretary confirmed that the district lines were driven by the fact that the black population in the State of Louisiana was sufficiently dispersed through the State that it was impossible to create a second majority black district without skewing the lines into a long irregular shape, as demonstrated by District 4 of the plan.

The districting plan embodied in Act 1 is highly irregular in its shape. Though it may be less bizarre than the plan created in Act 42, the physiognomy of District 4 still strongly suggests that the Legislature engaged in racial gerrymandering in creating the district. Looking at District 4 on a map of

Louisiana, it appears as if someone knocked over an inkwell somewhere around Waskom, Texas, spilling ink aimlessly across the map of Louisiana. There is simply nothing regular about the contours of District 4.

This Court acknowledges that the appearance or beauty of a district is irrelevant to a constitutional analysis; however, the irregularity in shape of a district is suspect and can indicate racial gerrymandering.

Although *Shaw* discusses the concept of bizarre or irregular shape as a means of demonstrating or inferring racial gerrymandering, the high court in no way indicated that shape alone was a determining factor in a finding of racial gerrymandering.

This Court finds, aside from the irregularity of the shape of this district, the evidence at trial clearly supported a finding of racial gerrymandering. The Louisiana Legislature abandoned traditional districting principles to arrive at a Plan which created two majority black voting districts. Act 1, like Act 42, completely disregards the traditional districting principles of compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and respect for commonality of interests.

a. Compactness

District 4, under Act 1, begins in Caddo Parish, and includes the Parishes of DeSoto, Red River, Sabine, and Natchitoches, all located in clearly defined North Louisiana, and ends in Ascension Parish, after cutting through the French region of Louisiana called "Acadiana," which includes Lafayette, St. Martin, St. Landry, and Evangeline Parishes. The district is approximately 250 miles long, and meanders through 15 parishes, making it considerably longer than any

other district in the State. District 4 cuts up four major population centers of Louisiana, including Shreveport, Alexandria, Lafayette, and Baton Rouge, in its efforts to capture sufficient pockets of African-American voters, paying no respect to parish lines.[2] The district points fingers out into Caddo, Rapides, and Lafayette Parishes, while taking small bites out of St. Martin and Iberville Parishes. A district that stretches over as much territory, touching so many media and population centers, cannot be said to be compact.

b. Respect for Political Subdivisions

Although Act 1 is an improvement from Act 42, the state legislature continues to disregard the parish lines in fashioning a plan to create a second minority district.

In the creation of District 4, the State found it necessary to fragment twelve of the fifteen parishes comprising District 4, splitting sixteen parishes statewide under the plan. District 4 is made up of pieces and parts of twelve parishes and splits four of the State's largest cities, outside of New Orleans — Shreveport, Baton Rouge, Lafayette, and Alexandria. Clearly, Act 1 has no respect for Louisiana's political subdivisions.

c. Commonality of Interests

To say that District 4 comprises voters with common interests violates all traditional north-south, ethno-religious, economic and historical distinctions in Louisiana which created this State's diverse personality.

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[2] This court notes that District 4 covers, not only four major population centers of Louisiana, but includes four separate and major media centers of this state. Congressional candidates would be required to spend substantial amounts of money and time covering the voters in four major areas of the state.

District 4 includes North Louisiana English-Scotch-Irish, mainline Protestants, South Louisiana French-Spanish-German Roman Catholics, traditional rural black Protestants, and Creoles. The district encompasses North, Central, and South Louisiana, each of which has its own unique identity, interests, culture, and history. The agricultural regions of District 4 include cotton, soybean, rice, sugar cane, and timber. Such diverse agricultural constituency has few common interests. We continue to question how on Congressional representative could adequately represent the varying interests of residents in such far-flung areas of the State.

A district which disregards commonality of interests and stretches across the State in a haphazard manner without regard to political subdivisions can only be explained as the result of racial gerrymandering.

Justification for Defendant's Plan

The State attempted to put forth a race-neutral explanation for its plan by the use of a geographer who testified that District 4 was drawn along the Red River Valley demonstrating a commonality of interest. The State failed in its burden of proof to show that the Red River Valley Region in the State of Louisiana demonstrated a commonality of interests.

Secondly, the State offered as support for its plan, that District 4 of the plan was modeled after the old eighth district in Louisiana which was created for and represented by Congressman Gillis Long.

This Court is not swayed by the assertion that the tradition of the past regarding the old eighth district is binding on this Court, due to the fact that the old eighth district was never challenged on constitutionality by any court in the

United States. This Court is not called upon to determine the constitutionality of the old eighth district, and does not rely on the fact that such a district existed in Louisiana. What was done by the Louisiana Legislature in the old eighth has no application to this case before this Court, and cannot be used as a comparable for the plan before this Court.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the only explanation of the State's Redistricting Plan was racial gerrymandering. The State intentionally segregated voters into Congressional districts on the basis of race, in order to intentionally create a second black majority voting district.

Narrowly Tailored

A racially gerrymandered plan is subject to strict scrutiny, and as such it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.

Compelling Governmental Interest

Again, the State advances two possible compelling state interests to justify their racial gerrymandering: (1) compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and (2) remedying the effects of past discrimination.

a. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that a state has an affirmative duty to avoid retrogression or to avoid enactment of a plan that has the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race.

The defendants established that the Louisiana Legislature was operating under the belief that a second

majority-black district was mandated by the Department of Justice to avoid retrogression, and to obtain preclearance. Without commenting further regarding the role of the Department of Justice in affecting the plan enacted in Act 1, this Court finds no evidence to support a finding that a second majority-black district is required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, to avoid retrogression. Prior to the census, Louisiana's Congressional delegation had only one black representative out of eight congressmen. Certainly, one congressman out of seven cannot constitute retrogression. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not constitute a compelling governmental interest in this case.

Additionally, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Acts prohibits a plan that has the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of a protected class. However, this claim must fall in the face of the Supreme Court's ruling in *Thornburg v. Gingles*.[3]

This Court finds that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is not implicated by this plan. Although the Voting Rights Act would permit a second minority district, such a district is not compelled by the Act.

b. Remedy Past Discrimination

The State advanced, as justification for its racially gerrymandered district, the belief that the creation of a second minority district in Louisiana is mandated to remedy the past discrimination which has existed in Louisiana.

This Court struggled with the concept of how to define "past discrimination" in Louisiana. Certainly, the history of

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[3] 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).

Louisiana, as of most states in the deep South with respect to its treatment of blacks, is indelibly imprinted in our memories. This State, having inflicted great atrocities against minorities, has made great strides in remedying past discrimination, being ever vigilant of its current existence in the attitudes of many of its residents today. Louisiana, in the sense of its history, will always have a history of past discrimination. However, this Court must determine whether this State has a history of past legal discrimination in the voting laws and procedures which compels it to make reparations and remediation.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have mandated the elimination of obstacles to minority participation at the polls. Since those turbulent times in Louisiana, and through the efforts of many black and white leaders in this State, we have seen the elimination of poll taxes, literacy tests, and violence to reduce or prohibit African-American participation in our elections process. Louisiana has minority representation in nearly every level of government, in almost every area of the State. Speaking only in the sense of the voting rights of minorities in Louisiana, this Court finds that there exist no significant obstacles for minorities in this state to participate in the elections process which have not been remedied by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Accordingly, the concept of remedying past discrimination is not a compelling governmental interest in the recent history of Louisiana in the area of voting rights.

This Court acknowledges the great benefits that are derived by an increase in minority representation in government, not only for those who are represented but also to the

process of government itself. Given the opportunity to serve, minorities have shown that they perform admirably. A greater number of African-American leaders in the government process not only provide positive role models for all black citizens, but their efforts in government will insure that the legal obstacles to minority advancement in all areas of life will be eliminated. However, to disregard the rights of all citizens of the State of Louisiana would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and such a plan would do further violence to the ultimate goal of a colorblind system.

Although we found that the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the contention that the Legislature was operating pursuant to a compelling state interest, even if there had been satisfactory evidence at trial that there is a compelling state interest in creating a second majority-minority Congressional district, the plan embodied by Act 1 was not narrowly tailored to effect that interest. The fact that outside of the Orleans Parish area, the minority black population is relatively dispersed throughout the rest of the State, elicited the question of whether it was even possible to develop a districting plan that creates a second majority-minority district *and* is narrowly tailored, in the sense that the plan in total does not unduly burden the rights of third parties.

The Court Imposed Plan

This Court, with the assistance and guidance of our appointed special master, devised a Congressional Districting Plan. This plan was created from a computer program which included the demographics of the State of Louisiana. This Court started with the goal of creating seven Congressional

districts, remaining true to the "one man, one vote" requirement, and the constraints of *Shaw* and *Gingles*.

After considering every combination available, this Court reached the conclusion that the diffused population of black voters in Louisiana, outside of District 2, makes it impossible to draw a Congressional plan which contains two minority-majority districts and passes constitutional muster. Act 1 clearly does not.

Conclusion

While this Court finds that the creation of a second minority-majority district in Louisiana is permissive and advantageous, we do not find it compelling, under the constraints of the Constitution.

This Court applauds the Louisiana Legislature in its efforts to create a second minority district; however, such efforts run aground of the Constitution and the dictates of *Shaw v. Reno*.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Civil Action No. 92-1522

RAY HAYS, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

EDWIN EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, et al.,

DEFENDANTS.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law be and it is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Act 1 of the Second Special Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature (the Act) is unconstitutional, in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the redistricting plan embodied in the Act is null and void.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of Louisiana is permanently enjoined from holding any elections under the Act.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, although we do not invalidate the 1992 congressional elections, the term of office of each member of the United States House of Representatives from Louisiana who represents a district created under the plan in Act 42 of 1992 of the State of Louisiana,

and each district created under such plan, shall expire, *ipso facto*, at noon on the 3rd day of January, 1995, and such terms of office and such districts shall not be extended or carried over into the next Congress in any manner whatsoever.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a congressional redistricting plan for the State of Louisiana is hereby provided, as set forth in Appendix A, on the basis of which all congressional elections for the seven (7) United States Representatives from the State of Louisiana to the One Hundred Fourth Congress shall be conducted, with the dates for qualifying and for holding such elections to be established by the cognizant officials of the State of Louisiana according to law; and that all subsequent elections of United States Representatives from the State of Louisiana shall be conducted under the plan provided by this court until and unless a congressional districting plan enacted by the State of Louisiana according to law is submitted to this court and is determined by it to be constitutionally valid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as prevailing parties in all phases of this case to date, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all reasonable costs, attorneys' fees and expenses, including reasonable expert witness fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, in amounts to be determined by reference to United States Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne for review and recommendations; provided, however, that such determination shall not prevent this Order from becoming final immediately upon its being filed.

This court reserves the right to issue, and intends to issue, a memorandum opinion consistent with this Order.

FOR THE COURT:
DONALD E. WALTER
District Judge

LOUISIANA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

The State of Louisiana is divided into the following seven Congressional Districts:

DISTRICT 1

District 1 is composed of Precincts 3-G, 5-G, 8-G, 9-G, 10-G, 1-H, 2-H, 3-H, 4-H, 5-H, 6-H, 7-H, 8-H, 9-H, 1-K, 2-K, 3-K, 4-K, 5-K, 6-K, 7-K, 8-K, 9-K, 10-K, 11-K, 12-K, 13-KA, 15-K, 16-K, 17-K, 18-K, 19-K, 20-K, 25-K, 27-K, 28-K, 34-K, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 170, 171, 171, 174B, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 193, 194A, 195, 210, 211, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, and 234 of Jefferson Parish; Precincts 3-20, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-10A, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-13A, 4-14, 4-14A, 4-15, 4-16, 4-16A, 4-17, 4-17A, 4-18, 4-18A, 4-19, 4-20, 4-20A, 4-21, 4-21A, 4-22, 4-23, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 7-33A, 7-40, 7-41, 7-42, 12-4, 13-1, 14-1, 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-8, 14-9, 14-10, 14-11, 16-2, 17-1, 17-17, 17-18, 17-18A, 17-18B, 17-19, 17-19A, 17-20, and 17-21 of Orleans Parish; St. Tammany Parish; Tangipahoa Parish; and Washington Parish.

DISTRICT 2

District 2 is composed of Precincts 1-G, 2-G, 4-G, 6-G, 7-G, 11-G, 13-KB, 14-K, 21-K, 22-K, 23-K, 24-K, 26-K, 29-K, 30-K, 31-K, 32-K, 33-K, 1-W, 2-W, 3-W, 4-W, 5-W, 6-W, 7-W, 8-W, 9-W, 104,

107, 115, 131, 133, 138, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157A, 157B, 172, 173, 174A, 179A, 179B, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194B, 196, 197, 198, 212, 213A, 213B, 213C, 214, 215, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 246A, and 246B of Jefferson Parish and Precincts1 1, 1-2, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-6A, 2-7, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 7-1, 7-2, 7-4, 7-4A, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-9A, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19, 7-20, 7-20A, 7-21, 7-22, 7-23, 7-24, 7-25, 7-25A, 7-26, 7-26A, 7-27, 7-27A, 7-27B, 7-28, 7-29, 7-30, 7-31, 7-32, 7-33, 7-34, 7-35, 7-36, 7-36A, 7-37, 7-37A, 7-38, 7-38A, 7-39, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-18, 8-19, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22, 8-23, 8-24, 8-25, 8-25A, 8-26, 8-26A, 8-27, 8-27A, 8-28, 8-29, 8-30, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-3A, 9-3B, 9-4, 9-5, 9-5A, 9-6A, 9-6B, 9-6C, 9-6D, 9-6E, 9-6F, 9-7, 9-8, 9-8A, 9-8B, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 9-13, 9-14, 9-15, 9-16, 9-17, 9-18, 9-19, 9-20, 9-21, 9-22, 9-23, 9-24, 9-25, 9-25A, 9-26, 9-26A, 9-27, 9-28, 9-28A, 9-28B, 9-28C, 9-28D, 9-28E, 9-28F, 9-29, 9-29A, 9-30, 9-30A, 9-31, 9-31A, 9-31B, 9-31C, 9-31D, 9-31E, 9-32, 9-33, 9-33A, 9-34, 9-34A, 9-35, 9-35A, 9-36, 9-36A, 9-36B, 9-40, 9-40A, 9-40B, 9-40C, 9-41, 9-41A, 9-41B, 9-41C, 9-41D, 9-42, 9-42A, 9-42B, 9-42C, 9-42D, 9-42E, 9-43, 9-43A, 9-43B, 9-43C, 9-43D, 9-43E, 9-43F, 9-43G, 9-43H, 9-43I, 9-43J, 9-43K, 9-43L, 9-43M, 9-43N, 9-44, 9-44A, 9-44B, 9-44C, 9-44D, 9-44E, 9-44F, 9-44G, 9-44H, 9-44I, 9-44J, 9-44K, 9-44L, 9-44M, 9-44N, 9-44O, 9-44P, 9-44Q, 9-45, 9-45A, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10, 10-11, 10-12, 10-13, 10-14, 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, 11-10, 11-11, 11-12, 11-13, 11-14, 11-15, 11-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-19, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7, 12-8, 12-9, 12-10, 12-11, 12-

12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, 12-19, 12-20, 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, 13-7, 13-8, 13-9, 13-10, 13-11, 13-12, 13-13, 13-14, 13-14A, 13-15, 13-16, 14-5, 14-6, 14-7, 14-12, 14-13, 14-13A, 14-14, 14-15, 14-16, 14-17, 14-18, 14-18A, 14-19, 14-20, 14-21, 14-22, 14-23, 14-24, 14-24A, 14-25, 14-26, 14-26A, 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 15-4, 15-5, 15-6, 15-7, 15-8, 15-9, 15-10, 15-11, 15-11A, 15-12, 15-12A, 15-13, 15-13A, 15-13B, 15-14, 15-14A, 15-14B, 15-14C, 15-14D, 15-14E, 15-14F, 15-14G, 15-15, 15-15A, 15-15B, 15-16, 15-17, 15-17A, 15-17B, 15-18, 15-18A, 15-18B, 15-18C, 15-18D, 15-18E, 15-18F, 15-19, 15-19A, 15-19B, 15-19C, 16-1, 16-1A, 16-3, 16-4, 16-5, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8, 16-9, 17-2, 17-3, 17-4, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, 17-8, 17-9, 17-10, 17-11, 17-12, 17-13, 17-13A, 17-14, 17-15, and 17-16 of Orleans Parish.

DISTRICT 3

District 3 is composed of Precincts 13, 14, 15, 16A & 16B, 27A, 27B, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35A, 35B, 36, 37, 40, 41, and 42 of Ascension Parish; Assumption Parish; Iberia Parish; Precinct 1-GI, 1-LA, 1-LB, 2-L, 216, 217, 238, 247, 249, and 250 of Jefferson Parish; Lafourche Parish; Plaquemines Parish; St. Bernard Parish; St. Charles Parish; St. James Parish; St. John the Baptist Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1 & 2-3, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 & 5-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4, 9-1, 9-4, and 9-5 of St. Martin Parish; St. Mary Parish; and Terrebonne Parish.

DISTRICT 4

District 4 is composed of Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 2-6-O, 3-1, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 5-2, 5-2A*, 5-5, and 5-10 of Allen Parish; Beauregard Parish; Bienville Parish; Bossier Parish, Caddo

Parish; Claiborne Parish; De Soto Parish; Natchitoches Parish; Red River Parish; Sabine Parish; Vernon Parish; and Webster Parish.

DISTRICT 5

District 5 is composed of Avoyelles Parish; Caldwell Parish; Catahoula Parish; Concordia Parish; East Carroll Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-13-0, 1-13-1, 4-1-2R, 4-1-3R, 4-1C, 4-2-0, 4-2-1, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2-0, 5-2-1, 5-2-2, 5-3, 5-4C, 5-4R, and 5-5 of Evangeline Parish; Franklin Parish; Grant Parish; Jackson Parish; La Salle Parish; Lincoln Parish; Madison Parish; Morehouse Parish; Ouachita Parish; Rapides Parish; Richland Parish; Tensas Parish; Union Parish; West Carroll Parish; and Winn Parish.

DISTRICT 6

District 6 is composed of Precincts 1, 2A & B, 3, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B, 6, 7A, 8A & 8B, 9, 10A & 10B, 11A, 12, 21A & 21B, 22A, 22B, and 23 of Ascension Parish; East Baton Rouge Parish; East Feliciana Parish; Iberville Parish; Livingston Parish; Pointe Coupee Parish; St. Helena Parish; West Baton Rouge Parish; and West Feliciana Parish.

DISTRICT 7

District 7 is composed of Acadia Parish; Precincts 1-2, 1-5, 2-1, 2-2-C, 2-2-O, 2-3, 2-4-C, 2-4-O, 2-5, 2-6-C, 3-2, 5-1, 5-3, 5-3A*, 5-4-C, 5-4-O, 5-4-X*, 5-4-Y*, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-8A*, 5-9, 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13 of Allen Parish; Calcasieu Parish; Cameron Parish; Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4-0R, 1-4-1R, 1-4C, 1-5-0, 1-5-1, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8-0, 1-8-1, 1-8-2, 1-9-0C, 1-9-1C, 1-9-2C, 1-9-3C, 1-9R, 1-10-0, 1-10-1, 1-11, 1-12, 1-14, 1-15, 1-16, 1-17-0R, 1-17-1R, 1-

Congressional District Statistics

Total Population

District Name	Number Members	Total Population	Ideal Population	District Variance	% District Variance
District 1	1	602,842	602,853	-11	0.00%
District 2	1	602,877	602,853	24	0.00%
District 3	1	602,839	602,853	-14	0.00%
District 4	1	602,876	602,853	23	0.00%
District 5	1	602,933	602,853	80	0.01%
District 6	1	602,774	602,853	-79	-0.01%
District 7	1	602,832	602,853	-21	0.00%

PLANWIDE STATISTICS:

Range of populations:	602,774 to 602,933
Ratio range:	1.0003
Absolute range:	-79 to 80
Absolute overall range	159
Relative range:	-0.01 to 0.01%
Relative overall range:	0.03%
Absolute mean deviation:	36.00
Relative mean deviation:	0.01%

Congressional District Summary

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

District Name	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
	100.00%	85.54%	12.11%	100.00%	88.97%	9.72%
District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
	100.00%	35.77%	60.69%	100.00%	37.66%	60.32%
District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
	100.00%	73.59%	23.58%	100.00%	75.88%	23.30%
District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
	100.00%	65.96%	32.51%	100.00%	71.43%	27.66%
District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
	100.00%	68.12%	31.05%	100.00%	71.86%	27.73%
District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507
	100.00%	66.86%	31.76%	100.00%	71.77%	27.53%
District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329
	100.00%	75.13%	23.83%	100.00%	76.86%	22.69%
Total	4,219,973	2,839,138	1,299,281	2,257,376	1,607,469	628,912
	100.00%	67.28%	30.79%	100.00%	71.21%	27.86%

Parish Population by Congressional District

Total Population and 1994 Registered Voters

Census Unit	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1						
Jefferson Parish	289,679	261,785	16,940	153,838	145,986	5,351
Orleans Parish	39,761	36,804	2,219	26,264	24,516	1,318
St. Tammany Parish	144,508	126,806	15,917	82,209	73,706	7,225
Tangipahoa Parish	85,709	60,601	24,527	45,988	34,015	11,831
Washington Parish	43,185	29,669	13,376	24,646	17,982	6,629
Total District 1	602,842	515,665	72,979	332,945	296,205	32,354
District 2						
Jefferson Parish	145,700	78,880	60,365	63,586	36,331	25,897
Orleans Parish	457,177	136,750	305,509	229,127	73,908	150,655
Total District 2	602,877	215,630	365,874	292,713	110,239	176,552
District 3						
Ascension Parish	21,079	10,831	10,107	13,202	7,186	5,983
Assumption Parish	22,753	15,273	7,349	13,823	9,411	4,410
Iberia Parish	68,297	46,940	20,154	38,442	27,371	10,951
Jefferson Parish	12,927	10,505	1,737	6,940	6,011	737

District 3 — continued						
Lafourche Parish	85,860	72,371	10,703	43,794	39,464	4,243
Plaquemines Parish	25,575	18,522	5,944	14,589	10,454	3,137
St. Bernard Parish	66,631	62,199	3,111	39,195	37,308	1,754
St. Charles Parish	42,437	31,638	10,253	25,533	19,315	6,184
St. James Parish	20,879	10,484	10,357	13,676	7,093	6,567
St. John the Baptist Parish	39,996	25,039	14,419	22,263	13,593	8,580
St. Martin Parish	41,337	27,044	13,664	24,405	16,495	7,850
St. Mary Parish	58,086	37,688	18,337	30,986	21,270	9,508
Terrebonne Parish	96,982	75,082	16,032	43,200	35,461	7,011
Total District 3	602,839	443,616	142,167	330,048	250,432	76,915
District 4						
Allen Parish	7,050	6,049	972	4,794	4,114	663
Beauregard Parish	30,083	25,242	4,489	16,481	14,255	2,125
Bienville Parish	15,979	8,986	6,949	9,883	5,606	4,270
Bossier Parish	86,088	67,030	17,381	39,519	33,037	6,146
Caddo Parish	248,253	146,580	99,511	123,515	81,992	40,524
Claiborne Parish	17,405	9,313	8,041	9,228	5,348	3,871
De Soto Parish	25,346	14,003	11,141	14,403	8,429	5,489
Natchitoches Parish	36,689	22,357	13,779	20,534	13,096	7,146
Red River Parish	9,387	5,752	3,589	5,997	3,848	2,144

District 4 — continued						
Sabine Parish	22,646	17,939	3,984	13,586	11,310	2,206
Vernon Parish	61,961	45,828	12,867	20,275	17,723	2,135
Webster Parish	41,989	28,550	13,277	21,437	15,273	6,157
Total District 4	602,876	397,629	195,980	299,652	214,031	82,876
District 5						
Avoyelles Parish	39,159	28,324	10,585	23,253	17,472	5,729
Caldwell Parish	9,810	7,970	1,760	6,397	5,357	1,031
Catahoula Parish	11,065	8,136	2,874	7,573	5,738	1,822
Concordia Parish	20,828	13,164	7,596	12,063	7,868	4,184
East Carroll Parish	9,709	3,355	6,291	5,774	2,303	3,436
Evangeline Parish	6,405	5,776	613	4,234	3,858	371
Franklin Parish	22,387	15,278	7,040	13,240	9,682	3,549
Grant Parish	17,526	14,860	2,540	10,566	9,015	1,523
Jackson Parish	15,705	11,065	4,589	9,297	6,663	2,620
La Salle Parish	13,662	12,271	1,257	10,185	8,748	1,324
Lincoln Parish	41,745	24,620	16,590	20,477	12,814	7,450
Madison Parish	12,463	4,961	7,415	7,834	3,597	4,207
Morehouse Parish	31,938	18,584	13,263	17,008	10,816	6,178
Ouachita Parish	142,191	96,870	44,096	70,344	51,233	18,890
Rapides Parish	131,556	92,989	36,805	68,931	51,287	17,105

District 5 — continued						
Richland Parish	20,629	13,020	7,539	11,586	7,835	3,726
Tensas Parish	7,103	3,292	3,785	4,503	2,217	2,283
Union Parish	20,690	14,850	5,767	12,816	9,449	3,347
West Carroll Parish	12,093	9,997	2,020,	6,808	5,809	986
Winn Parish	16,269	11,343	4,798	10,293	7,658	2,618
Total District 5	602,933	410,725	187,223	333,182	239,419	92,379
District 6						
Ascension Parish	37,135	33,649	3,161	21,626	20,151	1,402
East Baton Rouge Parish	380,105	240,614	132,328	199,491	139,379	58,868
East Feliciana Parish	19,211	10,022	9,083	10,844	6,129	3,804
Iberville Parish	31,049	16,519	14,385	20,020	10,953	9,058
Livingston Parish	70,526	66,269	3,920	40,589	38,303	2,232
Pointe Coupee Parish	22,540	13,196	9,275	14,550	8,899	5,644
St. Helena Parish	9,874	4,725	5,127	7,834	3,831	3,996
West Baton Rouge Parish	19,419	12,329	6,993	11,645	7,473	4,154
West Feliciana Parish	12,915	5,672	7,149	5,808	3,442	2,349
Total District 6	602,774	402,995	191,421	332,407	238,560	91,507

District 7						
Acadia Parish	55,882	45,532	10,179	32,718	26,875	5,817
Allen Parish	14,176	10,259	3,524	8,177	6,126	1,896
Calcasieu Parish	168,134	128,181	38,445	84,484	66,510	17,423
Cameron Parish	9,260	8,685	503	6,125	5,776	342
Evangeline Parish	26,869	18,629	8,088	17,546	12,336	5,193
Jefferson Davis Parish	30,722	24,721	5,836	17,704	14,562	3,116
Lafayette Parish	164,762	125,340	36,846	89,258	70,268	18,467
St. Landry Parish	80,331	47,532	32,392	48,634	28,873	19,638
St. Martin Parish	2,641	1,762	868	1,498	1,021	474
Vermilion Parish	50,055	42,237	6,956	30,285	26,236	3,963
Total District 7	602,832	452,878	143,637	336,429	258,583	76,329



APPENDIX G

MINUTE ENTRY

WALTER, J.

(July 22, 1994)

RAY HAYS, ET AL

versus

STATE OF LOUSIANA

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 92-1522

* * *

Motion by Intervenor and the State of Louisiana for stay pending appeal is DENIED.

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

RAY HAYS, EDWARD L. ADAMS,

SUSAN SHAW SINGLETON, GARY STOKLEY

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. CV92–1522S

EDWIN W. EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, SAMUEL B. NUNEZ, JR., in his official capacity as President of the Louisiana State Senate, JOHN A. ALARIO, JR., in his official capacity as Speaker of the House for the State of Louisiana; W. FOX MCKEITHEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana, JERRY FOWLER, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Elections for the State of Louisiana, and certain UNIDENTIFIED STATE LEGISLATORS

Defendants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant—Intervenor.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
(filed July 29, 1994)

Notice is hereby given that the defendants, the STATE

OF LOUISIANA, EDWIN W. EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, SAMUEL B. NUNEZ, JR., in his official capacity as President of the Louisiana State Senate; JOHN A. ALARIO, JR., in his official capacity as Speaker of the House for the State of Louisiana, W. FOX MCKEITHEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana, and JERRY FOWLER, in his official capacity as Commission or Elections for the State of Louisiana, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United State from the Judgment of the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana (three-judge panel) that declared Act 1 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the 1994 Louisiana Legislature, and the redistricting plan embodied therein, null and void, and enjoined the State of Louisiana from holding any future congressional elections based on the plan contained in that Act, and further adjudged that the terms of office of each member of the United States House of Representatives from Louisiana who represents a district created by Act 42 of Regular Session of the 1992 Louisiana Legislature shall expire *ipso facto* at noon on the third day of January 1995 and such terms of office shall not be extended or carried over into the next Congress; said judgment rendered orally by the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana on July 22, 1994 and entered on July 25, 1994.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
Attorney General

/ s / Roy A. Mongrue, Jr.
ROY A. MONGRUE, JR., LSBA #9549
Assistant Attorney General

ANGIE ROGERS LAPLACE #19669
Assistant Attorney General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
(504) 342-7013

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES has been served upon the following counsel:

PAUL LOY HURD
1101 Royal Avenue
Monroe, Louisiana 71201
(318) 323-3800

DEVAL PATRICK
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM
REBECCA J. WERTZ
RICHARD B. JEROME
STEVEN H. MULROY
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice
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MICHAEL D. SKINNER
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Shreveport, Louisiana 71101

by depositing same in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this 27th day of July, 1994.

/ s / Roy A. Mongrue, Jr.
Roy A. Mongrue, Jr.

APPENDIX I

ORDER LIST

THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1994

ORDER IN PENDING CASE

A-64) LOUISIANA, ET AL. V. RAY HAYS, ET AL .

A-75) UNITED STATES V RAY HAYS, ET AL.

The applications for stay presented to Justice Scalia and by him referred to the Court are granted and it is ordered that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Civil.Action No. CV 92-1522S, filed July 25, 1994, is stayed pending the timely filing of statements as to jurisdiction in this Court. Should such statements be so timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this Court's action on the appeals. If the judgment should be affirmed, or the appeals dismissed, this stay shall expire automatically. If the event jurisdiction is noted, or postponed, this order shall remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice Scalia would deny the applications.

APPENDIX J

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-CV-1522

RAY HAYES, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

(Filed Dec 28 1993)

Before WIENER, Circuit Judge, SHAW, Chief District Judge, and WALTER, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Ray Hayes, et al. (Plaintiffs) challenge the congressional redistricting plan (the Plan) adopted by the Louisiana State Legislature (the Legislature) when, following the 1990 census, it enacted Act 42 of 1992 (Act 42).[1] In its present posture, this case considers the

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[1] A technical distinction can be drawn between the terms "apportionment" and "reapportionment," on the one hand, and "districting" and "redistricting" on the other:

constitutionality of the Plan, admittedly designed *inter alia* to increase the number of black representatives in Louisiana's congressional delegation from one out of eight to two out of seven. The Plaintiffs insist that the Plan accomplishes this result by employing impermissible racial gerrymandering to create a new majority-black voting district, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

In simplest form, this case poses the question, "Does a state have the *right* to create a racial majority-minority congressional district by racial gerrymandering?" In simplest form, the answer – largely supplied by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in *Shaw v. Reno*[2], rendered during the pendency of this case – is "Yes, but only if the state does it *right*."

Finding that the Plan in general and Louisiana's Congressional District 4 in particular are products of racial gerrymandering and are *not* narrowly tailored to further any compelling governmental interest, we conclude that

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> *apportionment* and *reapportionment* involve the allocation [by Congress] of a finite number of representatives among a fixed number of pre-established areas. *Districting* and *redistricting* . . . refer to the process by which the lines separating legislative districts are drawn [by states].

See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. 1983) (quoting Backstrom et al., *Issues in Gerrymandering: An exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota*, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1121, 1121 n.1 (1978). For simplicity, however, we use both terms interchangeably.

[2] *Shall v. Reno*, 508 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 125 L. Ed. 511 (1993).

the Legislature did not "do it right." We hold, therefore, that Plaintiffs' right to equal protection as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution is violated by the Plan. Consequently, we declare Act 42 of 1992 to be unconstitutional and the redistricting plan embodied therein to be null and void; enjoin the State of Louisiana from holding any future congressional elections based on the Plan; and, although we do not invalidate the 1992 congressional elections held thereunder, hold that the term of office of each member of the United States House of Representatives from Louisiana who represents a district created under the Plan shall expire, *ipso facto*, at noon on the 3rd day of January, 1995,[3] such terms of office not to be extended or carried over into the next Congress in any manner whatsoever.

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Plan comprises five majority-white districts (Districts 1, 3, 5, 6 & 7) and two majority-black districts (Districts 2 and 4).[4] District 2 has a minority voting age population of 56%, while District 4 has a minority voting age population of 63%. New District 2 covers essentially the same geographic area as did old District 2 in the previous plan: almost the entire population of Orleans Parish and roughly one-third of the population of Jefferson Parish. District 2 is not challenged in the instant lawsuit, nor elsewhere to our knowledge. Rather, District

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[3] *See* U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1.

[4] *See* Table, Appendix A.

4, appearing for the first time in Act 42, is the primary focus of this constitutional challenge.

Shortly after the enactment of Act 42, the Plaintiff filed this suit seeking to have 1) the Plan declared unlawful, 2) the Defendants enjoined from using the Plan in the impending congressional elections, 3) the Legislature ordered to create a new plan that would not segregate state residents into voting districts on the basis of race, and 4) the Defendants preliminarily enjoined "from taking any action in preparation for the primary or general elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. . . . " In their complaint the Plaintiffs – who are black, white, and Asian residents of either District 4 or District 6 – allege that the Plan violates Section 3 of the Louisiana State Constitution, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Fifth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

As required by the Voting Rights Act, the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the fifth Judicial Circuit appointed the instant panel to hear this case. It was tried on August 26 and 27, 1992 (the Trial). At the conclusion of the Trial, we issued an interlocutory Memorandum Ruling and Order (the 1992 Order) in which we denied Plaintiffs' request for an injunction, allowed the 1992 Congressional elections to go forward under the Plan, refused to consider Plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional claims, and took Plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act claims under advisement. We also requested Post-Trial briefing on the question whether the Plan dilutes the voting strength of either blacks or whites in contravention of the Voting Rights Act.

Being aware of an essentially identical case originating in North Carolina – now known as *Shaw v. Reno* – which had progressed further than had the instant case, we held this one under submission until the results of *Shaw* became known. On June 29, 1993, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in *Shaw*, profoundly affecting this case and similar ones pending in other states. We requested the parties and invited amici curiae to file supplemental briefs, generally discussing the implications of *Shaw* and specifically addressing whether – in the terminology of *Shaw* – the Plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest." In August 1993, we held two additional days of trial (the Evidentiary Hearing) to assist us in determining whether the Plan is in fact the product of racial gerrymandering, and, if so, whether it should nonetheless be sustained because it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.

II

PRELIMINARY LEGAL MATTERS

A. Standing

Early in this case Defendants suggested that the white Plaintiffs intrinsically lack standing to challenge the Plan. The Defendants evidently believe that only historically disadvantaged minorities have standing to attack state laws that segregate citizens on the basis of race. But that is not the case.

In *Shaw*, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the important principle "that equal protection analysis is not dependant on the race of those benefited or burdened by a particular

classification."[5] "The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is explicit: 'No state shall . . . deny to *any person* within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."[6] White citizens thus clearly have standing to challenge redistricting plans under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, just as do black citizens, Hispanic citizens, Asian citizens, Native American citizens, and citizens of any other race. We reject out of hand the implication that, although all are equal under the law, "some . . . are more equal than others."[7]

B. Survival of Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Claim

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim does not conform to the structure of the

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[5] *Id.* at 531 (citing *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 494, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).

[6] *Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978). Indeed, laws that entail overt racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, even when they burden or benefit different races equally. *See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio*, 499 U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991). "[R]acial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree." *Powers*, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 425.

[7] George Orwell, Animal Farm 123 (Penguin Books 1972) (1946).

argument approved by the Court in *Shaw* and, consequently, that the Plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection claim under *Shaw*. The Defendants also argue that our 1992 Order, in which we denied Plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional claims, effectively disposed of the Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause claim with finality; and that we therefore may only consider the Plaintiffs' claim that the Plan violates the Voting Rights Act. We disagree with both of these assertions.

Although *Shaw* had not yet been decided at the time the Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit, the allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint are clearly sufficient to make out a cognizable claim of racial gerrymandering under *Shaw*. The narrow holding of *Shaw* is that a citizen states a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme adopted by his state is so irrational on its face, so bizarrely shaped and convoluted, "that it can only be understood as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race. . . . "[8] There is no question that the Plaintiffs make such allegations in their complaint.

For example, the Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he adoption of Act 42 . . . has resulted in the creation of at least two of seven districts which are devoid of any commonality of interest . . . geographical compactness, continguousness [sic], consistency with existing political, societal, governmental or economic districts or jurisdictional boundaries, other than the racial designation of the majority therein."

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[8] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (indicating that irregular shapes may imply impermissible racial gerrymandering). *See also id.* at 528-29.

Similarly, the plaintiffs allege that "Act 42 created two amorphous districts which embody a scheme for segregation of voters by race in order to meet a racial quota for representation of the State of Louisiana in the United States House of Representatives." And again, Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he defendants enacted and intend to implement Act 42 with the intent to create a Congressional Plan concentrating voters of a particular race in designated districts. . . . " We find that these statements clearly amount to allegations that the State of Louisiana "adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race."[9] We conclude that the Plaintiffs have stated an Equal Protection Clause claim essentially identical to the claim alleged by the plaintiffs in *Shaw*.

Moreover, our 1992 Order, denying Plaintiffs' state and federal constitution claims, worked a temporary dismissal of Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, not a final one. It was clearly an interlocutory ruling.

In an order dated June 29, 1993 (1993 Order) we requested supplemental briefing to clarify the relevance of *Shaw* to the instant case and to appear at the Evidentiary Hearing to elucidate whether the Plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest," as required by the Court in *Shaw*. Of necessity our 1993 Order modified our 1992 Order and reactivated the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim in light of *Shaw*. As such a resuscitation is specifically contemplated and authorized

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[9] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 536.

by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,[10] the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim persists and demands adjudication by this court.

III

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case are inextricably intertwined, we do not present them in separate sections. Such separate presentation would increase the length and redundancy of our discussion. Rather, our language will indicate whether we find a particular observation to be a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. To The the extent that a finding of fact is also a conclusion of law, we adopt it as both a finding of fact and a conclusion of law. To the extent that a conclusion of law is also a finding of fact, we also embrace it as both a conclusion of law and a finding of fact.

A. Racial Gerrymandering: General

Plaintiffs allege that the Plan is a product of racial gerrymandering. Consequently, as noted above, this case falls squarely within the ambit of *Shaw v. Reno*. In *Shaw*, the Court held that plaintiffs state a justiciable claim

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[10] Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in pertinent part: "[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims . . . and the order . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims . . . "Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a redistricting scheme is "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race. . . . [11] As *Shaw* was an appeal of the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case for failure to state a claim, however, the Court did not have to resolve that claim; it had only to recognize it. Thus, the roadmap sketched by the Court – as helpful as it is – leaves some questions to be answered in cases such as this.

1. Racial Gerrymandering Defined

A legislature creates a racially-gerrymandered districting plan when it *intentionally* draws one or more districts along racial lines or otherwise intentionally segregates citizens into voting districts based on their race.[12] Thus, "racial gerrymandering" refers to the *intentional*, not the accidental, segregation of voters on the basis of race.[13]

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[11] *Shaw v. Reno*, 125 L. Ed. 2d. at 536.

[12] *See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67, 84 S. Ct. 603, 11 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1964) (in which the Court examined whether the plaintiffs had sustained their burden of proving "that the New York legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew districts on racial lines"). *See also Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (in which "racially gerrymandering" and "intentional segregation of voters into separate voting districts" are used interchangeably throughout).

[13] For example, if a legislature devises a redistricting plan that separates river districts from mountain districts, and more blacks happen to live along the rivers, and more whites happen to live in the mountains, then the plan is not a product of racial

2. Racially Gerrymandered Plans are Subject to Strict Scrutiny

The bedrock principle underlying the Court's decision in *Shaw* is that racially gerrymandered redistricting plans are subject to the same strict scrutiny that applies to other state legislation classifying citizens on the basis of race.[14] As such, racially gerrymandered plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.[15]

Such plans receive "careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption."[16] This intense scrutiny is justified by

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gerrymandering, even though it entails some coincidental segregation. In short, *de facto* or accidental segregation in not constitutionally suspect, but state-sponsored intentional segregation is, irrespective of the legislature's underlying motives.

[14] *Shaw v. Reno*, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511; *accord City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55, 67, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1980) (indicating that claims of racial discrimination in the reapportionment context are resolved in the same way as other claims of racial discrimination); *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976) (referring to *Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. at 58, and pointing out that every member of the Court believed that plaintiffs stated a claim by alleging that "boundaries were purposefully drawn on racial lines"). In its supplemental brief to this court, the United States (which entered this case as amicus curiae) agrees that racially gerrymandered redistricting plans must be strictly scrutinized.

[15] *See Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528.

[16] *Id.* at 527. Thus, even if benign or benevolent motives underlie a legislature's decision to racially gerrymander a

the grave danger that is posed to our constitutional order and national community when a state creates and administers law based on the race of its citizens.[17]

3. Racial Gerrymandering May be Proved Either Inferentially or Directly

We have already noted the narrow holding of *Shaw*: a plaintiff may state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme adopted by his state is so irrational on its face "that it can only be understood as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race. . . . "[18] *Shaw* primarily deals with the problem of proving racial

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redistricting plan, that plan is still subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As discussed below, good motives may allow a plan to survive strict scrutiny, if they rise to the level of a compelling state interest, and if the plan is narrowly tailored to further such an interest. But such motives – however unspotted – do not automatically exempt the plan from what amounts to a presumption of unconstitutionality.

[17] In *Wright v. Rockefeller*, Justice Douglas discusses the dangers of racial gerrymandering. *Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("When racial . . . lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial . . . communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race . . . rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial . . . partisan."). In *Shaw*, Justice O'Connor echoes these same concerns. *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d. at 529 (Redistricting plans that segregate citizens primarily on the basis of race bear "an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.").

[18] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 536; *see id.* at 528-29 (indicating that irregular shapes may reflect impermissible racial gerrymandering).

gerrymandering *indirectly* or *inferentially*. Racial gerrymandering – says the Court in *Shaw* – can be inferred when districts are so bizarrely shaped that they presumptively bespeak an impermissible purpose.

But racial gerrymandering may – *a fortiori* – also be proved by *direct* evidence that a legislature enacted a districting plan with the specific intent of segregating citizens into voting districts based on their race. If everyone – or nearly everyone – involved in the design and passage of a redistricting plan asserts or concedes that design of the plan was driven by race, then racial gerrymandering may be found without resorting to the inferential approach approved by the Court in *Shaw*.[19] The Court recognized in *Shaw* that "[n]o inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute."[20] The same is equally true when virtually unanimous, essentially uncontroverted *direct* trial evidence establishes racial classification, as it did here. In this case, we find overwhelming evidence – both *indirect* and *direct* – that the Plan is a product of racial gerrymandering.

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[19] *See id.* at 528-29, 536 (regardless of how a racial gerrymander is created, it should receive strict scrutiny); *accord City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55, 67, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1980).

[20] 125 L. Ed. 2d at 525 (citing *Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979)).

4. Intent Distinguished from Motive

In a brief aside, we draw on the familiar crime of homicide as a didactic analogy to clarify the important distinction between *intent* and *motive* for purposes of this case. By definition, one who knowingly cocks, aims, and fires a loaded gun at another has the *intent* to kill or cause great bodily harm. That is the *purpose* for shooting. But the shooter may have any number of *motives* for intentionally shooting the victim: to eliminate a romantic rival; to collect insurance proceeds; to avenge some actual or perceived wrong; to repel aggression; to prevent the victim from perpetrating a crime or misdeed; and on and on. The applicable motive is the *goal* sought to be accomplished through the *intentional* killing of the victim.

We belabor the distinction between intent and motive because it provides a more recognizable way of looking at two separate aspects of this case: 1) the *intent* of the Legislature in creating the Plan on the basis of race (racial gerrymandering); 2) the *motives* of the Legislature or of individual or groups of legislators – whether compelling or not – for engaging in racial gerrymandering. Whatever the *motivations* of the Legislature or of the individual legislators who passed the Plan, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the *specific intent* of the Legislature – as an independent, collective organism – was indisputably to enact a plan that included two black and five white majority districts.

At the Evidentiary Hearing so much of the testimony purporting to discuss the intent of the Legislature, or those who sought to influence Louisiana's 1992 redistricting, confounded and confused *intent* or purpose with

motive or goal. More telling (and more candid) was the testimony at the Trial, a year earlier, concerning the *motive* for creating a second majority-black congressional district. That testimony differed markedly from its counterpart at the Evidentiary Hearing. In both proceedings the testimony on motive was considerably less uniform than was the virtually unanimous testimony regarding the Legislature's *intent* to create a second safe, black majority district. At least by implication, however, four immutable elements provided a common point of departure for all witnesses: 1) Louisiana had an unavoidable legal obligation to reapportion its congressional delegation; 2) reapportionment had to be in strict compliance with the constitutional imperative of one-person, one-vote, meaning that each of Louisiana's seven congressional districts had to contain roughly 603,000 residents; 3) given its failure to adopt a reapportionment plan in 1991, the Legislature would have to adopt a plan in its 1992 session that would be certain to receive immediate preclearance so that the congressional election, scheduled for the fall of that year, could be held; and 4) to obtain timely preclearance, i.e., voluntarily and not by court decree, any plan would have to include two safe, black majority districts.[21]

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[21] Even though the Legislature put itself under severe time constraints by failing to redistrict in 1991, the United States Department of Justice – not a party to this litigation – must be regarded as an active player in this case. As Louisiana is covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Legislature must either (1) have any proposed plan precleared by the Department of Justice, or (2) seek a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or

B. *Shaw v. Reno*: Inferential Proof of Racial Gerrymandering

Shaw deals primarily with proving racial gerrymandering *inferentially*. We proceed to examine the indirect or

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abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. . . . " Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). The testimony at the Trial and at the Evidentiary Hearing reflected overwhelmingly that the Attorney General's Office (AGO) had let it be known that preclearance would not be forthcoming for any plan that did not include at least *two* "safe" black districts out of seven. But neither Section 2, nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act justifies the AGO's insistence upon two black districts.

To challenge a redistricting plan under Section 2 successfully, plaintiffs who are members of a cognizable racial group must demonstrate that their group is *numerous* enough and *geographically compact* enough to be a majority in a district. *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 122 L. Ed. 2d 388, 403 (1993) (extending the threshold requirements elaborated in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 46-47, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1986), to single member, as well as multimember, districts). Obviously, however, black voters in District 4 do not constitute a *geographically compact* body as required by *Gingles*. Neither would any district resembling District 4 be geographically compact. Consequently, the AGO cannot legitimately claim that Section 2 of the Voting Rights compels the creation of any redistricting plan that contains a tortured district like District 4. Unless a second geographically compact black majority district is possible, the State's failure to create one does not violates Section 2. *Growe*, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 404. This is not to say that Section 2 forbids the creation of such a plan; simply that Section 2 does not require it. *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 122 L. Ed. 2d 500, 513-14 (1993). Consequently, the AGO cannot rely on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to force a state to adopt a plan containing an additional majority-minority district with a geographically dispersed black majority.

circumstantial evidence of racial gerrymandering in the instant case.

Additionally, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act expressly states that "[n]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Voting Rights Act of 1965, Section 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Section 2 refuses to transform the individual right to vote into a group right to elect. Thus, Section 2 emphatically does not authorize the AGO to reject plans that fail to "give full effect" to minority voters, or otherwise to create a *de facto* requirement of proportional representation by rejecting all plans that fail to maximize the concentration of minority voters. The text of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act expressly declares that proportional representation is not required.

Neither can Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act – on the basis of the 1990 Census – justify the AGO's insistence that Louisiana adopt a congressional redistricting plan with two safe, black-majority districts. In *Beer v. United States*, the Supreme Court stated that "the purpose of Section 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a *retrogression* in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1976) (emphasis added); *accord Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 533. In this case, however, a redistricting Plan for the State of Louisiana that provided for one black majority district would have satisfied the requirement of nonretrogression.

As a result of the 1990 Census, Louisiana lost a seat in the United States House of Representatives: previously it had eight seats, now it has seven. Thus, even if the Legislature had adopted a plan with a single black majority district, that plan would have satisfied the Section 5 nonretrogression principle: whereas before black majority districts comprised one-eighth of all districts, under a new plan with one black majority district, such districts would constitute one-seventh of all districts, an increase of nearly two percent. Thus, the Section 5 nonretrogression principle does not, on the instant facts, require

1. The Shifting Evidentiary Burden

The Court in *Shaw* apparently intended to establish an evidentiary "minuet" for racial gerrymandering cases

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Louisiana to adopt a redistricting plan with a second black-majority district. Any suggestion by the AGO to the contrary was incorrect.

In summary, neither Section 2 nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act justify the AGO's insistence that Louisiana adopt a plan with two safe, black majority districts. Yet members of the Legislature uniformly believed that they needed to create such a redistricting plan to secure preclearance. The letters sent by the Office of the Assistant Attorney General (AAGO) in response to redistricting plans for the Louisiana Senate and the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) show how Louisiana legislators got this mistaken impression.

In these letters, the AAGO acknowledged that the plans "appear[ed] to have no retrogressive effect" and met "in large part . . . Section 5 preclearance requirements." Yet the AAGO refused to preclear the plans because – in its apparent judgment – they could have been drawn "in a manner that would more effectively provide to black voters an equal opportunity . . . to elect candidates of their choice," there a euphemism for black candidates. But, again, the Voting Rights Act does not require that a plan be drawn to maximize the efficacy of the black vote, and we perceive the AAGO's insistence upon such a result to be tantamount to an insistence upon proportional representation: an insistence that is expressly forbidden by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

In one letter the AAGO went so far as to suggest *how* the plan should be drawn to secure early preclearance by combining "significant concentrations of black voters in northeastern Louisiana and in the parishes bordering the State of Mississippi, both along the river and the state's southern border." Here – in a nutshell – was a blueprint for the highly irregular district known as District 4: a district that runs

analogous to the one established by *McDonnell Douglas v. Green* and *Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine*

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through the length and breadth of the State, a district that ignores traditional geographical and political boundaries, yet a district that the AAGO inappropriately hinted would have to be created if Louisiana was to secure preclearance. What was the authority for the AAGO's insistence? The answer presents itself: none.

When State authorities wrote back, explaining the historical, cultural, political, economic, and religious significance of the north-south divide in Louisiana, as a means of explaining and defending its proposed plan, the AAGO dismissed the explanation and concluded that lumping black voters together in a district "transcends the distinction between northern and southern parishes." What was the authority for this judgment: again, none! To reiterate, neither Section 2 nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that geographically dispersed black voters be lumped together to maximize the efficacy of their vote. That is nothing more than an AAGO "gloss" on the Voting Rights Act – a gloss unapproved by Congress and unsanctioned by the courts.

The Department of Justice did not conclude that Louisiana's concern with preserving its historic parishes was pretextual; it *decided* that creating black districts trumped traditional redistricting criteria. What was the authority for this policy decision? Yet again, none! As the AAGO concluded that the State BESE plan was not retrogressive with respect to the black vote, it necessarily admitted that the plan had no discriminatory effect. *See Beer v. United States*, 47 L. Ed. 2d 629, 639. Thus, the AAGO could legally reject the plan only if it determined – and presumably for non-arbitrary reasons – that the plan reflected discriminatory motives. *Georgia v. United States*, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S. Ct. 1702, 36 L. Ed.2d 472 (1973). But the AAGO did not so conclude.

Rather, the AAGO arrogated the power to use Section 5 preclearance as a sword to implement forcibly its own redistricting policies, rather than as a shield to prevent lamentable historical abuses. The Attorney General's Office has

in the Title VII context.[22] After a citizen establishes a cause of action by alleging that the reapportionment scheme adopted by his state is so irrational on its face that it can only be understood as an effort to segregate voters on the basis of race – thereby creating a presumption of unconstitutionality[23] – the burden shifts to the state to proffer a legitimate, non-racial explanation for the irrationally shaped districts in its plan.[24] If, per chance,

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no authority to withhold preclearance for reasons outside the ambit of the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, because any plan that entails more racial gerrymandering than is absolutely necessary to pass Voting Rights Act muster is potentially unconstitutional, *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 534, the AGO will risk encouraging unconstitutional conduct if it pressures states to gerrymander their districts to maximize the concentration of minority voters.

[22] *McDonnell Douglas v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); *Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). The three-step McDonnell-Douglas-Burdine "minuet" structures the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in the Title VII context. *Burdine*, 450 U.S. at 252-53. This minuet requires (1) the plaintiff to prove – by a preponderance of the evidence – a prima facie case of disparate treatment that contravenes Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection, and (3) the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's proffered explanation is pretextual. *Id.* at 253. At the end of the day, however, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that a violation of Title VII occurred. *See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993).

[23] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 536; *See also id.* at 528-29 (indicating that irregular shapes may imply impermissible racial gerrymandering).

[24] *Id.*

the state should answer, generally denying gerrymandering, and move for summary judgment, the plaintiff presumably would need to support such a presumption with summary judgment evidence, e.g., affidavits and depositions demonstrating legislative intent, violation of redistricting principles, or the like. But if the state advances a legitimate, non-racial explanation for the plan's irregularity, then the factfinder must – as always – weigh the evidence on both sides and decide whether the plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that the plan's irrational shape reflects racial gerrymandering.[25]

Although the Court in *Shaw* does not discuss the respective burdens borne by the parties in this shifting protocol, Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of proving – by a preponderance of the evidence – that the irregularity of

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[25] *See, e.g., Wright*, 376 U.S. 52 (in which the Court held that the plaintiffs had not "sustained their burden of proving that . . . [the plan] . . . segregates eligible voters by race and place of origin in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. . . . "); *accord Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S. Ct. 1858, 29 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1971). To clarify this minuet further, if a plaintiff comes into court with a map bearing hideously contorted districts and evidence that the state legislature drew those districts on the basis of race, and if the plaintiff complains that those districts lack a non-racial explanation – i.e., cannot be explained or understood without hypothesizing racial gerrymandering – then the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case under *Shaw*. If the state then introduces evidence that tends to show that the legislature was actuated by other motives that can explain the bizarre contours of the districts without resorting to race, the state has created a competing inference. The factfinder must then decide, on the basis of all available evidence, who is right.

the challenged districts reflects racial gerrymandering.[26] Proof on the merits would likely focus on the pretext of the state's proffered non-discriminatory reasons. Nevertheless, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiffs reflects a basic tenet of equal protection analysis: there can be no violation of the Equal Protection Clause unless those who complain demonstrate that the state has engaged in purposeful discrimination.[27] Thus, in this case, Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the Legislature was "motivated by racial considerations" when it adopted Act 42.[28] We find that the plaintiffs have met that burden – comfortably.

2. Plaintiffs' Cause of Action

In addition to stating a cause of action by alleging extreme irregularity of shape, a plaintiff may, under *Shaw*, strengthen the inference that the state engaged in constitutionally suspect racial gerrymandering by demonstrating the state's disregard of traditional districting principles.[29] As discussed above in section II B, the Plaintiffs have clearly alleged both that the Plan – particularly

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[26] *Id.*

[27] *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. at 66, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1980) (citing *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976)); Plaintiffs also have the burden of proving the invalidity of a reapportionment plan under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. ___, 122 L. Ed. 2d 500, 512 (1993).

[28] *Wright*, 376 U.S. at 55.

[29] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528.

District 4 – is highly irregular on its face, and that the Plan disregards traditional districting principles.[30] We therefore conclude that the Plaintiffs established a cause of action essentially identical to that alleged by the plaintiffs in *Shaw*. It consequently devolved upon the Defendants either to refute the allegations directly or to provide legitimate, non-racial explanations for the Plan's irrational shape and its disregard of traditional districting criteria.[31]

3. Defendants' Proffered Justifications

Apparently recognizing the impossibility of directly refuting high irregularity and violation of traditional districting criteria, the Defendants attempted to justify the Plan. During the entire Trial, not one witness ever suggested that the Legislature's *intent* in creating District 4

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[30] For example, Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he adoption of Act 42 . . . has resulted in the creation of at least two of seven districts which are devoid of any commonality of interest . . . geographical compactness, contiguousness [sic], consistency with existing political, societal, governmental or economic districts or jurisdictional boundaries, other than the racial designation of the majority therein." *See* discussion in section II B of this Memorandum Opinion for other examples of Plaintiffs' allegations.

[31] Recalling our pedagogic comparison with homicide, when the state attempts to convict a defendant of homicide using circumstantial evidence – essentially arguing that the facts are consistent with homicide, the defendant may attempt to show that the evidence is consistent with a far more innocent hypothesis: for example, an accident. The Defendants' opportunity to provide legitimate, non-racial explanations for the Plan's irrational shape is analogous.

was anything other than to create a second district with a super-majority of black voters by drawing its boundaries along racial lines. Indeed, most of the testimony of the Defendants' witnesses concerned how numerically large a black majority was needed to ensure the effectiveness of the Plan, which everyone conceded to be a product of racial gerrymandering.

At the Evidentiary Hearing, however, following as it did on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in *Shaw*, the Defendants – with the benefit of hindsight – attempted to deny the racial gerrymandering that they so candidly proclaimed and avidly defended a year earlier at the Trial. Specifically, the Defendants now suggest that two non-racial factors played key roles in the creation of the Plan: partisan/incumbent politics and socioeconomic commonalities. As discussed in the following section, we find the Defendants' explanations wholly unconvincing and in many respects disingenuous.

4. Choosing Between the Competing Inferences

Because of the procedural posture of *Shaw*, the court did not have to go beyond reversing the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss. Following a full merits trial here, however, we are obliged to decide whether the Plaintiffs have carried their burden of proving – by a preponderance of the evidence – that the Plan's irregularity and its disregard of traditional redistricting principles reflect racial gerrymandering. As we find that the *only sensible* explanation for the Plan's extreme facial irregularity and its flagrant deviation from

traditional districting criteria is that the Legislature intentionally segregated voters into congressional districts based on their race, we conclude that the Plaintiffs have overwhelmingly satisfied their burden of proving racial gerrymandering.

a. Plaintiffs' Inferential Evidence

1. The Plan is Highly Irregular

The most cursory inspection of the districts established by the Act 42 reveals several of them to be irregular, and District 4 to be highly irregular.[32] Like the fictional swordsman Zorro, when making his signature mark, District 4 slashes a giant but somewhat shaky "z" across the state, as it cuts a swath through much of Louisiana.[33] It begins north of Shreveport – in the northwestern corner of Louisiana, just east of the Texas border and flush against the Arkansas border – and sweeps east along that border, periodically extending pseudopods southward to engulf small pockets of black voters, all the way to the Mississippi River. The district then turns south and meanders down the west bank of the Mississippi River in a narrow band, gobbling up more and more black voters as it goes. As it nears Baton Rouge, the district juts abruptly east to swallow predominantly black portions of several more parishes. Simultaneously, it hooks in a northwesterly arc, appropriating still more black voters on its way to Alexandria, where it selectively

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[32] *See* Map, Appendix B.

[33] *Id.*

includes only predominantly black residential neighborhoods. Finally, at its southern extremity, the district extends yet another projection – this one westward towards Lafayette – adding still more concentrations of black residents. On the basis of District 4's physiognomy alone, the Plan is thus highly irregular, suggesting strongly that the Legislature engaged in racial gerrymandering.[34]

2. The Plan Violates Traditional Redistricting Principles

In *Shaw*, the Court reiterates the notion that states are not constitutionally *required* to adhere to the traditional redistricting principles of compactness, contiguity, respect for established political subdivisions, and commonality of interests.[35] The Court also observes that a state's *adherence* to traditional districting criteria "may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."[36] Yet a state's *disregard* of such criteria, emphasizes the *Shaw* opinion, may be evidence of constitutionally-suspect racial gerrymandering.[37]

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[34] *See generally Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511.

[35] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528-29 (citing *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 752, n.18, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1973)). The seminal case of *Major v. Treen* also discusses these traditional redistricting criteria and applies them to the Louisiana context. *Major v. Treen*, 524 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).

[36] *Id.* at 529 (citing *Kardner v. Daggett*, 462 U.S. 725, 755, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 77 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1983).

[37] *Id.* at 528.

Indeed, the Court in *Shaw* refers to a situation "in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles . . . " as a circumstance in which racial gerrymandering can be easily inferred, precisely because the state ignored such principles.[38] As a state's decision to disregard traditional redistricting criteria is probative of constitutionally-suspect racial gerrymandering, we closely examine the Plan's adherence (or, more accurately, non-adherence) to those principles; and we find that, for the most part, the Plan cavalierly disregards them.

a. Compactness

District 4 snakes narrowly across Louisiana soil from end to end for more than 600 miles.[39] A rectangle superimposed on the Z-shaped figure formed by District 4 would overlay two-thirds of the State. Additionally, as it winds along its erratic path, District 4 projects myriad diverticulae to encapsulate small sacs of otherwise widely dispersed black voters. No one could claim that District 4 is compact, at least not with a straight face.

b. Contiguity

District 4 was confected to satisfy the traditional districting criterion of contiguity, but only hypertechnically and thus cynically. When displayed on a map of the State, the district's boundaries seem several times

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[38] *Id.*

[39] *See* Map, Appendix B.

to narrow to a single point. This impression reflects reality, for at some places along its attenuated path, District 4 is no more than 80 feet wide. Such tokenism mocks the traditional criterion of contiguity.[40]

c. Respect For Political Subdivisions

As one witness explained at the Evidentiary Hearing, there is no more fundamental unit of societal organization in the history of Louisiana than the parish.[41] Whereas the previous congressional plan divided only seven of modern Louisiana's 64 parishes, scattering fractions of the same parish in more than one congressional district, Act 42 splits and scatters 28. District 4 is particularly aggressive in violating the boundaries of these traditional political and governmental units of the State: of the 28 parishes touched by District 4, only four whole parishes are included; but the district annexes only shards of 24 additional parishes, usually incorporating none but the predominantly black fragments of those shattered regions. Additionally, for the first.time in Louisiana history, with the advent of Act 42 a districting plan violates the boundaries of nearly all major municipalities in the State. With the exception of Lake Charles, the Plan fragments all major municipalities into more than one congressional district, thereby destroying the common

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[40] In complementary fashion, District 6 maintains contiguity only by employing gossamer connections at several junctions.

[41] A parish is analogous to a county, but it has its roots in, and takes its name from, the ministrations of the Catholic Church in early Louisiana history.

representation historically enjoyed by residents of the same municipality.[42]

d. Commonality of Interests

Within its irregular boundaries, District 4 subsumes bits of every religious, ethnic, economic, social, and topographical type found in Louisiana.

(i) Religion and Ethnicity

District 4 violates the traditional north-south ethno-religious division of the State. Along its circuitous route, this new district combines English-Scotch-Irish, mainline Protestants, traditional rural black Protestants, South Louisiana black Catholics, Continental French-Spanish-German Roman Catholics, sui generic Creoles, and thoroughly mixed polyglots, each from an historically discrete and distinctive region of Louisiana, as never heretofore so extensively agglomerated.

(ii) Economic Base

Cotton and soybean plantations, centers of petrochemical production, urban manufacturing complexes, timberlands, saw mills and paper mills, river barge depots, and rice and sugarcane fields are strung

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[42] Disregarding New Orleans, which comprises the majority of District 2, the major municipalities of Shreveport, Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Monroe, Alexandria, and Ruston are all rent asunder in this manner.

together to form the eclectic and incoherent industrial base of District 4. These diverse segments of the State economy have little in common. Indeed, their interests more often conflict than harmonize.

(iii) Geography and Topography

Red clay hills and pinelands, hardwood bottomlands and forests, alluvial floodlands, coastal plains, marshes, swamps and wetlands – all are present in District 4, which – as noted above – stretches more than half a thousand miles from end to end. What did the Legislature intend when it created District 4 – this non-traditional, little-in-common "un-district"? The indirect evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the Legislature specifically intended to create a plan with at least two majority black districts. Given the pre-existence of District 2, we find beyond cavil that the Legislature accomplished this by parceling voters into the remaining six districts on the basis of race.

b. Defendants' Counter-Proof

In contrast, we have been shown no credible evidence supporting the defense witnesses' proffered motivations of party and incumbency protection and socioeconomic commonality. Their explanations ring hollow. We find them to be no more than disingenuous, *post hoc* rationalizations.

In particular, we find that neither partisan nor incumbency politics was a significant factor in the core decision intentionally to create a plan containing a second

black majority district. At the trial, the Defendants never suggested that partisan or incumbent politics played a role in the determination to create District 4.[43] Indeed, Defendants' counsel objected to Plaintiffs' counsel's questions aimed at eliciting testimony about the Black Caucus-Republican Caucus alliance that supported Act 42, arguing that such testimony was political and therefore irrelevant to the case. Moreover, even though party and incumbency protection play some role – large or small – in virtually everything done in the legislative branches (and executive branches, for that matter) of our contemporary governments, this universal truism does not negate the compelling inference that Act 42 in general, and District 4 in particular, are products of racial gerrymandering. Additionally, without for a moment granting that incumbency politics played a significant role in the decision to create a second majority black

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[43] At the Evidentiary Hearing, Defendants introduced evidence of the role of incumbency, but it proved irrelevant to the issue of intentional segregation of voters by race. Such evidence showed, at most, that incumbency affected only the general location of the gerrymander that is District 4, i.e., the effective efforts of Congressional incumbents in "pushing" the preordained second black majority district generally as far north and east as possible. Thus it follows largely the northern boundary of Louisiana with Arkansas and the eastern boundary of Louisiana, i.e., the Mississippi River. But, as Louisiana had already lost one of its eight seats in the House of Representatives, creating a game of incumbents' "musical chairs," none should be surprised by the interesting but irrelevant fact that, once the decision to create a second minority-majority district had been made, each incumbent did what he could to keep his traditional geographical base and see that the new district was located anywhere but in his.

district, we question whether the Defendants could prevail in this litigation even if it had.

The Defendants seem to believe that they can defeat a claim of racial gerrymandering under *Shaw* if *any* factor other than race played *any* cognizable role in the creation of a challenged redistricting plan. Although we need not correct such a misconstruction of *Shaw* to find racial gerrymandering in this case, we briefly address this legal issue – *obiter dictum* – in hopes of shedding a little additional light on this difficult area of the law.

The Defendants evidently base their belief – that the presence of any non-racial motivating factor will excuse racial gerrymandering – on language found at the end of the *Shaw* opinion. There the Court indicates that a plaintiff *states a claim* under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a reapportionment plan is so irrational on its face "that it can be understood *only* as an effort to segregate voters. . . ."[44] This emphatically does not mean that if any other factor influenced the legislature the plaintiff is unable to establish a racial gerrymander. Rather, it means that if the contours and content of a redistricting plan *can* be wholly explained to be the product of one or more factors other than race, then the defendants have created a competing inference. The court must then weigh the competing inferences – as indeed it usually must – to decide whether the plaintiff has proved his inference by a preponderance of the evidence.[45] Thus,

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[44] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (emphasis added).

[45] *Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52, 57, 84 S. Ct. 603, 11 L. Ed. 2d (1964).

accurately stated, the question posed by *Shaw* is whether a redistricting plan can be reasonably conceived as the product of non-racial factors. In this case the Plan cannot.[46]

No one claims that the contours of District 4 can be wholly and alternately explained as a product of partisan or incumbency politics. Every single witness who addressed the issue either proclaimed or acknowledged that the creation of a second black majority district was

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[46] At the risk of flaying a dead horse, we point out that logic demands that the Defendants' reading of *Shaw* be rejected. Suppose a state legislature came right out and admitted that it racially gerrymandered districts in a reapportionment plan, thereby obviating the plaintiff's need to show racial gerrymandering inferentially. Could the state then say, "but we also drew a few district lines to protect incumbents, or to follow a river, or to put a state wildlife park in the district of a congressman who likes migratory birds," and thereby defeat plaintiff's claim because race *was not the only factor* involved in the delineation of districts? Race will never be literally the only factor. So *Shaw* requires only that race be an important factor. If the plaintiff's evidence shows that the plan cannot be understood without postulating that the legislature was significantly actuated by racial motives, then the plaintiff has made out a case of racial gerrymandering.

The cases of *Wright v. Rockefeller* and *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.* support this interpretation. In *Wright* every member of the court accepted that the plaintiffs stated a claim by alleging that the "New York Legislature was *either motivated by racial considerations*, or in fact drew the districts on racial lines." 376 U.S. at 54. Similarly, the Court in *Arlington Heights* noted that invidious discriminatory intent need not be the legislature's dominant purpose: proof that such discriminatory intent was "a motivating factor" in the legislation is sufficient. 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977).

the primary factor – or at least a substantial and important factor – in the creation of the Plan. We agree. There is no way that a rational factfinder – looking at the map and reviewing the *credible* evidence with care – could conclude that Act 42 can be explained entirely without reference to racial gerrymandering.

At the Evidentiary Hearing, Dr. Alan Lichtman, an expert witness for the Defendants, opined that District 4 – which appears so violative of traditional redistricting principles – actually possesses socioeconomic commonality and coherence. Dr. Lichtman contended that District 4 was distinguishable from other districts because its residents were relatively poor, relatively under-educated, and owned fewer telephones and automobiles than did the residents of other districts established by the Plan. The Defendants offered this evidence to suggest "a rational basis [for District 4] other than race."[47] We do not gainsay the conclusions of this witness, but we disagree that they have significance.

Any able statistician who looks at enough statistical characteristics (multivariate analysis) can find something distinctive about any district. In this case District 4 was found to be fairly poor, although poverty is not particularly distinctive in any region of Louisiana. Had District 4 been a fairly wealthy district, the Defendants' expert

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[47] The Defendants also offered this evidence to argue (1) that Act 42 served a compelling state interest by enhancing the representation for poor people – especially poor black people – and (2) that the Plan adhered to the traditional redistricting principle of "commonality of interests" and thus was narrowly tailored.

could have opined that the citizens of District 4 shared the common interest of wealth. And had District 4 fallen right in the middle, he could have explained that District 4 was distinctive in being the most solidly middle class. But all these observations are irrelevant because we find them to rise to no level higher than *post hoc* rationalization.[48]

The Defendants admit that the socioeconomic profiles of the Plan's districts were not *actually* used by the Legislature: the census data used in Defendants' statistical analyses were not even available to the Legislature

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[48] An additional criticism of Mr. Lichtman's statistical legerdemain is that the socioeconomic characteristics he analyzes are themselves strongly correlated with race, a classic chicken-or-egg fallacy. At this moment in history black people in the South (and generally in America) are – on the average – poorer and less well-educated than their white counterparts. Moreover, blacks in largely segregated communities are probably poorer – on the average – than blacks in more integrated communities. Consequently, racially gerrymandered plans, which seek to draw boundaries around various concentrations of black persons, will inevitably tend to concentrate the poorer, less well-educated blacks.

The Defendants' conclusions therefore have a tautological quality: to prove that factors other than race can explain District 4, the Defendants analyze socioeconomic factors that correlate strongly with race. Of course District 4 is relatively poor and relatively uneducated: it was intentionally filled with relatively poor and uneducated minorities. To use statistical parlance, Dr. Lichtman's conclusions are *spurious:* they tell us nothing that we could not have predicted based on the Legislature's decision to pack District 4 with black voters. For a more scientific discussion of such *spurious correlations*, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* 443-48 (McGraw-Hill 1972).

when it passed Act 42. More specifically, freshman Louisiana State Senator Tom Greene testified that no socioeconomic data was submitted with the various redistricting plans when they were considered by the Legislature. Thus, the allegedly distinctive socioeconomic profile of District 4 is factually unconvincing, methodologically flawed, irrelevant, and unquestionably a hindsight rationalization of a plan that everyone understands to have been principally designed to create two majority-black districts. More simply, the socioeconomic profile of District 4 is an *effect* of District 4's design, not a *cause*.

We see, then, that the Defendants' proffer of protection of incumbent politicians and distinctive socioeconomic profiles as alternative explanations for the peculiar contours of the Plan simply do not ring true. Faced with competing inferences, this court – as fact finder – must determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and choose between those inferences.[49] Concluding that the facts and inferences overwhelmingly favor the Plaintiffs, we find that the Plan is undeniably a child of racial gerrymandering.[50] Defendants must therefore demonstrate that Act 42 is narrowly

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[49]. *Wright v. Rockefeller*, 376 U.S. 52, 57, 84 S. Ct. 603, 11 L. Ed. 2d (1964).

[50] In finding that racial gerrymandering exists in this case, we feel confident that we are faithfully following the Supreme Court's temper in *Shaw*. In that case, the Court gives two examples of fact patterns in which proving racial gerrymandering "will not be difficult at all." *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528. One example is when "a State concentrate[s] a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect

tailored to satisfy a compelling state interest, as required by *Shaw* and other applicable Equal Protection Clause cases.[51]

C. Direct Proof of Racial Gerrymandering

We need not even consider the kind of indirect or inferential proof approbated in *Shaw* to reach the same point – a finding of racial gerrymandering. In this case, we also reach that junction when we consider the great weight of the *direct* evidence elicited at both the Trial and the Evidentiary Hearing.[52] Regardless of whether we reach a finding of racial gerrymandering by the inferential approach elaborated in *Shaw*, or by direct testimony and documentary evidence, the Defendants have the burden of justifying that gerrymandering.

In this case, direct evidence clearly and forcefully demonstrates that the Plan is a product of racial gerrymandering. Virtually every witness who testified at the Trial (all without the benefit of a retrospective, self-serving view of *Shaw*) either affirmatively stated or accepted

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for subdivisions." *Id.* Those facts squarely conform to this case. In the instant case, the Louisiana State Legislature created a serpentine belt 600 miles long to engulf enough blacks (actually, more than enough) to create a single super-majority district. According to the Court, this case presents a textbook example of racial gerrymandering that can be easily proved by application of the *Shaw* inferential minuet.

[51] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528; *see also supra* note 13.

[52] *See Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528 (implying that however a racial gerrymander is established, it should receive strict scrutiny). *See also supra* note 17 and accompanying text.

as gospel that the Plan was drawn with the *specific intent* of ensuring the creation of a second, safe, black majority congressional district: namely, District 4. The Defendants' witnesses either stated or conceded that the districts created by Act 42 were racially gerrymandered. Indeed, those witnesses, both lay and expert, spent most of their time at the Trial discussing how large the percentage of registered black voters needed to be in the new majority black district to guarantee the efficacy of their racial gerrymander – an efficacy they viewed as the *sine qua non* of preclearance.

In response to this court's query whether the Legislature had created a racial gerrymander, Defendants' counsel – Mr. Mongrue – said, "[a]nd [racial gerrymandering]'s exactly what [the Legislature] can do . . . " Similarly, Mr. Willie Hunter, a black state legislator and a fact witness for the Defendants, testified that the Legislature's *intention* "was to create a district where there was an excellent possibility of having another black elected . . . , and that to accomplish this they [the legislators] "looked at numbers [of black voters] period." Professor Engstrom, an expert witness for the defense, stated unabashedly that "race drove . . . [the creation of] . . . the Districts."

Not surprisingly, the Plaintiffs' witnesses were at least equally convinced that considerations of race motivated the creation of Act 42. State Representative Adley, a white legislator from Northwest Louisiana, testified that "the only issue presented to us was a racial issue" and stated that District 4 was created "for the sole purpose of making sure that an additional black district got created regardless of what it looked like and what parishes it ran

through . . . " Dr. Gary Stokley agreed that "this plan is [based on] race."

At the more recent Evidentiary Hearing, however, the Defendants attempted to recast their arguments in light of *Shaw* and to gainsay the racial gerrymandering that they so readily approbated during the pre-*Shaw* Trial. But even at this latter hearing the witnesses agreed that race was the overarching factor that drove the actual creation of the Plan, and that the Legislature had specifically intended to assort voters into districts based on race. Senator Marc Morial, a black legislator from New Orleans who appeared on behalf of the Defendants, testified that "[i]t was the intent of the Legislature to create . . . [a] . . . second majority black district." This is perhaps the clearest, most direct post-*Shaw* statement of intent, and the best illustration of the difference between *intent* and *motive*. Similarly, United States Congressman James A. Hayes (D. La) stated that the politics of race "was the major element" that drove the creation of the Fourth District. Dr. Lawrence N. Powell, one of Defendants' expert witnesses, agreed that "the primary determinant" of the shapes of Districts 2 and 4 was race.

During four full days of testimony, two in 1992 and two more in 1993, some witnesses stated that race was the only factor, while others said that race was the primary factor. One witness – apparently uncomfortable with saying race was the primary factor – admitted that race was a very important factor. Not one witness, Plaintiffs' or Defendants', testified that Act 42 was not largely a product of racial gerrymandering – not one.

Harking back to our homicide analogy, we note that although witnesses at the Evidentiary Hearing voiced various altruistic *motives* – or accused others of various ulterior *motives* – for intentionally employing racial gerrymandering to create voting districts on the basis of race,[53] everyone agreed that the *intent* of the Legislature – analyzed as a whole rather than from the point of view of its constituent members or caucuses – was to create a redistricting plan with a second majority black district.

The evidence showed that the Plan passed the Legislature by virtue of an uncommon alliance of legislators: Some who supported the Plan wanted a second supermajority black district to increase the number of black representatives in Louisiana's congressional delegation. Other supporters of the Plan perceived various benefits in the correlative whitening of some districts that attends the intentional segregation of black voters into other adjacent districts.[54] But there is absolutely no doubt that the immediate *intent* of the Legislature as a whole was to enact a plan containing two black majority districts, essentially without regard to any other considerations and interests.

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[53] Among the positive goals thus voiced were promoting racial harmony, increasing racial fairness, eradicating vestiges of past de jure segregation, and "obeying the law" in the sense of complying with the Voting Rights Act in a way that would justify preclearance, to name a few.

[54] Testimony at the trial revealed that Act 42 was passed by a legislative alliance between the Black and the Republican Caucuses, historically uncommon bedfellows but, according to expert testimony, a phenomenon occurring with increasing frequency across the country.

Viewed in any light, the direct evidence in this case proves the presence of racial gerrymandering. Thus, even in the event that we may have somehow misconstrued the Court's opinion in *Shaw*, or misapplied the inferential minuet established therein, the *direct evidence* that Act 42 was a product of racial gerrymandering is overwhelming. Two independent evidentiary bases (inferential and direct) thus support our finding that Act 42 reflects racial gerrymandering. Each is sufficient on its own to subject Act 42 to strict scrutiny, and each is consequently sufficient to require the Defendants to demonstrate that Act 42 is "narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest," as required by *Shaw* and other applicable Equal Protection Clause precedents.[55]

D. Strict Scrutiny of the Plan

Again, the core principle underlying the Supreme Court's decision in *Shaw* is that racially gerrymandered redistricting plans are subject to the same strict scrutiny that applies to other state legislation classifying citizens on the basis of race.[56] To survive such scrutiny, racially gerrymandered redistricting plans must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.[57]

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[55] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528.

[56] *See supra* note 13.

[57] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 528.

1. Compelling Governmental Interest

Defendants advance four possible compelling state interests to justify their racial gerrymandering: (1) conformity with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, (2) conformity with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, (3) proportional representation of Louisiana blacks in Congress,[58] and (4) remedying the effects of past racial discrimination. Witnesses also made oblique references to various other admirable but nebulous – and often question-begging – motives, like promoting racial harmony and ensuring fairness. As we conclude, however, that Act 42 is not narrowly tailored to further these or any other compelling state interests, we need not decide here whether any one or more of them – properly clarified – is such an interest. For the sake of judicial economy, then, we do not analyze them in detail. Rather, we assume –

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[58] At the Trial, Legislator Willie Hunter strongly advocated a second black majority district for the expressed goal of achieving black proportionality in congress. Without commenting – one way or another – on proportional representation's viability as a "compelling governmental interest," we foresee serious constitutional problems in accomplishing that goal through creation of a second black majority district. Evidence adduced here demonstrates that, of Louisiana black voting age population outside New Orleans, even the overloaded 63% black District 4 would produce the election of the [black] candidate of choice of fewer than 40% of those blacks whom the proponents of proportional representation want to be thus represented in Congress. Consequently, the Plan would constitute state action that, in effect, grants voting "proxies" *from* the black voters residing in Districts 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 *to* the black voters of District 4 – clearly a disenfranchisement implicating equal protection and possibly due process as well.

without granting – that one or all of them constitutes a compelling state interest.

2. Narrowly Tailored

By thus assuming – again, without granting – that the Defendants have articulated one or more compelling state interests that the Plan might further, we have shifted the focus of our strict scrutiny to the final aspect of *Shaw*: whether the Plan is narrowly tailored. In our final illustrative comparison with homicide, we note the parallelism between the hypothetical criminal defendant's burden – *at common law* – of establishing an affirmative defense – such as justifiable homicide – and the State's burden here of establishing the affirmative justification of a compelling state interest.[59] But even such affirmative

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[59] We realize that many states choose to make the absence of justification an element of the *actus reus*, thereby imposing upon the prosecution the burden of proving that the criminal defendant did *not* act in self-defense. As the Supreme Court has lately declined to review whether the Due Process Clause requires the burden of persuasion in self-defense cases to be placed on the prosecution, *see, e.g., Moran v. Ohio*, 469 U.S. 948, 105 S. Ct. 350, 83 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), state legislatures remain free to allocate burdens of proof "by labeling as affirmative defenses" aspects of a case that could alternatively be considered elements of a crime. *Patterson v. New York*, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977); *see also McElroy v. Holloway*, 451 U.S. 1028, 101 S. Ct. 3019, 69 L. Ed. 2d 398, 399-400 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For our purposes, however, such subtleties are irrelevant: as noted above, we are merely using classic common law homicide/self-defense as an instructive analogy.

defenses contain crucial limiting elements: the requirement of applying only reasonable force in the self-defense context, and the requirement of narrow tailoring in the compelling state interest context.

A homicide defendant, relying for acquittal on self-defense or justifiable homicide, must show not only that he had a reasonable fear of imminent harm from the aggressor/victim, but also that he used no more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. If a single, deterrent gunshot to the aggressor/victim's leg happens to cause death from uncontrollable hemorrhaging, the homicide may well be justified; but if the defendant fires two or three or four additional, immediately-fatal shots into vital areas of that same aggressor/victim's body after he has been neutralized by the first shot in the leg, the defendant is likely to find that the affirmative defense is unavailing.

In close parallel, *Shaw* tells us that, even in retrogression cases under Section 5, the State does not have carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering; its reapportionment plan must *not* go "beyond what [is] reasonably necessary" to further the compelling governmental interest.[60] That is the essence of narrow tailoring in the redistricting context: just as a homicide defendant may not use excessive force to stop an aggressor, neither may a state burden the rights and interests of its citizens more than is reasonably necessary to further the compelling governmental interest advanced by the state.

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[60] Shaw, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 534.

In this case, uncontroverted evidence from both the Trial and the Evidentiary Hearing convinces us that the Plan is not narrowly tailored to satisfy any of the supposedly compelling state interests advanced by the Defendants.[61] We reach that conclusion first because the Plan entails considerably more segregation than is necessary to satisfy the need for a second black majority district – even assuming arguendo that such a second district were itself justified – and second because the Plan excessively burdens a variety of third party interests – dramatically so.

In its *Shaw* opinion, the Supreme Court provides one example to illustrate how to apply the requirement that a racially gerrymandered plan be *narrowly tailored* to satisfy one or more compelling state interests: "A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to avoiding the goal of retrogression if the state went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression."[62] Thus, if providing a single majority-minority district satisfies the nonretrogression requirement imposed by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,[63] then a racially gerrymandered redistricting plan comprising more than one minority-majority district is not narrowly tailored to satisfy the compelling

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[61] As noted above, in this section we assume – arguendo – that the State has demonstrated a compelling state interest, although, in fact, we have not so found. Neither could we on the evidence here presented. That is a judgment for the Legislature to make and the courts to review.

[62] *Shaw*, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 534.

[63] *Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (interpreting Section 5 as prohibiting voting-procedure changes that "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities. . . . ").

state interest of comporting with Section 5.[64] Stated more broadly, as voters have an equal protection right not to be segregated by their state legislatures or local governments into various voting districts on the basis of race, only a plan that segregates to no greater extent than is reasonably necessary to further a compelling governmental interest can survive constitutional scrutiny. The same can be said for a plan that supersaturates a majority-minority district, while concomitantly depleting adjacent majority-majority districts of minority voters.

In this case, we find that the Plan entails more constitutionally suspect segregation than necessary, and is therefore not narrowly tailored. Continuing to assume arguendo that some state interest had been identified which could justify the creation of a second black-majority district, this Plan would have to be rejected as insufficiently narrowly tailored. It packs more black voters into a District 4 than are reasonably necessary to give blacks a realistic chance to determine the outcome of elections there, providing that they exercise their right to vote. Also, the boundaries of the district violate traditional

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[64] The Court's example clearly indicates that the State of Louisiana may not justify the Plan, or any other racially gerrymandered plan with more than one black majority district, by reference to the need to comply with the Section 5 nonretrogression principle. As noted above, because Louisiana lost a seat in the United States House of Representatives, a plan with one black majority district would satisfy the Section 5 nonretrogression requirement given no more dramatic shift in the statewide ratio of white-to-black voters than is demonstrated by a comparison of the 1980 and 1990 census figures. *See supra* note 21.

districting principles to a substantially greater extent than is reasonably necessary.

District 4 contains 63% registered black voters, significantly more than are needed to elect representatives of their choice. To greater or lesser degrees, all expert witnesses acknowledged – some only reluctantly under cross examination – that 63% black voting age population was well in excess of the percentage needed for reasonable comfort in creating a safe voting-age majority-minority district. For further confirmation that this is so we need only ask rhetorically "If 54% is sufficient in District 2, why must District 4 be supersaturated with 63% black voting age citizens?" No evidence was adduced by the Defendants to demonstrate a substantial difference between the voting patterns in the areas covered respectively by Districts 2 and 4 – either in white crossover or black block voting – to rationalize the 54%-63% disparity in black voting age populations.

Although the witnesses at trial disagreed on the exact percentage of net white cross-over votes for black candidates, we find that the evidence supported an average, *net* white cross-over vote in non-judicial elections of between 10% and 25%.[65] The evidence at trial also indicated that minority voter registration is now comparable

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[65] In other words, on the average – for non-judicial elections in Louisiana – black candidates will gain more votes from white cross-over voters (whites voting for black candidates) than they will lose from black cross-over voters (blacks voting for white candidates): thus, there is a positive *net* white cross-over vote. To put it another way, black voters are – again on the average – more racially coherent/conscious than white voters.

to white registration. Clearly, District 4 need not contain a black voting age population of 63% to satisfy the interest of a second district in which black officials can be readily elected. And, although it is not the province of this court in this case to establish the demographic specifications of the State's congressional redistricting plan, we find on the basis of the credible testimony and documentary evidence, that in this instance a district with a black voting age population of not more than 55% – and probably less – would have been adequate to ensure that blacks could elect a candidate of their choice, assuming they chose to exercise their franchise and assuming the candidate of their choice had more than a modicum of appeal for non-black voters.

Additional confirmation that the Plan is not narrowly tailored lies in its excessive disregard of traditional redistricting criteria and its derogation from third-party interests. Supreme Court precedent indicates that a variety of factors, both relative and absolute, are germane to analyzing whether a government measure is narrowly tailored. These factors include (1) the necessity of the measure, (2) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral measures, (3) the availability of more narrowly tailored (less intrusive) measures, (4) the flexibility and duration of the measure, and (5) *the impact of the measure on the rights of third parties.*[66] Relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence

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[66] See, e.g., *Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 510-511, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989); *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 94 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1987); *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448, 510-15, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 65 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1980).

thus suggests that – in essence – a plan is not narrowly tailored if it adversely affects more interests, if it generally wreaks more havoc, than it reasonably must to accomplish the articulated compelling state interest. We find that the Plan thus offends.

Whether under a relative or a comparative analysis, the evidence adduced at Trial and at the Evidentiary Hearing undeniably established that, even in the face of the black population's wide dispersion in Louisiana (outside New Orleans), a second black majority district could have been drawn that would have done substantially less violence to traditional redistricting principles. For example, Marc Morial stated that "[t]here were alternatives which would have created a more compact black district that were not enacted. . . . " Similarly, Congressman Hayes admitted that a more compact plan could have been enacted. Freshman United States Congressman Cleo Fields – the former state senator and incumbent congressman from new District 4, who testified for the Defendants – also acknowledged that "it would have been possible to fulfill the desire of a second [black] majority district . . . and pay more attention than this District [District 4] does to both compactness and contiguity."

Dr. Alan Lichtman – one of the Defendants' expert witnesses at the Evidentiary Hearing – likewise testified that, were he to sit down with Dr. Ronald Weber (the expert on the other side) they "could create a [second black majority] district that looked better than this one [district 4]." And Dr. Weber – the Plaintiffs' expert witness at both the trial and the evidentiary hearing – testified that a plan could be devised that would include a second black majority district, yet still be significantly

more compact and comport much more closely with other traditional redistricting principles

The testimony of freshman state Senator Tom Greene at the Evidentiary Hearing was perhaps the most enlightening on this point. He stated that, with the neutral assistance of the Legislature's redistricting computer technician, he (Greene) actually created a plan that evinced greater respect for Louisiana's traditional parish boundaries than the Plan, and still included a second majority-black district. Finally, Mr. Glenn Koepp, who is the Assistant Secretary of the Senate and the technician in charge of reapportionment activity in Louisiana since 1981, testified that computer-supported mathematical modeling programs gave the State the tools to create several plans – including several with a second black district – that would respect traditional redistricting criteria to a much greater degree than does the Plan. Thus, the great weight of the credible evidence indicates that the Legislature could have developed and adopted a redistricting plan – even one with a second majority black district – that reflected greater respect for traditional redistricting criteria and that was less disruptive to the traditional political, social, economic, ethnic, geographical, and religious organization of the State. In short, substantially less extreme racially gerrymandered plans are readily available; plans without such obviously overbroad, overarching overkill.

In summary, we hold that the Plan is *not* narrowly tailored, either relatively or absolutely. This is so because it embraces considerably more racial gerrymandering – and thus more segregation – than is needed to satisfy any

advanced state interest, and because the Plan unnecessarily violates a host of historically important redistricting principles, thereby adversely affecting countless third party interests. These several and varied interests – some constitutionally protected and others merely important – may not be callously sacrificed on the altar of political expediency, particularly when less broadly tailored plans are conceivable.[67]

IV

CONCLUSION

We find that the Plan in general and Louisiana's Congressional District 4 in particular are the products of racial gerrymandering and are *not* narrowly tailored to further any compelling governmental interest. We are therefore constrained to conclude that the Plaintiffs' right

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[67] We offer no opinion as to how much more narrowly tailored a plan would have to be to survive strict scrutiny. Indeed, we cannot say whether it is even possible – based on the 1990 Census – to devise a plan that would have two majority-minority districts and still be narrowly tailored *vel non*.

Even a plan that under the circumstances is as narrowly tailored as possible – in a *relative sense* (i.e., the least invasive and damaging plan available to further a compelling state interest) – may fail to be sufficiently narrowly tailored – on an *absolute* basis – to pass constitutional muster. For example, when the minority population is spread so evenly throughout a state that a majority-minority district cannot be drawn without dramatically impairing the constitutional rights of the citizens of that state, there may simply be no constitutionally permissible way to draw such a district, no matter how defensible the legislature's motives for wishing to do so, or how *bona fide* its efforts to tailor the plan narrowly.

to equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution is violated by the Plan. Consequently, we declare Act 42 of 1992 to be unconstitutional and the redistricting plan embodied therein to be null and void; and we enjoin the State of Louisiana from holding any future congressional elections based on the Plan. We do not, however, invalidate the 1992 congressional elections held thereunder; but we do hold that the term of office of each member of the United States House of Representatives from Louisiana who represents a district created under the Plan – and each district thus created – shall expire, *ipso facto*, at noon on the 3rd day of January, 1995, such terms of office and such districts not to be extended or carried over into the next Congress in any manner whatsoever.

APPENDIX A

The Seven Districts Created by Act 42

District	Total Pop.	Total White	Total Black	Total Reg. Vot.	Total Reg. Wh.	Total Reg. Blk.
District 1	602,859	528,079	60,895	325,140	296,356	26,238
	100.00%	87.60%	10.10%	100.00%	91.15%	8.07%
District 2	602,689	213,832	367,460	295,953	113,917	177,634
	100.00%	35.48%	60.97%	100.00%	38.49%	60.02%
District 3	602,950	454,235	131,735	329,451	256,990	70,016
	100.00%	75.34%	21.85%	100.00%	78.01%	21.25%
District 4	602,884	198,389	400,493	309,357	112,241	195,351
	100.00%	32.91%	66.43%	100.00%	36.28%	63.15%
District 5	602,816	463,168	133,329	321,508	259,986	59,748
	100.00%	76.83%	22.12%	100.00%	80.86%	18.58%
District 6	602,854	502,982	87,718	329,071	289,575	38,032
	100.00%	83.43%	14.55%	100.00%	88.00%	11.56%
District 7	602,921	478,453	117,651	331,814	271,798	58,944
	100.00%	79.36%	19.51%	100.00%	81.91%	17.76%
Total	4,219,973	2,839,138	1,299,281	2,242,294	1,600,863	625,963
	100.00%	67.28%	30.79%	100.00%	71.39%	27.92%

APPENDIX J



(Filed Dec. 28, 1993)

Walter, District Judge, concurring:

I concur with the result of the majority opinion. However, since my examination of the case differs somewhat analytically, I write separately.

This court considered several questions: May a State enact a race-based reapportionment plan? If so, under what circumstances are race-conscious measures allowed? Finally, how do these requirements apply to Act 42.

I

LAW

> [I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved . . .
>
> The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law . . .
>
> The sure guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments, national and

> state, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States, without regard to race.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 (1896) (Harlan, dissenting).

A

CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN REDISTRICTING LEGISLATION

Despite the legislation enacted to promote racial equality, many states remained recalcitrant to the Civil War amendments' mandates. Among the methods used by the states to evade the fifteenth amendment were poll taxes, literacy tests, and gerrymandered[1] districts. Responding to this perversion, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 "as a dramatic and severe response to the situation." *Shaw v. Reno*, – U.S. –, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2823 (1993). Amended in 1982, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the dilution of a minority group's voting strength while section 5 mandates pre-clearance of newly created districts for those states that employed disenfranchising schemes in the past. The purpose of the voting rights legislation is to prohibit State efforts to

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[1] Gerrymander is "[a] name given to the process of dividing state or other territory into the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.)

abridge or deny minority representation. To this end, when pre-clearance is sought under section 5, the Department of Justice usually seeks maximization of minority voting strength to promote minority representation.[2] Since legislators are thus obligated to consider racial factors when redistricting, a delicate balance arises between promotion of minority suffrage and the color-blind strictures of equal protection.

B

EQUAL PROTECTION

"No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14 §1. Interpreting this clause nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court held in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537, 558, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 (1896) that the separate but equal doctrine comported fully with the Fourteenth Amendment. *Id.* at 548. "The majority [in *Plessy*] held that persons could be legally classified and treated in such a manner because of their race when the classifying law was a reasonable exercise of the police power. This meant that such laws must be reasonable, good faith attempts to

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[2] It is my opinion that *Shaw v. Reno* did not fully address the constitutional or statutory authority behind Department of Justice pre-clearance requirements that arguably go beyond the Voting Rights Act. Thus, the Supreme Court may very well hold the Department of Justice's reliance on minimum "safe" percentages unconstitutional. I do not reach that question today but am troubled by the effect that these demands are having upon states seeking administrative pre-clearance rather than a declaratory judgment from the District Court of the District of Columbia.

promote the public good and not be designed to oppress a particular class." John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, *Constitutional Law*, 618 (1991). As the Court itself stated:

> [W]e think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548, 16 S.Ct. at 1142.

Fifty-eight years later, *Plessy's* flawed concept of equal protection was rejected. Although *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954) did not expressly overrule *Plessy* outside the realm of education, that case heralded the demise of separate but equal treatment of the races by the states. Over the past four decades, the Supreme Court has confronted the consideration of race in State and federal legislation and has fashioned specific guidelines for testing the constitutionality of such considerations.

The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause "is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race." *Shaw v. Reno*, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics of racial hostility." *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company*, 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 722 (1989). Accordingly, the Court has "held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires

state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct at 2825. This test is known as strict or heightened scrutiny and is justified because:

> [a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.

Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. at 721. These equal protection principles apply to statutes that "although race-neutral, are, on their face, 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' " and classifications that are ostensibly neutral but are an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct at 2825 (citing *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)).

Under current equal protection doctrine, "race-conscious state decisionmaking is [not] impermissible in ***all***

circumstances." *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct at 2824 (emphasis in original). If State legislation contains explicit racial classifications, if it is inexplicable on grounds other than race, or if it contains race-neutral classifications that serve as mere pretext for racial discrimination, then courts are bound to apply the strict scrutiny regime. The classification must be ***justified*** by a ***compelling*** state interest, and then be ***narrowly tailored*** to fit that interest in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.

C

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION

Redistricting legislation is almost always race-neutral on its face. Before *Shaw*, the Supreme Court had

> held that only two types of state voting practices could give rise to a constitutional claim. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test . . . The second type of unconstitutional practice is that which affects the political strength of various groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As for this latter category, [the Court] insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.

Shaw, 113 S.Ct at 2834 (White, J. dissenting). The latter category, known as "dilution," arises when voters are not deprived of the right to vote, but, through methods such as "cracking," "stacking," and "packing," certain groups

are denied an *effective* vote. *See, United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) ("UJO"); *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed2d 500 (1993). Acknowledging UJO and its progeny, *Shaw* went further, holding that "district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption." *Id.* at 2926.

Supporting this holding is the now famous case of *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 346 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960) in which the Alabama legislature redefined the boundaries of Tuskegee, essentially excluding all but a few black citizens from the district. The result was "a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure." *Id.*, at 341. The Court found the scheme repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment, holding:

> . . . Act 140 was not an ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering. If these allegations upon a trial remain uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purpose to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters . . .
>
> It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles by which this Court must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously defined, obviously discriminate against colored citizens.

Id. at 341, 342. Therefore, racial gerrymandering, or legislation that manipulates district lines to achieve a predetermined racial result is subject to strict scrutiny.

D

PROVING A RACIAL GERRYMANDER

"Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563. Such invidious discriminatory intent or purpose need not be the legislature's dominant or primary consideration. Rather, proof that invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the legislation will suffice. *Id.* Because improper racial classifications rarely appear on the face of legislation, the Supreme Court has identified subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed. For example, legislation that "bears more heavily on one race than another" may indicate discrimination, *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976), as will historical patterns, *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 267, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564 (1977), legislative history, *Id.*, irrationality pointing to nothing but racial classification, *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886), and direct evidence adduced, as in this case, before a three judge panel. *Shaw* stands for the proposition that bizarre reapportionment schemes such as that challenged in North Carolina and Act 42 fall into the *Yick Wo* category and may, in and of themselves, be evidence of invidious discrimination.

Of course, these indicators may be rebutted by evidence of wholly legitimate purposes. "The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions." *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct. at 2826. When such legitimate purposes are disclosed and ***accepted by the court***, heightened scrutiny is inappropriate. However, if the grounds asserted are an obvious pretext for racial discrimination or are simply *post hoc* arguments contrived to shield the segregation from judicial inquiry, the court must pursue the strict scrutiny regime.

E

STRICT SCRUTINY: WHEN IS A STATE INTEREST COMPELLING AND WHAT DETERMINES NARROW TAILORING?

1

COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

Few interests will be deemed "compelling" enough to justify State classifications according to race. The Supreme Court has given little indication as to what satisfied this portion of the strict scrutiny regime. However, the Court has accepted the correction of past governmental and private sector discrimination, *Richmond v. J.A. Croson*, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed. 854 (1989), ethnic and racial diversification in the faculty and student bodies of state operated universities and professional schools, *see Regents of the University of California v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), and has suggested that States have a "very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that

are constitutionally valid as interpreted and applied." *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct. at 2930. Despite the language in *Bakke*, the Court seems unwilling to allow any race-based measures outside a remedial setting[3]. *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. at 721.

Although the States and their subdivisions may take action to remedy discrimination, "they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief." *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 503, 109 S.Ct. at 727. That identification occurs when "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations" are made. *Bakke*, 438 U.S. at 308-309, 98 S.Ct. at 2757-2758. Otherwise, "the dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 728.

2

NARROWLY TAILORED

Once an interest has been properly identified and accepted as compelling, the court must examine the classification in order to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to "fit" the interest involved. In deciding whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, the court may consider several factors. Among these are the

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[3] Compliance with federal law under the Voting Rights Act may be viewed as remedial and, therefore a state interest and perhaps compelling.

necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. *U.S. v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 169, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1066, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987). However, the relief must not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to accomplish the compelling interests. *See, Shaw*, 113 S.Ct. at 2831.

Therefore, this court must first determine how the districts were drawn, that is, whether they were drawn along race lines or not. To do so, this Court will examine the factors listed in section D above. If the State counters with a legitimate non-racial explanation for Act 42's configuration, this Court will defer to the Legislature and refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions. However, if a motivating factor behind the reapportionment scheme was racial, strict scrutiny applies. Then we turn to whether the State had a compelling interest supporting racial discrimination. We will expect the State to provide specific evidence warranting its action and require a nexus between the action and the interest. Finally, we will examine whether Act 42 itself was narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest in light of the factors discussed above.

II

ANALYSIS

A

ACT 42 IS A RACIAL GERRYMANDER

This court found the evidence to indicate overwhelmingly that the intent of legislature was to divide

Louisiana's congressional districts along racial lines. The inferential evidence and the direct testimony of legislators for both the plaintiffs and the State allow no other conclusion. It is true that the State attempted to demonstrate non-racial explanations for the highly irregular districts. In light of the testimony at both the trial and evidentiary hearing, these suggestions are but *post hoc* rationalizations.

The evidence before the Court demonstrated that the State Legislature acted as it did to gain pre-clearance and contrived the interest of correcting past discrimination for the purpose of the evidentiary hearing alone. Finally, as the majority notes above, most witnesses readily admitted to the availability of other plans less offensive to traditional districting patterns and or smaller racial discrepancies.

B

ACT 42 IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY

As our factual findings denote, Act 42 is a clear example of a racial gerrymander. Specifically, District 4 permits no conclusion other than classic segregation. Both the facial irregularity without plausible non-racial explanation[4] and

---

[4] The defense elicited testimony that District 4 actually represents certain commonalities of interest. Essentially, the State suggested that certain interests are predominantly shared by Blacks and therefore District 4 has a sufficient non-racial justification. This is exactly the type State action that our color-blind Constitution prohibits. As the *Shaw* Court held:

> "A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are

the explicit testimony of the legislators require this finding. Since redistricting along racial lines was a *motivating factor*, Act 42 is subject to strict scrutiny. This panel must now determine whether Act 42 was justified by a compelling governmental interest and that the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose were narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.

> otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group – regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live – think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract.
>
> The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. When a district is obviously created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy." *Id.* at 2827.

I agree with what I perceive to be Justice O'Connor's views. If a multi-cultural State in which voters shared interests not according to the color of their skin but the content of their lives and experiences was the Legislature's goal, the tampering would have resulted in more evenly split districts. The races would then have to reconcile their differences with one another and move forward on common ground.

1

COMPELLING INTERESTS

The State advanced two main compelling interests behind the racial gerrymander. I discussed the findings required by *Croson*, *Wygant*, and *Bakke* when a State attempts to rely on prior discrimination as a foundation for remedial action. I see no reason why the same analysis should not apply when a state argues that compliance with federal anti-discrimination law mandated the jurisdiction's race-based action. In order to rely on "remedying past discrimination" and "obeying the law," a State must "demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." *Croson*, 488 U.S. at 510, 109 S.Ct. at 730. I examine each purported interest in turn to see if the State has met this burden.

a

Past or Present Discrimination

"Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy." *Wygant*, 476 U.S. 276, 106 S.Ct. 1848. The Supreme Court has firmly held that States must have "convincing evidence that remedial action is *warranted*." *Id.* While there is no doubt that Louisiana has a sorry history of race relations, the defense did not provide evidence that the Legislature had before it the necessary factual predicate warranting a voluntary affirmative action redistricting plan. In fact, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not create Act 42 for the purpose of remedying past discrimination at all. Thus, if the State

does intend to redistrict along racial lines with the goal of correcting past electoral discrimination, it must demonstrate what evidence warrants a finding of discrimination and how a specific plan relates to the elimination thereof.

b

Pre-clearance from the Department of Justice

The State legislators acted under the assumption that failure to create a second majority-minority district would result in the denial of pre-clearance by the Department of Justice This assumption seems to be founded upon the rejection of two non-congressional plans by the Department of Justice. However, both letters from the Civil Rights Division acknowledged that the plans satisfied Section 5 pre-clearance requirements but rejected the plans because they could have been drawn more effectively. The *Shaw* opinion held that a state interest in complying with federal law is compelling only as constitutionally interpreted and applied. Additionally, by pointing out the distinction between what the law *requires* and what it *permits*, the Court stated that even valid plans under the Voting Rights Act must comport with the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Voting Rights requirements do not give covered jurisdictions *carte blanche* to engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of non-retrogression. the question for this court is whether the State of Louisiana had a strong basis in evidence for the belief that failure to create a second majority-minority district would violate Section 2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

(1)

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 was enacted to accomplish the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. Specifically, Section 2(a) prohibits the imposition of any electoral practice or procedure that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color." This section therefore rejects State actions that, "interacting with social and historical conditions, impair the ability of a protected class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters." *Voinovich v. Quilter*, – U.S. –, 113 S.Ct 1149, 1155 (1993). If, under the totality of the circumstances, a State's apportionment scheme has the effect of diminishing or abridging the voting strength of a protected class, a Section 2 violation has occurred. *Id.* These "dilution" claims involve three threshold conditions.

> First, they must show that the minority group 'is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district.' Second, they must prove that the minority group " 'is politically cohesive.' " Third, the plaintiffs must establish 'that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.'

Id. at 1157 (quoting *Gingles*, 507 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S.Ct 2752, 2766, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). District 4 is evidence alone that the minority population large enough to constitute a majority in a single member district is not geographically compact. Without satisfaction of this initial

Gingles condition, it is impossible to find that the State had a rational basis to believe that failure to create a second majority-minority district would violate Section 2. Reliance on possibly invalid applications of the Voting Rights Act by the Department of Justice cannot create a compelling state interest. If so, the Department of Justice and various States could sidestep the holdings of *Croson*, *Gingles*, and *Shaw* with ease.

(2)

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

Similar findings are required under the "non-retrogression" analysis of Section 5. If the State had no basis to believe that one majority-minority district out of seven districts would constitute retrogression, then reliance on Section 5 as a compelling interest is misplaced. "Under [the nonretrogression] principle, a proposed voting change cannot be pre-cleared if it will lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." *Shaw*, 113 S.Ct at 2830 (quoting *Beer v. U.S.*, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1364, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976). On its face, creating one district out of seven when the previous ratio was one district out of eight is not retrogressive. Once again, the legislature appears to have founded their belief that one district out of seven is retrogressive completely on the Department of Justice's previous unrelated rulings and the assumption that a gerrymandered second district was a requisite to pre-clearance. Without restating the points made above, I find

such an assumption, without additional evidence, uncompelling.

In summary, I find *post hoc* reliance on past discrimination and warrantless assertions that the Voting Rights Act mandated a second district, unpersuasive. This is not to say that the State cannot rely on those interests to justify future affirmative action. Rather, I find that the basis forwarded by the State to claim these interests as compelling is so slim that they reek of the pretextual and the contrived.

2

NARROWLY TAILORED

Even if this panel were to overlook the dearth of *Croson*-type findings in this case, Act 42 cannot be termed narrowly tailored to fit the interests above. Since I concur in the majority opinion, I find no reason to reiterate their conclusions that Act 42 is not narrowly tailored to fit any compelling interest.

III

CONCLUSION

I am gravely disturbed by the history of racial discrimination in this country and State, but I believe that segregation of voters by race will achieve nothing but more discrimination, more separation, more animosity and would push Justice Harlan's and Dr. King's dream for this nation ever further into the future. One hundred and thirty years ago this nation endured a bloody civil war to ensure freedom and equality for all. That pledge,

so dearly bought, remains elusive, but the concept that people defined only by race should receive separate representation in the legislative bodies of our government mocks the goals for which so many have suffered and died. Indeed, in my opinion, it breathes life into the discredited doctrine announced by the majority in *Plessy*, forty years after the Supreme Court administered what **should** have been its mortal wound.

The districts created under Act 42 are the creatures of a racial gerrymander. The circumstantial and direct evidence supported no other conclusion. Therefore, strict scrutiny applies to Act 42. Under that regime, the justifications offered by the State for its race-based measures were not accompanied by the requisite factual predicate. Additionally, the measures taken were not narrowly tailored to fit the interests, however baseless, advanced by the State.

APPENDIX K
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHEREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522

RAY HAYS, ET. AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET. AL.,

DEFENDANTS

(filed Aug. 27, 1992)

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

The request for injunction is **Denied.** This court will not interfere with the 1992 congressional elections.

The constitutional claims of the plaintiffs, state and federal, are **Denied.**

The issues under the Voting Rights Act are taken under advisement. Supplemental briefs on the question of whether specifically, under the totality of the circumstances, the redistricting plan embodied in Act 42 of 1992 dilutes the voting strength of any group, white or black, within the seven congressional districts created by the Act, or any of them, in violation of the Voting Rights Act.

Briefs shall be filed by the close of business, September 28, 1992; The Attorney General of the United States is invited to file amicus brief.

THIS DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 27th day of August, 1992

s/_____
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr.
United States Circuit Judge

s/_____
John M. Shaw
Chief United States District Judge

s/_____
Donald E. Walter
United States District Judge

APPENDIX L
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

No. 92-1522

No. 95-1241

RAY HAYS, ET AL.,

Plantiffs,

Versus

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Pending before this Court is the Defendants' Motion for New Trial or to Amend Judgment Under Rule 59 or to Amend Findings Under Rule 52(b). After full consideration of the Defendants' motion, it is **DENIED.**

THUS DONE AND SIGNED for the Court at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 24th day of 1996.

s/_____
DONALD E. WALTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX M

U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 provides:

> No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

42 U.S.C. §1973. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color through voting qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of violation

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42 USCS §1973b(f)(2)], as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. §1973c. Alteration of voting qualifications and procedures; action by State or political subdivision for declaratory judgment of no denial or abridgement of voting rights; three-judge district court; appeal to Supreme Court

Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 1973b(a)] based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 1973b(a)] based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) [42 USCS § 1973b(a)] based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 4(b) [42 USCS § 1973b(b)] are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does no have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the

guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42USCS § 1973b(f)(2)], unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standards, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State of subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made, Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code [28 USCS § 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

APPENDIX N

ACT OF 1994 2nd EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE

ACT No. 1

SENATE BILL NO. 1

BY SENATOR BRINKHAUS AND
REPRESENTATIVE DORSEY

AN ACT

To enact R S. 18:1276 and to repeal R.S. 18:1276.3; to provide for the redistricting of the state's congressional districts by redistricting the population into seven congressional districts according to population; to provide for the terms of members of congress currently serving; to provide for filling vacancies based on the districts; to provide with respect to elected and appointed positions and offices, other than congressional, which are based upon congressional districts; to provide for the effectiveness of the Act; and to provide for related matters.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1. R.S. 18:1276 is hereby enacted to read as follows:

§1276. Congressional districts

A. Louisiana is divided into seven congressional districts, and the qualified electors of each district shall elect one representative to the Congress of the United States.

(1) The first district is composed of that portion of Jefferson Parish designated as Precincts 3-G, 5-G, 9-G, 10-G, 1-H, 2-H, 3-H, 4-H, 5-H, 6-H, 7-H, 8-H, 9-H, 1-K, 2-K, 3-K, 4-K, 5-K, 6-K, 7-K, 8-K, 9-K, 10-K, 11-K, 12-K, 13-KA, 15-K, 16-K, 17-K, 18-K, 19-K, 20-K, 25-K, 27-K, 28-K, 34-K, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 170, 174A, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 191, 193, 194A, 195, 198, 210, 211, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, and 234; that portion of Orleans Parish designated as Precincts 3-20, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-10A, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-13A, 4-14, 4-14A, 4-15, 4-16, 4-16A, 4-17, 4-17A, 4-18, 4-18A, 4-19, 4-20, 4-20A, 4-21, 4-21A, 4-22, 4-23, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 7-33A, 7-40, 7-41, 7-42, 12-4, 13-1, 14-1, 14-2, 14-3, 14-4, 14-8, 14-9, 14-10, 14-11, 16-2, 17-1, 17-17, 17-18, 17-18A, 17-18B, 17-19, 17-19A, 17-20, and 17-21; St. Tammany Parish; Tangipahoa Parish; and Washington Parish.

(2) The second district is composed of that portion of Jefferson Parish designated as Precincts 1-G, 2-G, 4-G, 6-G, 7-G, 8-G, 11-G,13-KB, 14-K, 21-K, 22-K, 23-K, 24-K, 26-K, 29-K, 30-K, 31-K, 32-K, 33-K, 1-W, 2-W, 3-W, 4-W, 5-W, 6-W, 7-W, 8-W, 9-W, 104, 107, 115, 131, 133, 138, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157A, 157B, 171, 172, 173, 174B, 179A, 179B, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 194B, 196, 197, 212, 213A, 213B, 213C, that portion of Orleans Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-6A, 2-7, 3-1, 3-3, 3-

4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3 -9, 3-10, 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 7-1, 7-2, 7-4, 7-4A, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-9A, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 7-16, 7-17, 7-18, 7-19, 7-20, 7-20A, 7-21, 7-22, 7-23, 7-24, 7-25, 7-25A, 7-26, 7-26A 7-27, 7-27A, 7-27B, 7-28, 7-28A, 7-29, 7-30, 7-31, 7-32, 7-33, 7-34, 7-35, 7-36, 7-36A, 7-37, 7-37A, 7-38, 7-38A, 7-39, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, 8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, 8-11, 8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-18, 8-19, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22, 8-23, 8-24, 8-25, 8-25A, 8-26, 8-26A, 8-27, 8-27A, 8-28, 8-29, 8-30, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-3A, 9-3B, 9-4, 9-5, 9-5A, 9-6A, 9-6B, 9-6C, 9-6D, 9-6E, 9-6F, 9-7, 9-8, 9-8A, 9-8B, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12, 9-13, 9-14, 9-15, 9-16, 9-17, 9-18, 9-19, 9-20, 9-21, 9-22, 9-23, 9-24, 9-25, 9-25A, 9-26, 9-26A, 9-27, 9-28, 9-28A, 9-28B, 9-28C, 9-28D, 9-28E, 9-28F, 9-29, 9-29A, 9-30, 9-30A, 9-31, 9-31A, 9-31B, 9-31C, 9-31D, 9-31E, 9-32, 9-33, 9-33A, 9-34, 9-34A, 9-35, 9-35A, 9-36, 9-36A, 9-36B, 9-36C, 9-37, 9-37A, 9-38, 9-38A, 9-38B, 9-39, 9-39A, 9-39B, 9-40, 9-40A, 9-40B, 9-40C, 9-41, 9-41A, 9-41B, 9-41C, 9-41D, 9-42, 9-42A, 9-42B, 9-42C, 9-42D, 9-42E, 9-43, 9-43A, 9-43B, 9-43C, 9-43D, 9-43E, 9-43F, 9-43G, 9-43H, 9-43I, 9-43J, 9-43K, 9-43L, 9-43M, 9-43N, 9-44, 9-44A, 9-44B, 9-44C, 9-44D, 9-44E, 9-44F, 9-44G, 9-44H, 9-44I, 9-44J, 9-44K, 9-44L, 9-44M, 9-44N, 9-44O 9-44P, 9-44Q, 9-45, 9-45A, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10, 10-11, 10-12, 10-13, 10-14, 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, 11-10, 11-11, 11-12, 11-13, 11-14, 11-15, 11-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-19, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-5, 12-6, 12-7, 12-8, 12-9, 12-10, 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, 12-19, 12-20, 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5, 13-6, 13-7, 13-8, 13-9, 13-10, 13-11, 13-12, 13-13, 13-14, 13-14A, 13-15, 13-16, 14-5, 14-6, 14-7, 14-12, 14-13, 14-13A, 14-14, 14-15, 14-16, 14-17, 14-18, 14-18A, 14-19, 14-20, 14-21, 14-22, 14-23, 14-24, 14-24A,

14-25, 14-26, 14-26A, 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, 154, 15-5, 15-6, 15-7, 15-8, 15-9, 15-10, 15-11, 15-11A, 15-12, 15-12A, 15-13, 15-13A, 15-13B, 15-14, 15-14A, 15-14B, 15-14C, 15-14D, 15-14E, 15-14F, 15-14G, 15-15, 15-15A, 15-15B, 15-16, 15-17, 15-17A, 15-17B, 15-18, 15-18A, 15-18B, 15-18C, 15-18D, 15-18E, 15-18F, 15-19, 15-19A, 15-19B, 15-19C, 16-1, 16-1A, 16-3, 16-4,16-5, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8, 16-9, 17-2, 17-3, 17-4, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, 17, 17-9, 17-10, 17-11, 17-12, 17-13, 17-13A, 17-14, 17-15, and 17-16.

(3) The third district is composed of that portion of Ascension Parish designated as Precincts 1, 2A & B, 3, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B, 6, 7A, 8A& 8B, 9, 10A & 10B, 11A & 11B, 12,13, 14, 16A & 16B, 21A & 21B, 22A, 22B, 23, 34, 36, 40, and 41; Assumption Parish; Iberia Parish; that portion of Iberville Parish designated as Precincts 4, 5, 25, 25A, 25B, 26, 26A, 27, and 27A; that portion of Jefferson Parish designated as Precincts 1-GI, 1-LA, 1-LB, 2-L, 215, 216, 238, 246B, 247, 248, 249, and 250; Lafourche Parish; Plaquemines Parish; St. Bernard Parish; St. Charles Parish; St. James Parish; St. John the Baptist Parish; that portion of St. Martin Parish designated as Precincts 1-2, 1-5, 4-5, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 & 5-4, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 8-1, and 8-2; St. Mary Parish; and Terrebonne Parish.

(4) The fourth district is composed of that portion of Ascension Parish designated as Precincts 15, 27A, 27B, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35A, 35B, 37, and 42; that portion of Caddo Parish designated as Precincts 1, 3, 5, 6,7, 17, 23, 25, 29,30, 31,32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73A & 73B, 80, 81, 82A & 82B, 83A & 83B, 84, 85A & 85B, 86, 98, 99, 122, 130, 131, 132A & 132B, 133, and 140; De Soto Parish; that portion of East Baton Rouge Parish designated as Precincts

INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX A,

INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX B, 1-1, 1-2,1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-10, 1-11, 1-13, 1-14, 1-15, 1-16, 1-17, 1-18, 1-19, 1-20, 1-21, 1-22, 1-23, 1-24, 1-25, 1-26, 1-27, 1-28, 1-29, 1-30, 1-31, 1-32, 1-36, 1-37, 1-38, 1-45, 1-50, 1-51, 1-58, 1-59, 1-61, 1-62, 1-63, 1-66, 1-67, 1-68, 1-73, 1-76, 1-77, 1-84, 1-85, 1-86, 1-91, 1-92, 1-94, 1-95, 1-100, 1-101, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 2-9, 2-11, 2-16, 2-20, 2-22, 2-23, 2-24, 2-25, 3-5, and 3-20; that portion of Evangeline Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4-0R, 1-4-1R, 1-4C, 1-5-0, 1-5-1, 1-7, I-9-0C, I-9-1C, 1-9-2C, 1-9-3C, 1-10-0, 1-10-1, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13-0, 1-13-1, 1-15, 1-17-0R, 1-17-1R, 1-17C, 1-19, 5-1, 5-2-0, 5-2-1, 5-2-2, 5-3, 5-4C, 5-4R, and 5-5; that portion of Iberville Parish designated as Precincts 1, 2, 3, 6, 6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10A, 11, 12, 13, 13A, 13B, 14,14A, 14B, 15,15A, 16,17,17A, 18, 18A, 19, 19A, 20, 21, 22, 22A, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32; that portion of Lafayette Parish designated as Precincts 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24A, 24B, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 67, and 68; that portion of Natchitoches Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-3A, 1-4,1-4A 1-4B, 1-5,1-5A, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, I-9A, 1-10, 1-10A, 1-10B, 1-10C, 1-13, 1-14, 2-6A, 2-7, 2-8, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4,3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4,4-5, 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8; that portion of Pointe Coupee Parish designated as Precincts 8, 9, 10, 11, 12-A, 12-B, 13-A, 13-B, 14-A, 14-B, 18, and 19; that portion of Rapides Parish designated as Precincts 19, 21, 23, 29, 29A, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 35A, 36, 37, 38, 38A, 38B, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 77, 77A, 78 & 78A, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 88A, 89, 90, 91, 92, and 93; that portion of Red River Parish designated as Precincts 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 6-1, and 6-2; Sabine Parish; that portion of St. Landry Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-4A, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-9, 1-11, 1-13, 1-14, 1-15, 1-15A, 1-16, 1-16A, 1-16B, 1-18,1-19, 1-20, 1-21, 1-22,1-23,1-24, 1-25, 1-27, 1-29, 2-1, 2-2A, 2-9, 3-2, 3-4, 3-6, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5,

4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16, 5-1, 5-1A, 5-2, 5-3, 5-3A, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13A, 6-14, 6-15, and 6-17; that portion of St. Martin Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-3, 1-4,1-6, 1-7, 2-1 & 2-3, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, 6-3, 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 8-3, 8-4, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-4, and 9-5; and West Baton Rouge Parish.

(5) The fifth district is composed of Bienville Parish; Bossier Parish; that portion of Caddo Parish designated as Precincts 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 36, 47, 48, 49, 53, 56A & 56B, 62, 63, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76A & 76B, 77, 78, 79, 87, 88, 89A & 89B & 89C, 90A & 90B, 91A & 91B, 92, 93, 94, 95A& 95B, 96, 97A& 97B, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137A & 137B, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, and 159; Caldwell Parish; Claiborne Parish; East Carroll Parish; Jackson Parish; Lincoln Parish; Morehouse Parish; Ouachita Parish; that portion of Red River Parish designated as Precincts 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3; Richland Parish; Union Parish; Webster Parish; and West Carroll Parish.

(6) The sixth district is composed of Avoyelles Parish; Catahoula Parish; Concordia Parish; that portion of East Baton Rouge Parish designated as Precincts 1-7,1-8,1-9,1-12,1-33,1-34,1-35,1-39, 1-40, 1-41, 1-42, 1-43, 1-44, 1-46, 1-47, 1-48, 1-49, 1-52, 1-53, 1-54, 1-55, 1-56, 1-57, 1-60, 1-64, 1-65, 1-69, 1-70, 1-71, 1-72, 1-74, 1-75, 1-78, 1-79, 1-80, 1-81, 1-82, 1-83, 1-87, 1-88, 1-89, 1-90, 1-93, 1-96, 1-97, 1-98, 1-99, 1-102, 1-103, 2-3, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-17, 2-18, 2-21, 2-26, 2-

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*As it appears in the enrolled bill.

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(7) The seventh district is composed of Acadia Parish; Allen Parish; Beauregard Parish; Calcasieu Parish; Cameron Parish; that portion of Evangeline Parish designated as Precincts 1-6,1-8-0, 1-8-1, 1-8-2, 1-9R, 1-14,1-16,1-18-0C, 1-18-1C, 1-18R, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1-0, 3-1-1, 3-2-0, 3-2-1, 3-2-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6-0, 3-6-1, 3-6-2, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1-0R, 4-1-1R, 4-1-2R, 4-1-3R, 4-1C, 4-2-0, 4-2-1, 4-3, and 4-4; Jefferson Davis Parish; that portion of Lafayette Parish designated as Precincts 1, 2, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34A, 34B, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 60, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106; that portion of St. Landry Parish designated as Precincts 1-8, 1-8A, 1-10, 1-12, 1-17, 1-17A, 1-26, 1-28, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-5A, 2-6,

2-7, 2-8, 2-10, 3-1, 3-3, 3-5, 6-13, and 6-16; Vermilion Parish; and Vernon Parish.

B. The precincts enumerated in this Section are the precincts existing as of April 17, 1994 established by the governing authority of each parish in conformity with R.S. 18:1532.

C. With respect to any precinct enumerated herein which has been subdivided by action of a parish governing authority or registrar of voters on a nongeographic basis, or subdivided by action of the parish governing authority on a geographic basis, the enumeration herein of the general precinct designation shall be construed to include all polling subdivisions thereof or geographic subdivisions thereof, regardless of how such subdivision may be designated.

D. In any case in which a precinct as established by the parish governing authority includes an area of population which has been given an alphabetical designation in addition to the numerical designation for the purpose of convenience and clarity in taking and reporting the census count by the United States Bureau of the Census, the assignment of such precincts includes any alphabetically designated portion unless otherwise specifically enumerated in this Section.

E. This Section shall not reduce the term of office of any member of the Congress who was elected in the 1992 congressional election.

F. A vacancy in the representation of any congressional district which is filled after the effective date of this Section shall be filled as provided by law from that district as it is described in this Section.

G. This Section shall not reduce the term of any person

holding any position or office on the effective date of this Section for which the appointment or election is based upon a congressional district.

Section 2. R.S. 18:1276.3 is hereby repealed.

Section 3. This Act shall become effective upon signature by the governor or, if not signed by the governor, upon expiration of the time for bills to become law without signature by the governor, as provided by Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Louisiana. If vetoed by the governor and subsequently approved by the legislature, this Act shall become effective on the day following such approval.

Approved by the Governor, April 25, 1994.

A true copy:

W. Fox McKeithen
Secretary of State

APPENDIX O

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
1994 SECOND EXTRA SESSION
ACT NO. 1



APPENDIX P

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
1967–1970

BEST AVAIL

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
1971–1972



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CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
1973–1980



BEST AVA

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
1981–1992



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Nos. 95-1681, 95-1682, 95-1710

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAY 23 1996
CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA *ex rel.* RICHARD P. IEYOUB,
Appellant,

v.

RAY HAYS, *et al.*,
Appellees.

LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, *et al.*,
Appellants,

v.

RAY HAYS, *et al.*,
Appellees.

UNITED STATES,
Appellant,

v.

RAY HAYS, *et al.*,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

---

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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Counsel for Appellees

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS ◆ WASHINGTON, D.C. ◆ 1-800-347-8208

36 pp

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether these appeals are moot because Louisiana has repealed the challenged districting plan and adopted the court-ordered plan requested by the plaintiffs.

2. Whether the district court's finding that "race was the predominant factor" driving Act 1 was clearly erroneous.

3. Whether the district court erred when it found insufficient evidence of a compelling interest to justify segregation of Louisiana's voters by race.

4. Whether this Court should consider the appropriateness of the court-imposed plan when (1) such arguments were neither raised nor passed on below and (2) only the permissive intervenors have challenged the district court's remedy in this Court.

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MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Appellees respectfully request that this Court dismiss these appeals or, in the alternative, affirm the judgment of the three-judge District Court. That judgment for the second time held unconstitutional the Louisiana redistricting scheme set forth in Louisiana Acts 1994, First Extraordinary Session No. 1 ("Act 1").

These appeals are now moot because Louisiana has repealed Act 1, and thereby granted appellees the very relief they sought in this litigation. Indeed, Louisiana has not only repealed the constitutionally-repugnant Act 1, but it has specifically adopted the same redistricting plan ordered by the court below. *See* Louisiana Acts 1996, First Extraordinary Session No. 96 ("Act 96") (reprinted in Second Supp. to Opp. to Pending Applications for Stay, filed May 15, 1996 and attached in pertinent part hereto as Appendix A).

Unsuccessful both in the courts and the legislature, however, the supporters of Act 1 doggedly seek to keep this case alive by asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion reviewing that Act's constitutionality. But this litigation already has been resolved in the democratically optimal fashion—after having its day in court, the state legislature has ratified the court-ordered plan. The courts should seek to encourage such responsible legislative action, not to thwart it.

It would be remarkable, to say the least, for this Court now to punish Louisiana for voluntarily adopting the court-ordered plan. Although the Members of this Court have disagreed over the propriety of federal-court intervention in the redistricting process, all agree that the States, and not the federal courts, should have primary responsibility for that process. What has happened here is the best-case outcome for all concerned: rather than having a federal-court plan imposed on Louisiana by force, the State has decided to adopt that plan voluntarily. The political process has worked. Appellants' attempt to continue fighting their losing war in court must be soundly rejected.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the three years since this Court's decision in *Shaw v. Reno,* 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the three-judge court below has held *three* trials on the constitutionality of Louisiana's redistricting plans, and has *three times* invalidated Louisiana's plan. The first decision invalidated Louisiana Acts 1992, No. 42 ("Act 42"), which contained the notorious Z-shaped District 4 (the so-called "Zorro" district), which "[t]he State now concedes . . . was bizarre." *Hays II*, La. App. at 65 n.1.

The Louisiana Legislature responded by passing Act 1 guided by the Justice Department's threatened denial of preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The district court invalidated that districting plan, and the United States and Louisiana appealed. After noting probable jurisdiction and hearing argument, this Court held that the plaintiffs challenging Act 1 lacked standing because they did not live in District 4. *United States v. Hays*, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).

On remand, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add new plaintiffs who resided in District 4 as well as new allegations about District 5, where the original plaintiffs live. Plaintiffs also filed a new and identical action, which was consolidated with the original action. *Hays III*, La. App. at 8. The trial court allowed the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, Congressman Cleo Fields, and several residents of District 4 of Act 1 to intervene as defendants (collectively the "permissive intervenors"). The court held another trial on October 30 and 31, 1995, allowing live testimony and witness declarations from all parties. The court's judgment striking down Act 1 and imposing a court-devised plan was entered on January 5, 1996. *Id.* at 39.

A. The Demise of Act 42 and the Zorro District

In May 1992, "a legislative alliance between the Black and the Republican Caucuses" implemented a race-based approach to redistricting in response to Louisiana's loss of one

seat in the United States House of Representatives. *Hays I*, La. App. at 144 n.54. The result was Act 42 and its 65% black "Zorro" district, which spanned a distance of almost 600 miles. *Id.* at 131. The alliance of forces responsible for Act 42 never denied the controlling role of race; to the contrary, they championed race as the primary *justification* for Act 42. *Id.*

Four residents of Lincoln Parish filed suit to enjoin Act 42 in June, 1992. A three-judge panel convened to hear the case. The court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in August 1992. *Id.* The court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and allowed the 1992 congressional elections to proceed as planned under Act 42—including the "Zorro" District. *Id.* at 108-09. The district court then took plaintiffs' case on the merits under advisement until this Court rendered its judgment in *Shaw*, whereupon the court conducted a second two-day hearing in August 1993.

On December 28, 1993, the court struck down Act 42. *Id.* at 105. In so doing, the court rejected the argument that Section 5 of the VRA required a second majority-black district: "because Louisiana lost a seat in the United States House of Representatives, a plan with one black majority district would satisfy the Section 5 non-retrogression requirement given no more dramatic shift in the statewide ratio of white-to-black voters than is demonstrated by a comparison of the 1980 and 1990 census figures." *Id.* at 150 n.64.

B. Act 1 Replaces Act 42

While the invalidation of Act 42 was on appeal to this Court, the State convened a special legislative session to prepare a new redistricting plan. Notwithstanding the trial court's earlier admonitions, many legislators "remain[ed] convinced that the Department of Justice would not pre-clear any plan that did not contain two majority/minority districts"—a belief DOJ "encouraged, if not demanded." *Hays II,* La. App. at 69 n.3.

The tacit alliance between the proponents of Act 42 and the Justice Department was very much in evidence during the 1994 special legislative session. On April 20, 1994, with the two chambers of the Louisiana Legislature deadlocked over a new plan, Justice Department officials chose to intervene—albeit indirectly—through a letter of questionable authority to counsel for the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus. That letter, signed by the Honorable Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, set forth an interpretation of VRA Section 5 and closed by opining that "it remains reasonable to conclude that the Voting Rights Act requires the state to devise a congressional redistricting plan with two black-majority districts." PX 21.[1]

Immediately upon circulation of the Patrick letter, the Louisiana House reversed its prior course and passed a previously-defeated bill creating two majority-minority districts. PX 52 at 1-3. On April 22, the Senate approved the House-passed bill (which modified slightly the Senate's original bill) despite an attempted filibuster. PX 53 at 3-4.

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[1] Plaintiffs learned during discovery that the Patrick letter was the result of a concerted effort between the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus and the Department of Justice designed to influence the Louisiana Legislature in a manner analogous to the improper Justice Department contacts exposed in *Johnson v. Miller*, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), *aff'd*, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). On April 8, 1994, DOJ official Steve Rosenbaum conferred with counsel to the Black Caucus. Rosenbaum's notes of the conversation state: "Black caucus to send a letter asking for views. Still need for DOJ to do something. How quickly be able to turn it around?" PX 19. On April 11, Rosenbaum conferred again with counsel to the Black Caucus, who told Rosenbaum that "their clients and they as counsel in litigation thought it would be useful for the Department *to state its views publicly* about the application of the Voting Rights Act to Congressional redistricting in Louisiana . . . ." Rosenbaum Dep. vol. I at 114 (emphasis added). On April 15, counsel for the Black Caucus sent the promised letter "asking for views," PX 20, which did not mention the earlier telephone calls. On April 20, Deval Patrick provided the requested advisory opinion to counsel for the Black Caucus. PX 21.

Shortly thereafter, Governor Edwin W. Edwards signed Act 1 into law.

C. The Court's 1994 Decision Striking Down Act 1

After the State repealed Act 42 and enacted Act 1, this Court remanded to the trial court for consideration of Act 1. *Louisiana v. Hays*, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994). On July 6, 1994, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging Act 1.

The district court ordered yet another two-day trial. The record at trial reinforced the inference of intentional racial classification arising from the "bizarre and irregular shape of District Four . . . [which] cuts across historical and cultural divides, splits twelve of its fifteen parishes and divides four of the seven major cities of the State." *Hays II*, La. App. at 65. *See also*, *Hays I*, La. App. at 131-32. Moreover, "[t]he Senators themselves admitted that race played a large if not dominant role in the map as it is now drawn," the court explained, and "[t]hose persons involved directly with the formation of Act 1 acknowledged that the creation of a second majority-minority district was the specific intent of the Legislature." *Hays II*, La. App. at 65.

The State put forward two race-neutral explanations for its plan: (1) a geographer "testified that District 4 was drawn along the Red River Valley demonstrating a commonality of interest," and (2) witnesses claimed "that District 4 of the plan was modeled after the old eighth district in Louisiana . . . .." *Id.* at 78. The court dismissed these explanations, finding that "[t]he Red River valley theory is clearly a *post hoc* rationalization similar to the Mississippi River theory offered to support Act 42 and equally unbelievable." Similarly, the court found that "[t]he State's purported reliance on District Four's similarity to the 'old Eighth' is mere pretext." *Id.* at 66-67. The court accordingly applied strict scrutiny.

As compelling interests, the State "contend[ed] that [1] incumbency politics, [2] the Voting Rights Act, and [3]

remedying past legal and social or continuing social discrimination justified the racial segregation of voters." *Id.* at 68. The court acknowledged that "[a]dhering to federal anti-discrimination laws and remedying past or continuing discrimination could constitute compelling governmental interests—*if* the State could 'demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'" *Id.* (quoting *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court found that Louisiana had presented no such basis in evidence. *Id.* at 67-69.

The court rejected the State's Section 2 defense because under *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), "[t]he evidence convincingly proves that the State cannot clear the first *Gingles* hurdle"—compactness. *Hays II*, La. App. at 70. Specifically, "[d]espite a minority population of approximately 30%, demographic distribution is simply too diffuse . . . to generate a majority voting age population in any district outside of the Orleans Parish region." *Id.* at 70 n.4.

Finally, the court dismissed Louisiana's contention that Act 1 was otherwise necessary to remedy past or present discrimination. Acknowledging the "sordid history of unconstitutional treatment of black citizens in Louisiana" that remains "indelibly imprinted in our memories," *Id.* at 70-71, 80-82, the court nevertheless concluded that the State had failed to provide "concrete evidence of the lingering effects of past discrimination or continuing legal prejudice in voting laws and procedures, coupled with specific remedies." *Id.*

The court then formulated and implemented a redistricting plan for Louisiana. The United States and Louisiana appealed. This Court found that because the four plaintiffs did not reside in District 4, they lacked standing to challenge that district. *United States v. Hays*, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).

D. The Revived Challenge To Act 1

On remand, the plaintiffs responded to this Court's opinion by (1) amending the complaint to add (a) eight new plaintiffs who resided in District 4 and (b) allegations about the intent of the Louisiana Legislature with regard to District 5 of Act 1, where the original four plaintiffs reside; and (2) filing an identical original action on behalf of all twelve plaintiffs, which the trial court consolidated with plaintiffs' amended action.

The parties stipulated the admission of the record of prior proceedings, and undertook discovery. That discovery and the plaintiffs' presentation at a two-day trial on October 30 and 31, 1995, convinced the trial court that this case is factually "on all fours" with *Miller v. Johnson*, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). *Hays III*, La. App. at 12 n.33.

Consistent with *Miller*, the court found that "race was the predominant factor behind the Legislature's determination to draw a district map with two of seven districts being majority-minority" and that "race was the predominant factor driving the configuration of District 4." *Compare Hays III*, La. App. at 17 *with Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. The court based its findings on the evidence adduced during the entire litigation, including the plaintiffs' showings regarding "the shape of the district . . . 'in conjunction with its racial and population densities.'" *Hays III*, La. App. at 14. For example, the court credited plaintiffs' demonstration that "even down to the precinct level, the State considered only race in determining which pockets of voters to pull in and which pockets of voters to push out." *Id.* at 14; PX 14-2A; Weber Test., 10/30/95 Trial Tr. at 85-87.

Beyond this circumstantial evidence of racial gerrymandering, the court found direct evidence independently sufficient to subject Act 1 to strict scrutiny. *Hays III*, La. App. at 15. For example, "the cartographer charged with creating Act 1's districts readily admits that, in creating District 4, he concentrated virtually exclusively on racial demographics and

considered essentially no other factor except the ubiquitous constitutional 'one person-one-vote' requirement." *Id.*

The court further found that the Justice Department's role in Louisiana paralleled its role in Georgia, making the Louisiana Legislature "justifiably convinced that the United States Department of Justice would preclear no redistricting plan for Louisiana that failed to include a second majority-minority district." *Id.* The court pointed to the April 20, 1994 Deval Patrick letter (discussed above at 4) as the source of that belief. *Id.*; PX 21. In the court's view, "[t]he State's desire to comply with the Department's policy only reinforces the conclusion that the Legislature knowingly allowed race to become the predominant factor driving the enactment of Act 1." *Hays III*, La. App. at 16. The court concluded: "by demanding a maximization of majority-minority districts the Justice Department impermissibly encouraged—nay, mandated—racial gerrymandering." *Id.*

In rebuttal, the defense again offered three supposedly race-neutral justifications, each entirely inconsistent with the others: "(1) the boundaries were intended to coincide with the lines of Louisiana's 'Old Eighth' district; (2) the District as designed to follow the Red River; and (3) the District is actually majority-poor, rather than majority-black." *Id.* The court found the last two justifications to be "patently post-hoc rationalizations." *Id.* As for the "Old Eighth" justification, the court found it to be "equally spurious, albeit slightly less obvious." *Id.* The court determined that the old district "was used as a guise for amassing a large percentage of minority voters into one district, not as a means of following traditional district boundaries" *Id.* at 17. As a result, any examination of the Old Eighth merely "reinforces the conclusion that race motivated the design of District 4." *Id.* The court readopted its earlier finding in *Hays II* that the "Old Eighth" justification was "mere pretext." La. App. at 5 n.16.

As potentially compelling interests, the defense offered (1) compliance with the Voting Rights Act and (2) the

remediation of generalized past discrimination. Regarding the former, the court concluded that "federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws." *Id.* at 18 (quoting *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2490-91). Applying the factors in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the court again found that "the evidence convincingly proves that the State cannot clear the first *Gingles* hurdle"— compactness. *Hays III*, La. App. at 19. The black population outside of the majority-black District 2, the court concluded, "is so widely and evenly dispersed that, to create a congressional district that meets the one-person-one vote criterion and has even a simple majority black population, resort must be had to graphic design that constitutes racial Rorschach-ism." *Id.*

The court similarly rejected the claim that the evidence in the record of past discrimination against African Americans could constitute a compelling interest justifying the segregation of Louisiana voters. The court acknowledged that there is "a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination." *Id.* at 20 (quoting *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2490), but found that the defense failed to show "lingering effects of past discrimination in current voting laws and procedures. Neither have they provided *any credible evidence* that the Legislature considered this motivation when it adopted Act 1." *Hays III*, La. App. at 20 (emphasis added). The court thus concluded that "[g]eneralized societal 'remedying' of past discrimination can never meet the Supreme Court's requirement of particularized solutions for specifically identifiable vestiges of past discrimination." *Id.* (citing *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).

E. Post-Trial Proceedings and Legislative Ratification of the Court Plan

In striking down Act 1, the trial court found that the State had "persisted in defending the indefensible" and that there was "no basis for believing that, given yet another

chance, [Louisiana] would produce a constitutional plan." *Hays III*, La. App. at 23. At plaintiffs' request, the court accordingly revived the same plan it had imposed in the earlier challenge to Act 1.

Significantly, none of the defense parties ever asked for a hearing on the issue of remedy or challenged the Court's authority to implement a plan of its own design or, more specifically, the 1994 court-ordered plan sought by plaintiffs. Only *after* the court's decision—more than a month after judgment and three months after trial—did the defendants move for a stay, arguing for the first time, *inter alia*, that the court should have held a hearing on the issue of remedy. Not surprisingly, the district court ruled that any challenge to its remedy had been waived, along with the claim that the court-ordered plan violated the Voting Rights Act. *See* La. App. at 54-55. The appellants reiterated the same arguments in their pending applications for stay in this Court.

Later, Louisiana Governor Mike Foster put ratification of the court-ordered plan on the agenda of a special session of the Louisiana Legislature to be convened on March 19, 1996. Both houses of the Louisiana Legislature subsequently adopted the court plan, which became law as Act 96 on May 13, 1996. *See* Appendix A.

GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OR AFFIRMANCE

Appellants essentially ask this Court to issue an advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of Act 1, a plan that Louisiana has now repealed. Louisiana already has held two congressional elections with unconstitutional racially-gerrymandered districts. After *four* trials and *three* judicial opinions invalidating previous plans, the citizens of Louisiana, acting through their elected representatives, have chosen to settle this litigation. That settlement effort should not be thwarted by protracted litigation over a repealed plan. Accordingly, this Court should either dismiss these appeals or summarily affirm on the merits.

I. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE APPEALS

The constitutionality of Act 1 is of purely academic interest in light of the Louisiana Legislature's repeal of Act 1 and enactment of Act 96. Regardless of any decision by this Court on the constitutionality of Act 1, the districts imposed by the trial court will remain in effect. Were this Court to note probable jurisdiction, any resulting opinion therefore would be wholly advisory. Moreover, because "the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action," the State "voluntarily forfeited [its] legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal . . . thereby surrendering [its] claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur." *U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership*, 115 S. Ct. 386, 391-92 (1994). The Court therefore should dismiss the appeals and leave in place the judgment below.

A. Act 96 Renders The Appeals Moot

Act 96, which simultaneously repeals Act 1 and enacts "the congressional redistricting plan contained in Ray Hays, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al." in its place, became law on May 13, 1996. *See* Appendix A. Act 96 therefore provides the relief plaintiffs have sought all along. In the complaint, the plaintiffs asked the Court to "[d]evise and implement a lawful, court-ordered congressional districting plan." Complaint, Prayer for Relief ¶ 5. At trial, the plaintiffs asked the Court more specifically to implement "the very same plan that it did once before." 10/31/95 Trial Tr. at 293. *See also* Plaintiffs' Post Trial Br. at 1 ("Accordingly, this Court should again strike down Act 1 and place in its stead the constitutional plan as adopted by the Court in 1994"). By remedying its earlier unconstitutional action and complying with plaintiffs' repeated requests, the State mooted these appeals. *See Commissioner v. Shapiro*, 424 U.S. 614, 623 n.7 (1976) (challenge to timeliness of service of notice of deficiency mooted by timely service of new notice of deficiency).

In *Crowell v. Mader*, 444 U.S. 505 (1980), this Court was presented with the same situation. The district court there

had invalidated a redistricting plan in Tennessee, and had enjoined the State "from conducting any elections pursuant to that plan." *Id.* at 505. After the State appealed, the appellees informed the Court that the State had enacted a new plan; the appellees further argued that the new plan mooted the State's appeal from the injunction against the old plan. This Court agreed, and dismissed the appeals. *Id.* at 506. The same disposition of the appeals should hold here.

It does not matter for present purposes that Louisiana is a covered jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act. The court-ordered plan, of course, is not subject to Section 5 because it is "perfectly clear" that "the Act's preclearance requirement does not apply to plans prepared and adopted by a federal court to remedy a constitutional violation." *McDaniel v. Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 138 (1981); *Connor v. Johnson*, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971) ("a decree of the United States District Court is not within the reach of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act."). As of January 5, 1996, therefore, the only enforceable congressional districting plan in Louisiana was the court-ordered plan. *Hays III*, La. App. at 40.

Accordingly, contrary to the permissive intervenors' suggestion, *see* Reply in Further Support of Applications for Stay at 2, filed April 29, 1996, Act 96 is not subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5. Even if Act 96 were simply a legislatively-devised plan rather than a judicial plan, preclearance would not be necessary because Act 96 does not constitute a *change* in voting procedures from the appropriate baseline. Simply put, Act 96 is no different from the enforceable court-ordered plan that was in effect immediately before it became law. Although this Court has interpreted Section 5 broadly to apply to "any state enactment which alter[s] the election law of a covered State *in even a minor way*," *Allen v. Board of Elections*, 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1969) (emphasis added), nothing in the Voting Rights Act or this Court's decisions requires Section 5 procedures for state action that indisputably does *not* change currently effective voting

procedures *at all*. Surely the Voting Rights Act does not prevent a State from enforcing the voting procedures it has been *ordered* to follow by a three-judge federal court as a remedy for a constitutional violation.

This conclusion comports with the purposes of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 was designed to prevent covered States from keeping one step ahead of the law by "enacting new and slightly different requirements with the same discriminatory effect" once old laws were stricken down. *Allen*, 393 U.S. at 548. There is no such concern here. The plan now in place does not require preclearance because it was devised and implemented by three federal judges intimately familiar with Louisiana's culture and history as a remedy for a constitutional violation. *Cf. McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 138 (court-imposed plan that was devised and submitted to court by legislature is subject to Section 5 procedures). The court below ensured that the plan would not be retrogressive, *see Beer v. United States*, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); moreover, the court surely did not harbor any unconstitutionally discriminatory intent against minority voters. The legislature's decision to implement the court's plan perforce is not motivated by an intent to discriminate against minority voters, but instead by an intent to settle the litigation and remedy an earlier constitutional violation by the State. The State has not thereby thwarted Section 5, but instead has put itself in the same position as if it had chosen not to appeal.

In summary, Act 96 moots the appeals because this Court can no longer provide meaningful relief to the appellants. Even if this Court were to reverse the court-ordered plan as appellants request, Act 96—the same plan—would remain federally-enforceable state law. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss these appeals. *See United States v. Evans*, 213 U.S. 297 (1909) (statute cannot allow federal court to consider appeal by government from judgments of acquittal because appellate court cannot undo a ruling of acquittal).

B. This Court Should Not Vacate The Judgment Below

Appellees request that the Court not vacate the judgment below. Vacatur of the lower court's judgment is not granted as a matter of course when this Court dismisses an appeal as moot. *See, e.g.*, *Voltaggio v. Caputo*, 371 U.S. 232 (1963); *Matthews v. Little*, 397 U.S. 94 (1970); *Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n, Inc. v. Postmaster General*, 488 U.S. 998 (1989). A party seeking review who is "frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance" need not "be forced to acquiesce in the judgment"; but when a losing party to the litigation voluntarily moots the case, the circumstances do not justify the equitable remedy of vacatur. *U.S. Bancorp*, 115 S. Ct. at 393. The State therefore is much in the same position as if it had foregone the right to appeal altogether, or had withdrawn the appeal after filing its notice of appeal and jurisdictional statement. *See Karcher v. May*, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987).[2]

In any event, even if this Court were to vacate, it should not order that the entire case be dismissed. Where other issues such as calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee remain to be determined, vacatur is "without prejudice to such further proceedings in the District Court as may be appropriate." *Crowell*, 444 U.S. at 506. *See also Maher v. Gagne*, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (party who prevails through settlement entitled to fees under § 1988).

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[2] The Louisiana Attorney General's office apparently believes that Act 96 requires preclearance. *See New Remap to Become Law*, New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 14, 1996, at A10. Were this Court to vacate the judgment below without clearly stating that preclearance is not required, further litigation might result if the Louisiana Attorney General follows such a course and DOJ (a losing party in this litigation) denies preclearance pursuant to its "maximization policy" in an attempt again to force Act 1 on the citizens of Louisiana.

II. THE COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR WHEN IT SUBJECTED ACT 1 TO STRICT SCRUTINY

If this Court reaches the merits, it should summarily affirm the judgment below. The district court applied the proper legal standard and found that "the plaintiffs have decisively established that race was the predominant factor" behind the districts of Act 1. *Hays III*, La. App. at 17. The court further concluded that Act 1 was unsupported by any compelling interest. Under *Miller*, the findings below are amply supported.[3] Although the appellants claim that the drafters of Act 1 employed "a judicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistricting," U.S. J.S. at 13, the court did not clearly err in holding otherwise.

A. The Trial Court's Finding That "Race Was The Predominant Factor" Driving Act 1 Is Not Clearly Erroneous

Contrary to the State's assertions, the court below did not hold that "any intentional creation of a majority-black election district renders a state's congressional redistricting plan constitutionally suspect." La. J.S. at 8. Nor is the court's holding merely a "rephras[ing]" of its earlier opinion. Intervenor J.S. at 13. Instead, the court's judgment was grounded firmly in *Miller* and record evidence that the State harbored an unconstitutional discriminatory intent. The trial court therefore properly held that the legislature "subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles—such as compactness, respect for commonality of interests, and respect

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[3] The intervenors' challenge to plaintiffs' standing, which occupies only a sentence of their brief, Intervenor J.S. at 27, deserves only a brief mention here. It is undisputed that eight of the plaintiffs live in District 4, the primary focus of this challenge to Act 1. *Hays III*, La. App. at 10. Moreover, after remand, plaintiffs added allegations to the complaint and produced evidence of the legislature's race-based intent with regard to District 5, where the original four plaintiffs live. Therefore, "[a]s residents of [the challenged districts], all appellees had standing." *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.

for political subdivisions—to enact a plan containing a second majority-minority district" *Compare Hays III*, La. App. at 13 *with Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. That factual finding must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. *Hernandez v. New York*, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); *Rogers v. Lodge*, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).

1. Circumstantial evidence of racial intent

The court's finding is amply supported by circumstantial evidence that the legislature subordinated all traditional districting principles to racial considerations. In each instance, the evidence showed (1) a substantial disregard for traditional districting principles, *see Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor concurring); and (2) subordination of those principles to racial considerations, *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.

Compactness: The plaintiffs presented evidence that District 4 of Act 1 is the least geographically compact district in the history of Louisiana. Their expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, presented two statistical measures of geographic compactness—the dispersion score and the Max Aspect score. On the dispersion score, District 4 of Act 1 was less compact than any district in Louisiana history with the exception of the predecessor of a New Orleans district ultimately invalidated under the Voting Rights Act as a racial gerrymander. PX 14-8A-G; *Major v. Treen*, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983). The Max Aspect score showed Act 1's District 4 to be the least compact district in Louisiana history. This departure from Louisiana's past practice was explained by the legislature's desire to connect the black neighborhoods of the four major cities outside New Orleans in a single district. The legislature could not have created a second black-majority district otherwise since nearly 58% of the black citizens (53% of the black registered voters) in District 4 resided in these four cities.

And the mapmaker of Act 1 admitted that the purpose of going to each of these cities was to "capture" a "dense black population." Koepp Dep. at 76, 88, 90.

Respect for political subdivisions: Plaintiffs showed, among other things, that Act 1's District 4 divided twelve of its fifteen parishes—the most "fundamental unit[s] of societal organization in the history of Louisiana. . . .." *Hays I,* La. App. at 132. District 4's twelve split parishes constituted: (1) *three times* more split parishes (previous maximum—four) than any single previous congressional district; *see* PX 3; 1994 USX 8 at Table 1; and (2) almost *twice* as many split parishes (previous maximum—seven) as any *entire congressional districting plan* in Louisiana history. Similarly, Act 1 split *seventeen* cities and towns—*fourteen* strung along District 4's borders. District 4 alone splits four major cities (Shreveport, Alexandria, Lafayette and Baton Rouge), three of which never have been split in Louisiana history.

If further proof were needed, the evidence revealed that the legislature *consistently* divided parishes by placing most *black* registered voters (more than 82% of blacks in split parishes) in District 4, while placing most *white* voters (nearly 77% of whites in split parishes) in the neighboring predominantly white Districts (3, 5, 6, and 7). Likewise, in each split city, areas with large *black* majorities (73% to 80%) were placed into District 4 while areas with even larger *white* majorities (83% to 88%) were placed into in Districts 5, 6 and 7. *See* PX 4.

Shared communities of interest: Plaintiffs' expert opined that "District 4 in Act 1 contains a broad array of agricultural, economic, cultural, and other interests and . . . cannot be explained as an attempt to bring together persons sharing common interests other than race." PX 14 at 6. The district court agreed, and further concluded that the result of this artificial joining of diverse interests was due to racial considerations. *Hays III*, La. App. at 13. As in *Miller*, "there are no tangible 'communities of interest' spanning the hundreds of miles" of District 4. 115 S. Ct. at 2490. Although the United States may disagree and argue that there was

evidence that "District 4 was designed to combine persons with common interests," U.S. J.S. at 14, that disagreement does not make the court's findings clearly erroneous. *See Anderson v. Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.").

2. Direct evidence of racial intent

The plaintiffs also presented direct evidence of racial purpose. The court found that Glenn Koepp, the mapmaker of Act 1 "readily admits that, in creating District 4, he concentrated virtually exclusively on racial demographics and considered essentially no other factor . . . .." *Hays III*, La. App. at 15. Koepp testified that he used computer software called "Plan Builder" that kept running tallies of demographic statistics. Koepp Dep. at 21. Koepp testified that he used only racial information in devising the tortuous boundaries of Act 1:

Q: [W]hat were the windows that were up while you were drawing the districts in Act 1?

A: The one we talked about earlier with the data on it.

Q: So total population by race, —

A: Yeah.

Q: — voting age population by race, —

A: Yes.

Q: — and the voter registration by data by race?

A: Right, right.

Q: Was there anything on your screen about compactness?

A: No.

Q: Was there anything on your screen about contiguity?

A: I did not turn contiguity on, but there is— there was the option of turning it on.

Q: Okay. Was there any socio-economic data on the computer?

A: No.

Q: Was there any list of the number of parishes that were split?

A: No.

Q: Or municipalities?

A: No.

Q: But there was the one man-one vote up on the screen?

A: [A]bsolutely.

Q: Is there any capability of the program to measure communities of interest?

A: No.

Koepp Dep. at 78-79; *see also id.* at 31-32, 39-40. Although the appellants would interpret Koepp's testimony differently, U.S. J.S. at 15, La. J.S. at 10-12, their disagreement does not make the district court's findings clearly erroneous.

The role that race played was, of course, foreordained by the Justice Department's involvement. Thus, legislators who participated in the debate over Act 1 believed that a second majority-minority district outside of New Orleans was required by DOJ's "policy of maximizing majority-black districts." *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2492. Although Louisiana had not been denied preclearance for a congressional plan with only one majority-black district, the Deval Patrick letter, which broke the log-jam in the Louisiana House, loudly proclaimed DOJ's maximization policy. It therefore became clear to the legislature that "the Justice Department wanted two minority districts regardless." Adley Test., 10/30/95 Trial Tr. at 21. The

State did not contest this; to the contrary, one of its own legislative witnesses testified in writing to his belief at the time that a plan with fewer than two majority-black districts would not "receive preclearance by the United States Justice Department." 1994 SX 16 ¶ 6.

B. The Court Below Properly Rejected The State's Pretextual Race-Neutral Justifications

The trial court properly allowed the defense a full opportunity to present race-neutral explanations for Act 1. *See Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2488 ("Where . . . race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a state can 'defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.'"). Two of these race-neutral explanations—that District 4 purposely followed the Red River and that District 4 was designed as a poor district rather than a black district—were summarily rejected because there was no evidence that the legislature actually was motivated by these considerations. Indeed, the defense never presented its "socio-economic" argument in earlier proceedings on Act 1, and there was no evidence that District 4's boundaries were guided by a desire to group persons with economic similarities, or that the mapmaker even had access to such information. The appellants apparently now have abandoned the "Red River" justification, presumably because the mapmaker of Act 1 conceded that he did not intend to draw District 4 along the Red River. Koepp Dep. at 85-86.

The only remaining supposedly race-neutral justification advanced by the State is that District 4 is similar to the Old Eighth district under past districting plans. But the state's own evidence showed that the mapmaker "was asked to look at the old Eighth District" precisely because it was "the highest minority population district in the state other than the minority district number two." 7/21/94 Trial Tr. vol. 2 at 11. From that point on, parishes and parish parts were added or subtracted, always with the apparent aim of racial segregation.

The end result departed dramatically from any of the many versions of the "old Eighth." No previous configuration of the "old Eighth" ever split more than four parishes; District 4 split twelve. *See* PX 3. Likewise, no version of the "old Eighth" ever included fewer than twelve *full* parishes; District 4 included only three. *Id.*

Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, buttressed the Court's earlier findings with his testimony in the latest trial. His analysis showed that District 4 of Act 1 is more similar to the Zorro District than it is to any of the prior configurations of the Old Eighth. After comparing the overlap of population between the Old Eighth and District 4, Dr. Weber testified that "even though it might look on the map like there was some commonality between district, old District 8 and new District 4 in Act 1, the population analysis does not reveal that." 10/30/95 Trial Tr. at 107. Weber concluded that District 4 includes no more than 37.7% of the population of any prior version of the Old Eighth, *id.* at 108, with the population overlap in one case being as low as 18%. PX 14-10A. In contrast, a remarkable 54% of District 4's population came from the Zorro District, which was anchored by the black neighborhoods in the same four major cities split by District 4 of Act 1. PX 14-10B.

In sum, the court properly found that the "Old Eighth" justification was "mere pretext." *Hays II*, La. App. at 67. Based on the evidence before it, then, the court had little choice but to find that race was the "predominant factor" driving Act 1. That finding is not clearly erroneous, and should be upheld by this Court.

III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING THE STATE'S PURPORTED COMPELLING INTERESTS

Applying strict scrutiny, the court properly recognized that Act 1 could be upheld only if "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest." *Hays III*, La. App. at 17. The defendants argued that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as well as amorphous claims of past discrimination, could serve as compelling interests in support of Act 1. The court properly held that neither of these purported interests could justify Act 1.

A. The Voting Rights Act Did Not Compel The Race-Based Districting of Act 1

The Voting Rights Act can provide a justification Act 1's race-based districting only if Act 1 is "reasonably *necessary* under a constitutional reading and application" of the Voting Rights Act. *Miller*, 115 S. Ct. at 2491 (emphasis added). Under the familiar standard of *Gingles*, a Section 2 plaintiff must show that (1) minority voters tend to vote as a bloc; (2) the majority consistently votes as a bloc to defeat candidates preferred by the minority; and (3) there is a geographically compact minority population sufficient to constitute a majority in a single district. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51.

The district court properly concluded that the Voting Rights Act did not compel the creation of a district that is geographically less compact than any other district in Louisiana history. *See supra* at 16. Although the appellants attempt to argue that the district court failed to measure the compactness of District 4 against other Louisiana districts, U.S. J.S. at 16-17, Intervenor J.S. at 21, La. J.S. at 18, the district court actually made just that comparison. *Hays III*, La. App. at 14. To counter plaintiffs' statistical proof, the defense relied on nothing but the self-serving testimony of the mapmaker of Act 1 to the effect that District 4 is compact because

"compactness is in the eye of the beholder." Koepp Test., 7/22/94 Trial Tr. at 90.

"Compactness" under *Gingles*, however, is a question of fact, *Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. Westwego*, 906 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1990), and the district court did not clearly err by accepting (1) the statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs showing that District 4 is not geographically compact by Louisiana standards, *see supra* at 16; (2) evidence showing that District 4 could amass a majority black population only by joining the black neighborhoods of four major cities scattered across the State, PX 14;[4] and (3) the defense's own expert, who presented evidence that District 4 spans a greater distance than any other district in Louisiana history. 1994 USX 8 at Table 1. Because Section 2 does not clearly compel creation of such a district, the trial court properly rejected any contrary interpretation and its attendant constitutional problems. *Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988).[5]

B. Amorphous Claims of Past Discrimination Cannot Justify Act 1

Appellants claim that "Louisiana in this case had a compelling interest in ameliorating the effects of racial bloc voting attributable to past and present governmental and private discrimination." U.S. J.S. at 17, Intervenor J.S. at 24-25, La. J.S. at 19-21. But a State cannot insulate

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[4] On similar facts, the district court in *Johnson v. Miller*, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1389, *aff'd*, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), found that "[t]he populations of the Eleventh are centered around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that have absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch the district hundreds of miles across rural counties . . . ." There, as here, "DOJ's insistence that they are 'compact' renders the term meaningless." *Id.*

[5] Although the district court did not reach the other *Gingles* factors, plaintiffs introduced evidence of remarkable success for black-preferred candidates in senatorial, gubernatorial, and congressional elections in the years preceding trial. PX 14-4Q-T, 14-4W, 14-6.

discriminatory action from review simply "by conceding that [it] discriminated in the past, now that it is in [its] interest to make such a concession." *Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.*, 476 U.S. 267, 278 n.5 (1986) (plurality opinion). And as for racially-polarized voting, not only was there no finding below, but there was no reason to reach the issue in light of the court's dispositive finding that Act 1 failed *Gingles'* first precondition. Nor was there proof that any racially-polarized voting was "*attributable to* past and present governmental and private discrimination," U.S. J.S. at 17, or that gerrymandered districts would cure such polarization.

The district court therefore properly recognized the lack of any "concrete evidence of the lingering effects of past discrimination in voting laws and procedures." *Hays III*, La. App. at 20. Moreover, the court found that there was no credible evidence that the legislature was actually motivated by this desire when it passed Act 1. As in *Miller*, "there is little doubt that the State's true interest in designing the [] District" was not remedying past discrimination but instead was "creating a [] majority-black district to satisfy the Justice Department's preclearance demands." 115 S. Ct. at 2490.

Appellants seize upon an apparently approving reference in a plurality opinion to the "fair allocation of political power between white and nonwhite voters." *United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (plurality opinion). Subsequent decisions, however, have condemned racial *group* remedies under the Voting Rights Act except where a minority is "essentially . . . shut out of the political process." *Davis* v. *Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor concurring). And far from creating remedies beyond the Act, recent decisions hold that a Section 2 claim may not exist even where all three *Gingles* criteria are satisfied. *Johnson v. DeGrandy,* 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2663 (1994); *Nipper v. Smith*, 39 F.3d 1494, 1512 (11th Cir. 1994) *(en banc), cert. denied*, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). By contrast,

appellants' expansive additional remedy would make *Gingles'* requirements superfluous.

In sum, the district court properly found that Act 1 could not survive strict scrutiny. Because racial classifications deserve "the most searching judicial inquiry," *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena*, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995), the court properly held that the evidence here did not make out a compelling state interest justifying Act 1.

IV. THE COURT'S REMEDIAL PLAN WAS PROPER

The permissive intervenors alone argue that "the district court exceeded its authority in imposing a permanent remedial plan that departs from State policy and violates the Voting Rights Act." Intervenor J.S. at 27-29. They further argue that the court should not have imposed the remedy "without providing the Louisiana Legislature an opportunity to redraw the districts." *Id.* at 27.[6] This Court should reject these arguments because none of them was raised or passed on below, La. App. at 54-55, and because the United States and the State have not raised these arguments even here. This case therefore is entirely unsuitable for this Court's review either along with or after decision in *Abrams v. Johnson*, Nos. 95-1425 and 95-1460, *probable jurisdiction noted*, __ S. Ct. __ (May 20, 1996).

Nor do any of these arguments have merit, assuming they were not waived. The court plan is fully consistent with Louisiana policy, as evidenced by the speedy passage of Act 96. Moreover, any suggestion that the court plan actually violates the Voting Rights Act requires more careful analysis than a calculation of the percentage of majority-black districts, Intervenor J.S. at 29, U.S. J.S. at 17, 18, especially when the

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[6] The United States and Louisiana apparently have abandoned on appeal any argument about the propriety of the remedy implemented by the district court. The United States claims only in a passing reference that the court plan allegedly violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. U.S. J.S. at 17 n.2.

court below found (based on expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs) that "our plan, with its one black majority and three influence districts, empowers more black voters statewide than does Act 1's plan." *Hays III*, La. App. at 6 n.17.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeals should be dismissed as moot. In the alternative, the judgment below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
Act 96 [EXCERPTED]

First Extraordinary Session, 1996

HOUSE BILL NO. 49

BY REPRESENTATIVES BRUNEAU, MCCALLUM, LANCASTER, SCALISE, AND WALSWORTH AND SENATORS GREENE, DARDENNE, AND HOLLIS

AN ACT

To enact R.S. 18:1276.1 and to repeal R.S. 18:1276, to adopt the congressional redistricting plan contained in Ray Hays, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al.; to provide for the redistricting of the seven congressional districts according to the congressional redistricting plan contained in Ray Hays, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al.; to provide for the terms of members of congress currently serving; to provide for filling certain vacancies; to provide for effective dates; and to provide for related matters.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1. The Legislature of Louisiana adopts as its own the congressional redistricting plan for the state of Louisiana ordered by the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division in the case of Ray Hays, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al., Nos. 92-1522 and 95-1241.

Section 2. R.S. 1:1276.1 is hereby enacted to read as follows:

§1276.1. Congressional districts

* * * * *

Section 3. R.S. 18:1276 is hereby repealed in its entirety.

Section 4. This Act shall become effective upon signature by the governor or, if not signed by the governor, upon expiration of the time for bills to become law without signature by the governor, as provided in Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Louisiana. If vetoed by the governor and subsequently approved by the legislature, this Act shall become effective on the day following such approval.

/s/

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

/s/

PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPROVED: _____

This bill having been submitted to the Governor and no action having been taken within the time provided by the Constitution, said bill becomes law without his approval.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 11 1996
CLERK

(4) (3) (3)

Nos. 95-1681, 95-1682 and 95-1710

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

RAY HAYS, ET AL.

LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

RAY HAYS, ET AL.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT

v.

RAY HAYS, ET AL.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

DREW S. DAYS, III
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Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

No. 95-1681

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

RAY HAYS, ET AL.

No. 95-1682

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RAY HAYS, ET AL.

No. 95-1710

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RAY HAYS, ET AL.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

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1. Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 11-13) that the appeals in this case are moot because Louisiana has recently enacted legislation (Act 96) that repeals Act

1 and adopts the district court's remedial redistricting plan. Act 96, however, has not been precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Unless and until it is precleared, Act 96 is not effective as law. *Clark* v. *Roemer*, 500 U.S. 646, 652-653 (1991). As the Court explained in *Clark*:

> Section 5 requires States to obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance before implementing a voting change. A voting change in a covered jurisdiction "will not be effective as la[w] until and unless cleared" pursuant to one of these two methods.

Ibid. Because Act 96 is not effective as law, it cannot affect the viability of the present appeals.

Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 12) that Act 96 is not subject to Section 5 preclearance because it does not constitute a "change" in the State's voting practices. As the text of Section 5 makes clear, however, an unprecleared voting practice is a "change" subject to preclearance when the practice is "different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964." 42 U.S.C. 1973c. See 28 C.F.R. 51.2. Since Act 96's redistricting plan is different from the redistricting plan that was in effect on November 1, 1964, Act 96 must be precleared under Section 5.

Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 12-13) that preclearance may be avoided because court-ordered plans are not subject to preclearance under Section 5 and Act 96 adopts a court-ordered plan. That contention is incorrect. Under this Court's decision in *McDaniel* v. *Sanchez*, 452 U.S. 130, 153 (1981), the preclearance requirement applies whenever a redistricting plan "reflect[s] the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people—no matter what

constraints have limited the choices available to them." Act 96 clearly reflects the policy choices of Louisiana's elected representatives. It is therefore subject to the preclearance requirement under *McDaniel*, even though the same redistricting plan was not subject to preclearance when the district court ordered it into effect.

The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 extension of Section 5, which was cited by the Court in *McDaniel*, 452 U.S. at 148-149, leaves no doubt that Congress intended to require preclearance of legislation that adopts a court-ordered plan. It states that:

> The one exception where Section 5 review would not ordinarily be available is where the court, because of exigent circumstances, actually fashions the plan itself instead of relying on a plan presented by a litigant. This is the limited meaning of the "court decree" exception recognized in *Connor* v. *Johnson*, 402 U.S. 690 (1971). Even in these cases, however, if the governmental body subsequently adopts a plan patterned after the court's plan, Section 5 review would be required.

S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1975) (citation omitted).

Because Act 96 has not been precleared and is not legally effective, the appeals from the district court's judgment invalidating Act 1 are not moot. For purposes of deciding whether an appeal is moot, the relevant inquiry is whether the Court can grant effective relief. *Church of Scientology of California* v. *United States*, 506 U.S. 9, 12-14 (1992). Effective relief can be granted here. If the Court reverses the district court judgment, Act 1 would become the State's legally effective redistricting plan and future elections would

be held in accordance with that plan. The appeals in this case are therefore not moot.*

2. As we argue in our Jurisdictional Statement, in holding that District 4 in Act 1 is unconstitutional, the district court failed to give sufficient weight to Louisiana's traditional redistricting practices. In particular, the district court failed to evaluate the constitutionality of District 4 in light of the similarity of that district to old District 8. That legal error infected both the court's determination that strict scrutiny was applicable and its determination that District 4 does not satisfy the compactness requirement set forth in *Thornburg* v. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See J.S. 13-14, 16-17. The district court also made several clearly erroneous findings concerning the role that race played in the redistricting process. J.S. 14-16. Those legal and factual errors warrant this Court's plenary review.

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* If the Court were to conclude that the appeals are moot, the correct course would be to vacate the district court's judgment. *Department of Treasury* v. *Galioto*, 477 U.S. 556 (1986); *United States* v. *Munsingwear, Inc.*, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). Otherwise, parties in future litigation would be free to argue that the United States and defendant-intervenors are bound by determinations made by the district court in this case. The United States and the defendant-intervenors "ought not in fairness" be subject to such consequences. *U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.* v. *Bonner Mall Partnership*, 115 S. Ct. 386, 391 (1994). In arguing that a determination of mootness should not lead to vacation of the judgment below, appellees rely (Mot. to Dis. 14) on the Court's holding in *U.S. Bancorp*, 115 S. Ct. at 393, that a party who voluntarily moots an appeal is not entitled to the equitable remedy of vacatur. That holding may be applicable to the State of Louisiana; it has no application to either the United States or the defendant-intervenors.

Appellees nonetheless argue that, if the Court reaches the merits, it should summarily affirm the district court's judgment. Mot to Dis. 15-25. Our Jurisdictional Statement addresses most of the arguments made by appellees in support of the judgment below. We limit our response here to the arguments made by appellees that we have not previously addressed.

a. Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 16, 23) that Ronald Weber's testimony on mathematical measures of compactness supports the district court's finding that District 4 is not geographically compact. The Constitution, however, does not require a State to construct its districts in accordance with mathematical models of compactness. See *Shaw* v. *Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). The relevant inquiry is whether the State concluded in "good faith" that District 4 was reasonably compact when compared with old District 8. *Miller* v. *Johnson*, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995). Since District 4 is only ten miles longer than one version of old District 8, and is similar in appearance to various versions of it, the State acted in good faith when it concluded that District 4 is reasonably compact.

In any event, appellees have not fairly characterized Weber's testimony. Weber calculated three "mathematical" measures of compactness: a population test, a dispersion test, and a "max aspect" test. Weber Test., 10/30/95 p.m., Tr. 161. Weber testified that District 4 scored approximately as well or better on the population test as all five versions of old District 8 in place since 1970. *Id.* at 162-163. He testified that District 4 in Act 1 scored worse on the dispersion test than the 600 mile-long Z-shaped District 4 in Act 42. *Id.* at 103-104. That testimony

raises serious questions about the validity of the dispersion test as a measure of compactness. And Weber admitted that the max aspect test was unreliable. *Id.* at 161. Accordingly, to the extent that Weber's testimony is relevant, it reinforces the conclusion that the State acted in good faith when it determined that District 4 in Act 1 is reasonably compact when compared to old District 8.

b. Appellees also err in relying (Mot. to Dis. 21) on Weber's testimony that District 4 in Act 1 more closely resembles the 600 mile-long Z-shaped District 4 in Act 42 than old District 8. Weber focused exclusively on the overlap in population among the districts. *Ibid.* The State, in contrast, reasonably focused on the size, geographic location, and appearance of the districts as well. When assessed against all the relevant criteria, District 4 resembles old District 8 far more than the Z-shaped district.

c. Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 18-19) that Glenn Koepp testified that he used only racial information in constructing the boundaries of District 4. The testimony cited by appellees, however, shows only that Koepp's computer contained racial data, and that it did not contain certain other data, such as socioeconomic data. The testimony does not remotely suggest that Koepp used only racial data in constructing the districts. Indeed, in a passage in his testimony omitted by appellees, Koepp made clear that the computer program he was using allowed him to compare the district he was drawing with districts in other plans. Koepp Dep. at 79. Koepp also testified that he considered other factors in devising District 4, including compactness and contiguity. *Id.* at 45-46, 146-148; Koepp Test., 7/21/94 a.m., Tr. 13-14, 25. Appellees' assertion that Koepp testified that he relied

exclusively on race in drawing District 4 is therefore incorrect.

d. Appellees contend (Mot. to Dis. 19) that a letter written by the head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice to counsel for the defendant-intervenors "loudly proclaimed DOJ's maximization policy" and "foreordained" that race would predominate in the redistricting process. Appellees are mistaken. The letter cited by appellees responded to an inquiry by counsel for the defendant-intervenors concerning whether the decision in *Hays I* invalidating Act 42 had affected the views expressed by the Department of Justice in the *Hays I* litigation. In that litigation, the Department had argued that the State had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that the Voting Rights Act required the drawing of a second majority-black district. The letter made clear that the Department had not changed its view. It stated that:

> Evidence in the record [of the *Hays I* proceeding] demonstrates that the three preconditions under *Thornburg* v. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), are satisfied, giving Louisiana a strong basis for taking action to avoid a Section 2 violation. The plaintiffs' own plans, developed and presented at trial by Dr. Weber, demonstrate that the black population is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact such that two reasonably compact districts with black voting age population majorities can be drawn. In addition, there is uncontradicted evidence that voting is racially polarized in congressional elections, sufficient to satisfy the second and third *Gingles* preconditions.

PX 21, at 2. That discussion reflects a straightforward application of the standards set forth by this Court in *Gingles* for determining whether the preconditions for a Section 2 violation have been established. It is not evidence of a "maximization policy."

Appellees' assertion that the Department of Justice letter "foreordained" the State's policy choices is also unsupported by the record. Glenn Koepp devised his plan without having had any communication with the Department of Justice concerning that plan. Koepp Dep. at 134. The State Senate passed Koepp's plan, containing two majority-black districts, before the Department of Justice sent the letter to counsel for defendant-intervenors. And not a single state legislator testified that the letter affected his vote on Act 1.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those in our jurisdictional statement, the Court should note probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted.

DREW S. DAYS, III
Solicitor General

JUNE 1996